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La	  presente	  Tesis	  Doctoral	  analiza	  el	  riesgo	  bancario,	  la	  diversificación	  de	  ingresos	  y	  la	  
ética	  de	   las	   instituciones	   financieras	   en	   el	   contexto	  de	   la	   última	   crisis	   financiera	   y	   ha	  
sido	  estructurada	  en	  base	  a	  tres	  ensayos	  que	  guardan	  una	  conexión	  entre	  ellos.	  
El	  primer	  ensayo	  analiza	   los	  determinantes	  del	   riesgo	  en	   la	  banca.	  Se	  examinan	   tanto	  
variables	   específicas	   como	   macroeconómicas	   sobre	   una	   amplia	   muestra	   de	   bancos	  
comerciales	   de	   la	   zona	   euro.	   Las	  principales	   conclusiones	  que	   se	   obtienen	   son	  que	   la	  
capitalización,	   rentabilidad,	   eficiencia	   y	   liquidez	   se	   encuentran	   inversa	   y	  
significativamente	  relacionadas	  con	  el	  riesgo	  bancario,	  mientras	  que	  un	  incremento	  en	  
la	   financiación	   mayorista	   lo	   aumenta	   significativamente.	   Los	   resultados	   muestran	  
también	  que	  el	  riesgo	  bancario	  aumenta	  en	  economías	  con	  mercados	  más	  competitivos,	  
tipos	  de	  interés	  bajos	  y	  altas	  tasas	  de	  inflación,	  en	  un	  contexto	  de	  crisis	  económica.	  
El	  segundo	  ensayo	  estudia	  el	  efecto	  de	  la	  diversificación	  de	  los	  ingresos	  sobre	  el	  ratio	  de	  
morosidad,	  utilizando	  una	  muestra	  de	  cajas	  de	  ahorro,	  cooperativas	  de	  crédito	  y	  bancos	  
comerciales	  de	  la	  zona	  euro.	  Como	  proxy	  de	  la	  diversificación	  de	  ingresos	  se	  emplea	  un	  
índice	  Herfindahl–Hirschman	   index	   (HHIRD).	  Dicho	   índice	   incluye	   los	  diferentes	   tipos	  
de	  ingresos	  recogidos	  en	  los	  estados	  financieros	  de	  las	  entidades	  analizadas,	  tales	  como	  
los	   intereses,	   las	   comisiones	   netas,	   las	   operaciones	   de	   trading,	   y	   otros	   ingresos.	   Las	  
principal	   conclusión	   de	   este	   ensayo	   es	   que	   los	   bancos	   europeos	   pueden	   reducir	  
significativamente	  su	  tasa	  de	  morosidad	  incrementando	  su	  diversificación.	  Además,	  esta	  
relación	  es	  especialmente	  significativa	  en	  períodos	  de	  crisis,	  lo	  que	  sugiere	  que	  aquellos	  
bancos	   más	   diversificados	   en	   cuanto	   a	   las	   mencionadas	   fuentes	   de	   ingresos	   se	  
encuentran	  mejor	  preparados	  para	  afrontar	  situaciones	  macroeconómicas	  adversas.	  
Finalmente,	   el	   tercer	   ensayo	   estudia	   los	   factores	   relacionados	   con	   el	   gobierno	  
corporativo	   que	   pueden	   explicar	   la	   reputación	   ética	   (aproximada	   mediante	   el	   índice	  
EthicalQuote	  publicado	  por	  Covalence)	  sobre	  una	  muestra	  de	  las	  mayores	  instituciones	  
financieras	   a	   nivel	   internacional.	   En	   este	   tercer	   ensayo	   se	   concluye	   que	   aquéllas	  
instituciones	   financieras	   con	   consejos	   de	   administración	   que	   reflejan	   un	   control	  más	  
estricto	  cuentan	  con	  una	  mayor	  reputación	  ética.	  En	  concreto,	  el	  tamaño	  del	  consejo	  de	  
administración,	  la	  experiencia	  y	  la	  diversidad	  de	  género	  de	  sus	  miembros	  se	  encuentran	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positiva	   y	   significativamente	   ligadas	   a	   la	   reputación	   ética;	   mientras	   que	   existe	   una	  
relación	  negativa	  y	  significativa	  entre	  el	  número	  de	  otros	  consejos	  de	  administración	  en	  
los	  que	  participan	  y	  la	  reputación	  ética	  de	  las	  entidades.	  
Palabras	   clave:	   bancos	   sistémicos,	   consejo	   de	   administración,	   diversificación	   de	  
ingresos,	   instituciones	   financieras	   sistémicas,	   ratio	   de	   morosidad,	   reputación	   ética,	  
riesgo	  bancario,	  sistema	  bancario	  europeo,	  sistema	  bancario	  internacional,	  Z-­‐Score.	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This	  thesis	  analyzes	  bank	  risk-­‐taking,	  revenue	  diversification	  and	  the	  ethical	  behavior	  of	  
financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  last	  financial	  crisis	  by	  three	  essays.	  	  
The	   first	   essay	  examines	  bank-­‐specific	  and	  macroeconomic	  determinants	  of	  bank	   risk	  
for	  a	   large	  sample	  of	  commercial	  banks	  operating	   in	   the	  euro	  area.	  The	  main	   findings	  
are	   that	   capitalization,	   profitability,	   efficiency	   and	   liquidity	   are	   inversely	   and	  
significantly	   related	   to	   bank	   risk,	  whereas	  wholesale	   funding	   increases	  bank	   risk.	  We	  
also	  find	  that	  less	  concentrated	  markets,	  lower	  interest	  rates,	  higher	  inflation	  rates,	  and	  
economic	  crises	  (with	  e.g.,	  falling	  GDPs)	  increase	  bank	  risk.	  
The	   second	   essay	   focuses	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   non-­‐performing	  
loans	  of	  Eurozone	  banks.	  The	  main	  conclusion	  is	  that	  European	  banks	  can	  significantly	  
reduce	   their	   non-­‐performing	   loan	   ratios	   by	   increasing	   revenue	   diversification.	   This	  
relationship	   is	   enhanced	   during	   the	   crisis	   period,	   suggesting	   that	   revenue-­‐diversified	  
banks	  are	  better	  prepared	  for	  adverse	  macroeconomic	  conditions.	  
Finally,	   the	   third	   essay	   studies	   the	   corporate	   governance	   factors	   that	   explain	   ethical	  
reputation	  (proxied	  by	  the	  Covalence	  EthicalQuote	  index)	  using	  an	  international	  sample	  
of	  large	  financial	  institutions.	  This	  essay	  concludes	  that	  financial	  institutions	  with	  board	  
characteristics	   that	   reflect	  more	   stringent	  monitoring	   have	   better	   ethical	   reputations.	  
Specifically,	   the	   results	   show	   a	   statistically	   positive	   relationship	   between	   ethical	  
reputation	  and	  board	  size,	  experience,	  and	  gender	  diversity	  but	  a	  negative	  relationship	  
between	  ethical	  reputation	  and	  the	  busyness	  of	  the	  board	  members.	  
Keywords:	   Bank	   risk;	   Board	   of	   directors;	   Board	   characteristics;	   Board	   monitoring;	  
Corporate	   governance;	  Ethical	   reputation;	  European	  banking	   system;	  Non-­‐performing	  
loans;	  Revenue	  diversification;	  SIFI;	  G-­‐SIB	  Z-­‐score.	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The	  most	  recent	  economic	  and	  financial	  crisis	  has	  called	  into	  question	  the	  foundations	  
of	  capitalism,	  and	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  banking	  industry	  are	  often	  cited	  as	  a	  primary	  cause	  
of	   the	   crisis.	   The	   laxity	   in	   lending	   operations	   combined	  with	   the	   abuse	   of	   derivative	  
products	  in	  a	  climate	  of	  euphoria	  and	  abundance	  contributed	  greatly	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
bubble	   that	  began	   to	  deflate	   in	  2008,	  when	   the	   fourth-­‐largest	   investment	  bank	   in	   the	  
world	  announced	  its	  bankruptcy;	  this	  event	  led	  to	  the	  worst	  global	  recession	  in	  history.	  
The	   global	   financial	   crisis	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   early	   identification	   of	  
riskier	  banks	  because	  early	  identification	  would	  allow	  problems	  to	  be	  solved	  at	  a	  lower	  
cost.	  The	  cost	  of	  bank	  bailouts	  associated	  with	  the	  current	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  
large	  output	  losses	  suffered	  by	  several	  European	  countries	  clearly	  indicate	  the	  need	  for	  
a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  bank	  risk.	  In	  addition,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
the	   financial	   crisis,	   politicians,	   banking	   supervisors,	   and	   central	   bankers	   have	   alleged	  
and	   acknowledged	   that	   flaws	   in	   the	   corporate	   governance	   mechanisms	   and	   ethical	  
cultures	  of	   financial	   institutions	  played	  a	  central	  role	   in	  the	   in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
crisis	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Basel	  Committee	  on	  Banking	  Supervision,	  2010;	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	  
the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System,	  2009,	  2010;	  Haldane,	  2012).	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  severe	  consequences	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  financial	  crisis,	  which	  originated	  in	  
the	  financial	  industry	  but	  quickly	  spread	  to	  other	  sectors	  and	  caused	  great	  harm	  to	  the	  
real	  economy,	  this	  doctoral	  dissertation	  addresses	  both	  bank	  risk	  and	  ethical	  behavior	  
determinants.	  
The	   general	   conclusion	   of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   that	   bank-­‐specific	   variables	   that	   are	  
closely	  related	  to	  capable	  management	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  bank	  
risk-­‐taking;	  in	  addition,	  effective	  information	  systems	  such	  as	  well-­‐monitored	  boards	  of	  
directors,	   lead	   to	   better	   ethical	   reputation	   for	   financial	   institutions.	   Moreover,	   these	  
indicators	  exert	  a	  similar	  or	  greater	  effect	  under	  crisis	  macroeconomic	  conditions.	  
More	   specifically,	   this	   dissertation	   shows	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   several	   bank-­‐specific	  
factors,	   such	   as	   capitalization,	   profitability,	   efficiency	   and	   liquidity,	   can	   significantly	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contribute	   to	   the	   reduction	   of	   bank	   risk.	   Conversely,	   recourse	   to	   wholesale	   funding	  
seems	   to	   increase	   bank	   risk.	   Our	   results	   further	   indicate	   that	   different	   sources	   of	  
revenue	   diversification	   contribute	   significantly	   to	   the	   reduction	   of	   non-­‐performing	  
loans	  held	  by	  banks	   in	   the	  euro	  area;	  moreover,	   the	  amplification	  of	   this	   relationship	  
during	  the	  financial	  crisis	  implies	  that	  diversified	  banks	  are	  better	  prepared	  than	  their	  
non-­‐diversified	  counterparts	  are	  and	  thus	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  loan	  
portfolios	  held	  by	  diversified	  banks	   is	  relatively	  small.	  Additionally,	  we	   find	  that	  bank	  
risk	  is	  significantly	  affected	  by	  external	  factors	  that	  do	  not	  directly	  depend	  on	  bankers’	  
managerial	  qualities	  and	  skills;	   for	  example,	   less	  concentrated	  markets,	   lower	   interest	  
rates,	  higher	  inflation	  rates	  and	  economic	  crises	  (with	  a	  falling	  GDP)	  increase	  bank	  risk.	  
We	  further	  find	  that	  financial	  institutions	  with	  board	  characteristics	  that	  indicate	  more	  
effective	   monitoring	   and	   oversight	   have	   better	   ethical	   reputations.	   In	   particular,	   we	  
demonstrate	   that	   ethical	   reputation	   is	   positively	   associated	  with	   the	   size,	   experience,	  
and	  gender	  diversity	  of	  the	  board	  and	  with	  CEO	  duality	  but	  negatively	  related	  to	  board	  
busyness	   and	   to	   a	   composite	   index	   that	   indicates	   poor	   monitoring	   by	   boards	   of	  
directors.	   Finally,	   we	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   adverse	   influence	   of	   the	   global	   financial	  
crisis	   on	   the	   ethical	   reputations	   of	   financial	   institutions	   is	   less	   pronounced	   for	  
institutions	  with	  boards	  that	  demonstrate	  stronger	  monitoring	  practices.	  
	  This	   dissertation	   is	   structured	   in	   two	  parts.	   The	   first	   part	   is	   an	   introductory	   chapter	  
that	   provides	   a	   theoretical	   background	   to	   support	   our	   empirical	   findings	   and	  
contextualizes	   the	   macroeconomic	   conditions	   of	   the	   banking	   industry	   during	   the	  
financial	  crisis.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  dissertation	  comprises	  three	  empirical	  essays	  on	  
bank	  risk-­‐taking,	  revenue	  diversification	  and	  ethical	  behavior	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  	  
Pablo	  de	  Olavide	  University,	  Seville	  (Spain)	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2. Theoretical	  background	  
In	   this	   section,	   we	   provide	   the	   theoretical	   background	   that	   supports	   the	   empirical	  
findings	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
2.1. 	  Moral	  hazard	  and	  risk	  transfer:	  The	  Agency	  Theory	  
The	  Agency	  Theory	  states	  that	  an	  agency	  problem	  occurs	  when	  there	  is	  a	  relationship,	  
in	  which	  one	  party	  (the	  principal)	  delegates	  work	  to	  another	  (the	  agent)	  and	  between	  
this	  two	  cooperating	  parties	  there	  are	  different	  goals	  or	  different	  attitudes	  towards	  risk	  	  
(Jensen	  and	  Meckling,	  1976;	  Ross,	  1973).	  Therefore,	  the	  agency	  problem	  emerges	  from	  
two	   main	   sources:	   i)	   when	   the	   goals	   of	   principal	   and	   agent	   are	   in	   conflict	   and	   it	   is	  
difficult	   or	   expensive	   for	   the	   principal	   to	   verify	   the	   agent	   actions;	   and	   /or	   ii)	   when	  
principal	  and	  agent	  have	  different	  attitudes	  towards	  risk-­‐taking	  (Eisenhardt,	  1989).	  
The	  key	  assumptions	  from	  this	  theory	  regarding	  to	  human	  behavior	  are	  that	  people	  act	  
and	  take	  decisions	  pursuing	  their	  self-­‐interest;	  rationality	  is	  bounded	  due	  asymmetrical	  
information;	   and	   people	   are	   naturally	   risk	   averse.	   	   Concerning	   information,	   it	   is	  
assumed	  to	  be	  limited,	  asymmetrical	  and	  purchasable	  as	  a	  commodity.	  
The	  Agency	  Theory	  has	  developed	  into	  two	  streams:	  positivists	  and	  principal-­‐agent.	  The	  
main	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  lines	  of	  research	  are	  that	  Positivist	  Agency	  Theory	  
is	   less	   mathematical	   and	   more	   focused	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   owners	   and	  
managers	   of	   public	   corporations	  while	   the	  Principal-­‐Agent	   view	   is	  more	   abstract	   and	  
applies	  for	  any	  relationship	  under	  a	  contract	  (Berle	  and	  Means,	  1932).	  	  
The	  most	  relevant	  contributions	  of	  the	  Agency	  Theory	  lay	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  self-­‐interest	  
guides	  most	  organizational	  decisions	   and	   therefore	   information	  and	   risk	   aversion	  are	  
key	  elements	  for	  the	  principal	  to	  control.	  First	  contribution	  is	  that,	  information	  is	  seen	  
as	  a	  commodity	   that	  can	  be	  purchased	  (e.g.:	   information	  systems,	  boards	  of	  directors,	  
etc.),	  and	  the	  second	  one	  would	  be	  that	  uncertainty	  is	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  risk/reward	  
trade-­‐offs,	   instead	   of	   in	   terms	   of	   inability	   to	   preplan	   (Eisenhardt,	   1989).	   However,	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detractors	   of	   this	   theory	   claim	   it	   to	   be	   trivial,	   dehumanizing	   and	   dangerous	   (Perrow,	  
1986).	  
The	  Agency	  theory	  is	  reflected	  in	  all	  the	  three	  essays.	  Particularly,	  in	  Essay	  1	  where	  risk	  
taking	   determinants	   are	   analyzed,	   we	   hypothesize,	   following	   Uhde	   and	   Heimeshoff	  
(2009),	  and	  De	  Jonghe	  (2010)	  that	  larger	  entities	  may	  be	  more	  attracted	  to	  amplifying	  
risk	   taking,	   reducing	   market	   discipline	   and	   creating	   competitive	   distortions	   as	   they	  
know	  they	  will	  be	  bailed	  out.	  Another	  similar	  example	  of	   risk	   transfer	   is	  described	   in	  
the	   bank	   capitalization	   section,	   where	   we	   state	   that	   capital	   requirements	   play	   an	  
important	   role	   as	   a	   disincentive	   to	   risk-­‐taking	   by	   bank	   shareholders,	   who	   may	   be	  
conditioned	   by	   limited	   liability	   (Behr	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   In	   general,	   the	   bank	   specific	  
characteristics	  that	  depend	  on	  managerial	  and	  shareholders	  decisions	  can	  be	  all	  related	  
with	  this	  theory.	  
Perhaps,	  the	  most	  obvious	  agency	  relationship	  example	  is	  described	  in	  the	  third	  essay	  
where	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  is	  empirically	  tested	  as	  an	  effective	  monitoring	  system	  to	  
dissuade	  managers	  from	  taking	  unethical	  decisions.	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2.2. Diversification:	  The	  Markowitz	  Portfolio	  Theory	  
Markowitz	  Portfolio	  theory	  (1952)	  states	  that	  a	  portfolio	  is	  well	  diversified	  if	  there	  is	  no	  
portfolio,	  which	  has,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  lower	  risk	  and	  at	  least,	  as	  much	  expected	  return.	  
Analytically,	   it	   is	   described	   as	   follows:	   Considering	   a	   portfolio	  with	   n	   different	   assets	  
where	  asset	  number	  i	  will	  give	  the	  return	  Ri.	  Let	  μi	  and	  δ2i	  be	  the	  corresponding	  mean	  
and	   variance	   and	   let	  δi,j	   be	   the	   covariance	   between	   Ri	   and	   Rj	   .	   Suppose	   the	   relative	  
amount	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   portfolio	   invested	   in	   asset	   i	   is	   xi.	   If	   R	   is	   the	   return	   of	   the	  
whole	  portfolio,	  then:	  
𝜇 = 𝐸 𝑅 = 𝜇!x!!!!! 	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   1 	  
𝛿! = Var R =   !!!! 𝛿𝑖,𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗    
!
!!!
	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2 	  
x! = 1!!!! 	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	     3 	  
x! ≥ 0; i = 1, 2,… , n  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	     4 	  
	  
The	  set	  of	  total	  obtainable	  combinations	  (δ2,  𝜇)	  is	  called	  attainable	  set.	  Those	  portfolio	  
combinations	   (δ2,  𝜇)	  with	  a	  minimum	  δ2	   for	  a	  given	  𝜇	  or	  more	  and	  maximum	  𝜇	  for	  a	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Figure	  1:	  Efficient	  and	  Attainable	  sets	  
	  
	  
Two	   conditions	   are	   necessary	   to	   apply	   efficient	   surfaces:	   first,	   i)	   the	   investor	   must	  
desire	  to	  act	  according	  to	  the	  (µμ,	  δ!)	  maxim;	  and	  second	  ii)	  reasonable	  μi	  and	  δi,j	  are	  
required.	  	  
Traditional	  financial	   intermediation	  literature	  (e.g.	  Diamond,	  1984;	  Ramakrishnan	  and	  
Thakor,	   1984;	   Boyd	   and	   Prescott,	   1986)	   applies	   Markowitz’s	   findings	   to	   banks	   and	  
other	   financial	   institutions	   showing	   diversification	   to	   reduce	   the	   likelihood	   of	   bank	  
default.	  Recent	  banking	  literature	  assesses	  different	  sources	  of	  diversification	  (industry,	  
geographical	   and	   revenue	   diversification)	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   bank	   performance,	  
however	   showing	   not	   consensus	   in	   their	   results.	   The	   controversy	   lies	   in	   if	  
diversification,	   by	   providing	   low	   correlated	   sources	   of	   income,	   macroeconomic	  
conditions,	   etc.;	   provides	   enough	   economies	   of	   scale	   to	   offset	   the	   costs	   of	   increasing	  
traditional	  banking	  complexity.	  
Some	  authors	   like	  Acharya	  et	  al.	   (2006),	  Hayden	  et	  al.	   (2007)	  or	  Bebczuk	  and	  Galindo	  
(2008)	   focus	   on	   diversification	   across	   industries,	   however,	   finding	   differing	   results.	  
Source: Markowitz, 1952 
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According	  to	  Acharya	  et	  al.	   (2006)	  and	  Hayden	  et	  al.	   (2007)	  asset	  diversification	  does	  
not	  produce	  superior	  return	  performance	  and/or	  greater	  safety	  neither	  for	  Italian	  nor	  
for	   German	   banks	   while	   Bebczuk	   and	   Galindo	   (2008)	   show	   positive	   industry	  
diversification	  effects	  on	  both	  risk	  and	  profitability.	  	  
Literature	  also	  provides	  both	  supporting	  and	  contradicting	  arguments	  of	  geographical	  
diversification.	  Proponents	  of	  geographical	  diversification	  allude	  to	  economies	  of	  scale	  
as	  these	  banks	  may	  get	  a	  better	  access	  to	  capital	  markets	  in	  other	  regions	  and	  countries	  
(Deng	   and	   Elysiani,	   2008)	   greater	   market	   power	   (Iskandar-­‐Datta	   and	   McLaughlin,	  
2007)	   and	   reduced	   tax	   liabilities	   from	   low	   tax	   areas;	   while	   advocates	   of	   the	  
geographically	  focused	  strategies	  state	  that	  agency	  costs	  may	  not	  offset	  diversification	  
benefits	  (Berger	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  Deng	  and	  Elyasiani,	  2008).	  
Finally,	   literature	  on	   revenue	  diversification	   is	  widely	  addressed	   in	  our	   second	  Essay,	  
where	   we	   study	   the	   effect	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   bank	   non-­‐performing	   loan	  
ratios	  (NPLR).	  Our	  findings	  show	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  contribute	  to	  
reduce	   bank	   distress	   in	   banks	   of	   the	   euro	   area,	   therefore	   providing	   support	   to	  
traditional	  banking	  and	  Markowitz	  theories.	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3. The	  banking	   industry	   and	   the	   global	   financial	  
crisis	  
The	   deregulation	   trend	   that	   started	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   by	   progressively	   breaking	   the	  
Banking	  Act	  known	  as	  the	  Glass-­‐Steagall	  Act,	  1933	  (GSA)	  enabled	  financial	  companies	  to	  
increase	   their	   complexity	   and	   size.1	  It	   also	   allowed	   banks	   to	   diversify	   their	   asset	  
portfolio	   and	   to	   significantly	   increase	   their	   profits	   by	   fostering	   the	   emergence	   of	  
numerous	   alternative	   sources	   of	   income	   such	   as	   underwriting	   and	   trading	   securities,	  
brokerage	   and	   investment	   banking	   as	  well	   as	   other	  non	   traditional	   banking	   activities	  
(Wilmarth,	   2010;	   Meslier	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   This	   deregulated	   scenario	   alongside	   with	   an	  
expansionary	  monetary	  policy	  (with	  low	  interest	  rates	  and	  loan	  ease)	  that	  was	  aimed	  to	  
alleviate	  an	  economic	  drastic	  fall	  from	  the	  burst	  of	  the	  Dotcom	  bubble	  in	  the	  beginning	  
of	   the	   21st	   Century	   are	   blamed	   as	   the	   main	   causes	   of	   the	   Subprime	   mortgage	   and	  
Financial	   crisis	   (2007-­‐2009)	   that	   started	   in	   the	   US	   and	   rapidly	   spread	   to	   Europe	  
evolving	   in	   a	   Debt	   Crisis,	   and	   finally	   resulting	   in	   the	   so	   called	   “Great	   Recession”	  
(Altunbas	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  crisis	  was	  stimulated	  with	  substantial	  “ethical	  problems”	  in	  
the	   financial	   industry	   related	   to	   conflicts	   of	   interest,	   handling	   of	   confidential	  
information,	   quality	   of	   financial	   reporting,	   lending	   practices,	   antitrust	   compliance,	  
compensation	  schemes,	  insider	  abuse,	  insider	  trading,	  and	  money	  laundering	  (Mitchell	  
et	  al.,1992).	  
Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  regulators	  and	  policy	  makers	  are	  agreeing	  on	  
new	   international	   banking	   guidelines	   (e.g.	   Basel	   III	   Accords,	   definition	   and	   control	   of	  
systematically	   important	   financial	   institutions,	   etc.)	   to	   boost	   global	   financial	   stability.	  
Some	  of	  them	  are	  briefly	  described	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  	  
                                                
1	  The	  GSA-­‐1933	  restricts	  the	  securities	  activities	  of	  commercial	  banks	  (Carpenter	  and	  Murphy,	  2010).	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3.1. Basel	  III	  and	  bank	  risk	  taking	  
In	   2010	   the	   Basel	   Committee	   on	   Banking	   Supervision	   (BCBS)	   agreed	   on	   new	  
international	   banking	   guidelines	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2008.2	  	   This	  
Accord,	   known	   as	   Basel	   III,	   tries	   to	   improve	   financial	   stability	   and	   strengthen	   the	  
solvency	  and	  liquidity	  of	  banks	  without	  diminishing	  the	  flow	  of	  money	  from	  the	  credit	  
market.	  The	  new	  framework	  also	  aims	  to	  improve	  risk	  management	  and	  governance	  as	  
well	   as	   strengthen	   banks’	   transparency	   and	   disclosures,	   learning	   from	   the	   financial	  
crisis.	  However,	  unlike	  Basel	   II	   (2004),	  Basel	   III	  does	  not	   imply	  a	  major	  change	   in	   the	  
previous	   Capital	   Accord	   but	   rather	   they	   complement	   each	   other;	   it	   simplifies	   and	  
strengthens	   the	   numerator	   of	   the	   capital	   ratio	   and	   introduces	   some	  macroprudential	  
components	  to	  the	  regulatory	  framework.	  Among	  the	  main	  elements	  proposed	  by	  Basel	  
III	  are	  the	  following:	  first,	  it	  substantially	  raises	  the	  quality	  and	  quantity	  of	  capital,	  with	  
a	  greater	  focus	  on	  common	  equity.3	  	  Capital	  needs	  to	  be	  of	  the	  highest	  quality	  to	  better	  
absorb	   losses	   from	   shocks	   that	   could	   emanate	   from	   anywhere;	   second,	   Basel	   III	   also	  
introduces	   a	   simple	   leverage	   ratio,	   which	   will	   act	   as	   a	   backstop	   to	   the	   risk-­‐based	  
measure.	  Such	  a	  measure	  is	  critical	  to	  underpinning	  the	  whole	  regime	  and	  will	  provide	  a	  
simple,	   easy	   to	   understand	   sanity	   check	   of	   the	   results	   produced	   by	   the	   risk-­‐based	  
framework.	  Third,	  Basel	  III	  discusses	  capital	  buffers.	  The	  conservation	  buffer	  provides	  a	  
strong	   incentive	   for	  banks	   to	  build	  up	   capital	   in	   good	   times	  while	   the	   countercyclical	  
buffer	   should	   help	   protect	   banks	   against	   the	   dangers	   of	   rapid	   credit	   growth.	   Finally,	  
sound	   liquidity	   risk	   management	   principles	   and	   global	   liquidity	   standards	   will	   help	  
                                                
2	  The	  Basel	  Committee's	  oversight	  body	  -­‐	  the	  Group	  of	  Central	  Bank	  Governors	  and	  Heads	  of	  Supervision	  
(GHOS)	   -­‐	   agreed	   on	   the	   broad	   framework	   of	   Basel	   III	   in	   September	   2009	   and	   the	   Committee	   set	   out	  
concrete	   proposals	   in	   December	   2009.	   These	   consultative	   documents	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  
Committee's	   response	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis	   and	   are	   part	   of	   the	   global	   initiatives	   to	   strengthen	   the	  
financial	  regulatory	  system	  that	  have	  been	  endorsed	  by	  the	  G20	  Leaders.	  The	  GHOS	  subsequently	  agreed	  
on	   key	   design	   elements	   of	   the	   reform	   package	   at	   its	   July	   2010	   meeting	   and	   on	   the	   calibration	   and	  
transition	  to	  implement	  the	  measures	  at	  its	  September	  2010	  meeting.	  
3	  The	  minimum	   Common	   Equity	   Tier	   1	   and	   Tier	   1	   requirements	  will	   be	   phased	   in	   between	   1	   January	  
2013	  and	  1	  January	  2015.	  On	  1	  January	  2013,	  the	  minimum	  Common	  Equity	  Tier	  1	  requirement	  will	  rise	  
from	   the	   current	   2%	   level	   to	   3.5%.	   The	   Tier	   1	   capital	   requirement	   will	   rise	   from	   4%	   to	   4.5%.	   On	   1	  
January	  2014,	  banks	  will	  have	  to	  meet	  a	  4%	  minimum	  Common	  Equity	  Tier	  1	  requirement	  and	  a	  Tier	  1	  
requirement	  of	  5.5%.	  On	  1	  January	  2015,	  banks	  will	  have	  to	  meet	  the	  4.5%	  Common	  Equity	  Tier	  1	  and	  the	  
6%	  Tier	  1	  requirements.	  The	  total	  capital	  requirement	  remains	  at	  the	  existing	  level	  of	  8.0%	  and	  so	  does	  
not	  need	  to	  be	  phased	  in.	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ensure	   that	  banks	  more	  effectively	  manage	   their	   risk	  and	  maintain	  adequate	   liquidity	  
buffers.	  	  
In	   addition,	   the	  new	  Capital	  Accord	  pays	   special	   attention	   to	   the	   systemic	   risk;	   it	   has	  
dramatically	  increased	  its	  presence	  from	  Basel	  II	  to	  Basel	  III;	  even	  when	  it	  was	  a	  known	  
issue	   last	  crisis	  made	   the	  Committee	  more	  aware	  about	   it.	   In	  words	  of	  Caruana,	  2010	  
(General	  Manager	   of	   the	   BIS):	   “The	   international	   financial	   crisis	   has	  made	  us	   all	   think	  
much	  harder,	  not	  only	  about	  what	  systemic	  risk	  means,	  but	  also	  what	  it	  means	  for	  policy.	  
Systemic	  risk	  was	  underestimated	  across	  the	  board	  before	  the	  crisis.	  We	  were	  faced	  with	  
the	   unthinkable	   when	   a	   number	   of	   very	   large	   institutions	   failed,	   despite	   their	   previous	  
reputation	  for	  balance	  sheet	  strength	  and	  leadership	  in	  risk	  management.	  Coming	  to	  grips	  
with	   systemic	   risk	   is	   vital	   because	   the	   aggregate	   risk	   facing	   the	   system	   is	  much	   higher	  
than	  the	  simple	  sum	  of	  the	   individual	  risks	  attending	  financial	   institutions,	  products	  and	  
markets.”	  
3.2. Global	  Systemically	  Important	  Banks	  
In	  November	   2011	   the	   Financial	   Stability	   Board	   (FSB)	   published	   an	   integrated	   set	   of	  
policy	   measures	   to	   address	   the	   systemic	   and	   moral	   hazard	   risks	   associated	   with	  
systemically	  important	  financial	  institutions	  (SIFIs).	  SIFIs	  have	  been	  defined	  as	  entities	  
that	   could	   endanger	   the	   entire	   financial	   system	   because	   of	   their	   size,	   contagion	  
potential	   effects,	   correlation,	   concentration	   and	   context	   (Thomsom,	   2009).	   SIFI	   is	   a	  
wide	   concept	   that	   comprises	  markets	   infrastructures,	   insurance	   companies	   and	  other	  
bank	  and	  non-­‐bank	   financial	   institutions.	  As	  banks	  are	   the	   financial	   institutions	  more	  
likely	   to	   induce	   risk	   to	   the	   system,	   given	   that	   their	   business	   models	   have	   generally	  
placed	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  trading	  and	  capital	  market	  activities,	  Basel	  Committee	  has	  
focused	   its	   regulations	   in	   Systemically	   Important	   Banks	   (G-­‐SIBs)	   and	   how	   to	   reduce	  
their	  likelihood	  of	  failure.	  GSIBs	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  banks	  that	  are	  not	  being	  allowed	  to	  
fail	   due	   their	   size,	   interconnectedness,	   complexity,	   lack	   of	   substitutability	   or	   global	  
scope	  (BIS,	  2011).	  This	  “too	  big-­‐interconnected-­‐complex-­‐unsubstitutable-­‐global	  to	  fail”	  
condition	   could	   tempt	   them	   to	   behave	   in	   their	   private	   benefits,	   taking	   sub-­‐optimal	  
outcomes	  from	  a	  system	  wide	  level.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Basel	  Committee	  has	  the	  challenge	  
to	  identify	  these	  institutions	  and	  to	  require	  more	  restrictive	  policies	  for	  them.	  In	  order	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to	  do	  that,	  a	  process	  to	  identify	  and	  assess	  SIBs	  has	  been	  developed	  (BIS,	  2011):	  first,	  a	  
set	   of	   categories	   and	   indicators	   have	   been	   defined	   (cross	   jurisdictional	   activity,	   size,	  
interconnectedness,	   substitutability	   and	   complexity)	   and	   equally	   weighed	   so	   as	   to	  
distribute	  SIBs	  in	  different	  buckets	  with	  minimal	  additional	  loss	  absorbency	  according	  
to	   the	   range	   of	   systemic	   risk	   obtained	   (from	   1	   to	   5).	   Following	   these	   criteria,	   28	  
financial	  institutions	  were	  designed	  as	  G-­‐SIBs	  form	  a	  sample	  of	  the	  73	  biggest	  banks,	  in	  
January	   2011.	   The	   methodology	   developed	   by	   the	   Basel	   Committee	   on	   Banking	  
Supervision	  (BCBS)	  is	  described	  in	  figure	  2.	  The	  current	  list	  of	  GSIBs	  is	  provided	  in	  table	  1.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Figure 2: G-SIBs process 
Source: Bank for International Settlements 
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Table	  1:	  List	  of	  GISBs	  (updated	  on	  November	  2014).	  
Entity	   Country	   Total	  capital	  ratio	  
requirement	  (%	  of	  RWA)	  
Mizuho	  FG	   Japan	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Sumitomo	  Mitsui	   Japan	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Mitsubishi	  UFJ	  FG	   Japan	   12.0%(CET1=min.8.5%)	  
Bank	  of	  China	   China	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
ICBC	   China	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Agricultural	  Bank	  of	  China	   China	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Dexia	  Group	   Belgium	   -­‐	  
BNP	  Paribas	   France	   12.5%(CET1=min.9%)	  
Crédit	  Agricole	   France	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Banque	  Populaire	  CE	   France	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Société	  Générale	   France	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Commerzbank	   Germany	   10.5%(CET1=min.7%)	  
Deutsche	  Bank	   Germany	   12.5%(CET1=min.9%)	  
Unicredit	  Group	   Italy	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
ING	  Bank	   Netherlands	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Banco	  Bilbao	  Vizcaya	  	  Argentaria	   Spain	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Santander	   Spain	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Nordea	   Sweden	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Credit	  Suisse	   Switzerland	   12.0%(CET1=min.8.5%)	  
UBS	   Switzerland	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	   United	  Kingdom	   12.0%(CET1=min.8.5%)	  
Barclays	   United	  Kingdom	   12.5%(CET1=min.9%)	  
HSBC	   United	  Kingdom	   13.0%(CET1=min.9.5%)	  
Lloyds	  Banking	  Group	   United	  Kingdom	   10.5%(CET1=min.7%)	  
Standard	  Chartered	   United	  Kingdom	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Bank	  of	  America	   USA	   12.0%(CET1=min.8.5%)	  
Bank	  of	  New	  York	  Mellon	   USA	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Citigroup	   USA	   12.5%(CET1=min.9%)	  
Goldman	  Sachs	   USA	   12.0%(CET1=min.8.5%)	  
JP	  Morgan	  Chase	   USA	   13.0%(CET1=min.9.5%)	  
Morgan	  Stanley	   USA	   12.0%(CET1=min.8.5%)	  
State	  Street	   USA	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Wells	  Fargo	   USA	   11.5%(CET1=min.8%)	  
Source:	  Financial	  Stability	  Board,	  2014	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One	   of	   the	  main	   risks	   of	   G-­‐SIBs	   is	   the	  moral	   hazard	   associated	  with	   the	   government	  
support:	   systemic	  banks	  may	  be	  more	  attracted	   to	  amplify	   risk-­‐taking,	   reduce	  market	  
discipline	   and	   create	   competitive	   distortions	   which	   could	   increase	   the	   probability	   of	  
distress	   in	   the	   future	   as	   they	   know	   they	   will	   be	   bail	   out.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   G-­‐SIBs	  
failure	  could	  have	  cross-­‐border	  repercussion	  and	  harm	  other	  countries’	  institutions	  and	  
even	  the	  global	  economy	  at	  large.	  
Although	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  solve	  G-­‐SIBs	  externalities	  completely,	  the	  broad	  aims	  
for	  the	  regulatory	  community	  are	  to	  reduce	  the	  probability	  of	  failure	  by	  increasing	  their	  
going-­‐concern	   loss	  absorbency	  and	   to	   reduce	   their	  extent	   impact	  by	   improving	  global	  
recovery	  and	  resolution	  frameworks.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  financial	  crisis	  has	  shown	  that	  
not	  only	  a	  G-­‐SIB	  bankruptcy	  could	  have	  systemic	  consequences;	  an	  evidence	  of	   this	   is	  
the	   large	   investment	   that	   different	   governments	   have	   spent	   in	   rescuing	   their	   banks:	  
Spain	   has	   spent	  more	   than	  €41	  billion	   in	   the	   last	   restructuration	   of	   its	   saving	   banks,	  
while	   the	   cost	   of	   bailed	   out	   banks	   in	  Europe	  between	  2007	   and	  2011	   raises	   to	  €440	  
billion	  plus	  €1.1	  trillion	  in	  guarantees;	  and	  the	  US,	  has	  invested	  $204.8	  billion	  between	  
2008	  and	  2009	  in	  banks	  rescues.4	  
3.3. Stress-­‐testing	  
A	  macro	  stress-­‐testing	  framework	  is	  often	  used	  to	  assess	  in	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  manner	  
the	   resilience	   of	   the	   banking	   sector	   to	   (adverse)	   macroeconomic	   and	   financial	  
developments	   (Henry	   and	  Kok	  2013).	   	   Supervisory	   authorities,	   such	   as	   the	   European	  
Central	   Banks	   and	   the	   Federal	   Reserve,	   carry	   out	   annual	   stress	   test	   to	   their	   largest	  
banks	  as	  part	  of	  their	  regulatory	  oversight	  of	  the	  banking	  sector;	  to	  analyze	  whether	  a	  
bank	  has	  enough	  capital	  to	  resist	  the	  impact	  of	  adverse	  macroeconomic	  conditions	  (i.e.	  
falling	  economic	  output,	  rising	  unemployment	  and	  declining	  house	  prices)	  and	  prevent	  
possible	  systemic	  future	  consequences.	  
The	  last	  stress	  tests	  from	  the	  Euro	  area,	  released	  last	  October	  2014,	  were	  conducted	  to	  
130	  banks	   that	  were	   required	   a	  minimum	  of	   5.5	   per	   cent	   of	   common	   equity	   tier	   one	  
                                                
4	  Sources:	  European	  Commission,	  US	  Department	  of	  Treasury.	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after	   the	   test	   was	   conducted.	   The	   results	   showed	   that	   25	   banks	   failed	   the	   tests.5	  
Regarding	   the	   US,	   25	   of	   the	   to	   the	   30	   largest	   banking	   conglomerates	   that	   were	  
examined	   in	   2014	   succeeded,	   only	   one	   of	   them	   (Zions	   Bancorporation)	   failed	   due	  
capital	   shortfalls	   (less	   than	   5%	   Tier	   1	   common	   capital	   ratio),	   while	   the	   other	   four	  
financial	   institutions	   (Citigroup	   Inc.,	   HSBC	   Holdings	   plc,	   The	   Royal	   Bank	   of	   Scotland	  
Group	   plc	  ,	   and	   Santander,	   S.A.)	   were	   rejected	   based	   on	   ambiguities	   in	   their	   risk	  
management	  practices	  and	  flaws	  in	  their	  capital	  distribution	  plans.6	  
Given	   the	   role	   of	   the	   financial	   institutions	   in	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   the	   adverse	  
consequences	  it	  has	  brought	  to	  the	  global	  economy;	  as	  well	  as	  the	  changes	  in	  banking	  
regulations	  that	   it	  has	  generated;	   it	   is	  of	  actual	   interest	  to	  analyze	  the	  possible	  factors	  
that	  may	  have	  lead	  to	  that	  extreme	  situation.	  	  
	   	  
                                                
5	  Source	  ECB:	  Nine	  of	  the	  failed	  institutions	  were	  from	  Italy,	  3	  three	  form	  Cyprus	  and	  Greece	  respectively,	  
two	  from	  Belgium	  and	  Slovenia;	  and	  one	  bank	  form	  Austria,	  France,	  Germany,	  Ireland,	  Portugal	  and	  Spain	  
respectively.	  
6	  Source:	  Federal	  Reserve	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4. Summary	  of	  the	  Essays	  
4.1. Essay	   1:	   Factors	   Influencing	   Bank	   Risk	   in	   Europe:	  
Evidence	  from	  the	  Financial	  Crisis	  	  
Essay	  1	  examines	  bank-­‐specific	  and	  macroeconomic	  determinants	  of	  bank	  risk-­‐taking.	  
We	  use	   a	   dynamic	  panel	   data	  model	   to	   analyze	  determinants	   of	   bank	   risk	   for	   a	   large	  
sample	  of	  commercial	  banks	  operating	  in	  the	  euro	  area	  from	  2001	  to	  2012.	  The	  selected	  
time	   span	   considers	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   on-­‐going	   financial	   and	   economic	   crisis	   on	   the	  
Eurozone	  banking	  system.	  	  
This	   Essay	   contributes	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   in	   various	   ways.	   First,	   this	   work	  
complements	  the	  previous	  literature	  by	  analyzing	  the	  factors	  (bank-­‐specific	  and	  macro)	  
that	   influence	  bank	  risk	   in	  euro	  area	  commercial	  banks.	  The	  selected	   time	  span,	   from	  
2001	  to	  2012,	  considers	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  on	  the	  
Eurozone	   banking	   system.	   To	   the	   best	   of	   our	   knowledge,	   little	   research	   has	   been	  
conducted	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  both	  bank-­‐specific	  and	  macroeconomic	  variables	  on	  the	  risk	  
of	  European	  commercial	  banks	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  on-­‐going	   financial	   crisis.	  	   Second,	  
we	  use	   the	   generalized	  method	  of	  moments	   (GMM)	  estimator,	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  
system-­‐GMM	   estimator,	   developed	   for	   dynamic	   panel	   models	   by	   Arellano	   and	   Bover	  
(1995)	   and	   Blundell	   and	   Bond	   (1998).	   It	   allows	   us	   to	   control	   for	   unobserved	  
heterogeneity	   as	   well	   as	   for	   endogeneity.	   This	   new	   technique	   has	   only	   been	   used	   in	  
recent	  studies	  on	   the	  determinants	  of	  bank	  risk	   (e.g.,	  Delis	  and	  Staikouras,	  2011;	  Haq	  
and	  Heaney,	  2012;	  Louzis	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
4.2. Essay	   2:	   How	   Revenue	   Diversification	   Affects	   Non-­‐
Performing	  Loans	  of	  European	  Banks	  
In	  Essay	  2,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  
held	  by	  banks	   in	  14	  European	  countries.	  We	  consider	  a	  maximum	  of	  more	  than	  2,000	  
Eurozone	   institutions,	   including	   commercial	   banks,	   saving	   banks	   and	   credit	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cooperatives,	   from	   1998	   to	   2012.	   We	   use	   the	   general	   method	   of	   moments	   (GMM)	  
estimator,	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   system	   GMM	   estimator,	   which	   was	   developed	   by	  
Arellano	   and	   Bover	   (1995)	   and	   Blundell	   and	   Bond	   (1998)	   for	   dynamic	   panel	   data	  
models.	   This	   method	   allows	   us	   to	   control	   for	   unobserved	   heterogeneity	   and	  
endogeneity	  by	  means	  of	  suitable	  instruments.	  
This	   essay	   contributes	   to	   the	   existing	   body	   of	   banking	   literature	   on	   revenue	  
diversification	   in	   the	   following	   respects.	   First,	   studies	   addressing	   the	   relationship	  
between	  the	  quality	  of	  loan	  portfolios	  and	  revenue	  diversification	  are	  relatively	  scarce,	  
and	   those	   that	   do	   exist	   are	   inconclusive	   (e.g.,	   Louzis	  et	  al.,	   2012	   and	  Chaibi	   and	  Ftiti,	  
2015).	  Second,	  similar	  to	  Elsas	  et	  al.	   (2010),	  we	  proxy	  revenue	  diversification	  with	  an	  
adjusted	  Herfindahl-­‐Hirschman	  index	  (HHIRD)	  that	  considers	  different	  types	  of	  revenue	  
rather	   than	   with	   less	   specific	   revenue	   diversification	   measures	   that	   consider	   only	  
interest	  and	  non-­‐interest	  income	  (e.g.,	  Lepetit	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  and	  Huizinga,	  
2010;	  Sawada,	  2013).	  Third,	  we	  consider	  the	  different	  effects	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  
on	  NPLR	  between	  commercial	  banks	  and	  savings	  and	  cooperative	  banks	  and	  between	  
bank-­‐	   and	  market-­‐oriented	   institutions.	   Fourth,	  we	   control	   for	   possible	   differences	   in	  
bank	   regulatory	   schemes	   by	   including	   four	   indicators	   (capital	   stringency,	   official	  
supervisory	   power,	   private	   monitory	   index	   and	   activity	   restrictions	   index)	   obtained	  
from	  the	  World	  Bank	  database	  on	  Bank	  Regulation	  and	  Supervision	  developed	  by	  Barth	  
et	  al.	  (2001).	  
4.3. Essay	  3:	  Ethical	  Reputation	  of	  Financial	  Institutions:	  Do	  
Board	  Characteristics	  Matter?	  
Essay	   3	   examines	   the	   association	   between	   board	   characteristics	   and	   the	   ethical	  
reputation	  of	   financial	   institutions.	  Our	  sample	   includes	  43	   large	  publicly	  traded	   large	  
financial	   institutions	   from	   13	   different	   countries	   from	   2005	   to	   2010.	   We	   utilize	   the	  
Covalence	   EthicalQuote	   index	   to	  measure	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   these	   institutions.	  
Given	  the	  pivotal	  governance	  role	  of	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  and	  the	  value-­‐relevance	  of	  
ethical	   corporate	   behavior,	   we	   postulate	   a	   positive	   relationship	   between	   ethical	  
reputation	  and	  board	  features	  that	  foster	  more	  effective	  monitoring	  and	  oversight.	  	  We	  
run	  several	  alternative	  panel	  regressions	  of	  ethical	  reputation	  on	  board	  characteristics	  
and	  firm-­‐specific	  controls.	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To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  essay	  is	  the	  first	  attempt	  to	  examine	  the	  association	  
between	  ethical	  reputation	  and	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  in	  the	  financial	  industry.	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Essay	  1:	  Determinants	  of	  Bank	  Risk	  in	  Europe:	  Evidence	  from	  
the	  Financial	  Crisis 
	  
Abstract	  
In	   this	   essay	   we	   use	   a	   dynamic	   panel	   data	   model	   to	   analyze	   bank-­‐specific	   and	  
macroeconomic	   determinants	   of	   bank	   risk	   for	   a	   large	   sample	   of	   commercial	   banks	  
operating	   in	   the	  euro	  area.	  The	   selected	   time	  span,	   from	  2001	   to	  2012,	   considers	   the	  
impact	  of	   the	  on-­‐going	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  on	  the	  Eurozone	  banking	  system.	  
Our	   results	   indicate	   that	   capitalization,	   profitability,	   efficiency	   and	   liquidity	   are	  
inversely	   and	   significantly	   related	   to	   bank	   risk.	   However,	   the	   recourse	   to	   wholesale	  
funding	   by	   banks	   seems	   to	   increase	   their	   risk.	   We	   also	   find	   that	   less	   concentrated	  
markets,	   lower	   interest	   rates,	   higher	   inflation	   rates	   and	   a	   context	   of	   economic	   crisis	  
(with	  a	  falling	  GDP)	  increase	  bank	  risk.	  
	  
1 Introduction	  
The	  recent	  financial	  crisis	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  need	  for	  a	  better	  regulation	  and	  
supervision	  of	   the	  EU	   financial	   sector,	  particularly	   in	   the	  euro	  area.	  Although	  banking	  
regulation	  in	  the	  EU	  was	  initially	  harmonized	  following	  successive	  directives	  (specially	  
after	   the	   Financial	   Services	   Action	   Plan	   of	   1999),	   most	   policy	   instruments	   in	   the	  
Eurozone	  remained	  at	  the	  national	   level.	  As	  the	  financial	  crisis	  progressed	  and	  turned	  
into	   the	   Eurozone	   debt	   crisis	   in	   2010/2011,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   greater	  
interdependency	  for	  those	  countries	  sharing	  the	  euro	  required	  a	  deeper	  integration	  of	  
the	  banking	  system.	  Contradictory	  national	  solutions	  led	  to	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  single	  
market	  in	  financial	  services,	  which	  in	  turn	  contributed	  to	  disruptions	  in	  lending	  to	  the	  
real	  economy.	  This	  effect	  on	  the	  real	  economy,	  triggered	  by	  the	  problems	  in	  the	  banking	  
sector,	  was	  extremely	  severe,	  producing	  record	  levels	  of	  unemployment	  and	  giving	  way	  
to	  what	  is	  now	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Great	  Recession	  (Altunbas	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
Consequently,	   in	   2012,	   EU	   authorities	   agreed	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   integrated	  
financial	  framework	  (the	  so-­‐called	  banking	  union)	  to	  restore	  confidence	  in	  banks	  and	  in	  
the	  euro.	  The	  banking	  union	  relies	  on	  common	  rules	  that	  all	  financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  
EU	  must	  comply	  with.	  These	  rules	   include	  the	  establishment	  of	  more	  adequate	  capital	  
requirements	   (the	   EU	   Capital	   Requirements	   Directive	  was	   approved	   in	   2013),	   better	  
protection	   for	  all	  EU	  depositors	   (the	  EU	  Directive	  on	  Deposit	  Guarantee	  Schemes	  was	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adopted	   in	  2014),	  and	  common	  tools	   to	  deal	  effectively	  with	   failing	  credit	   institutions	  
(the	  EU	  Directive	  on	  Bank	  Recovery	  and	  Resolution	  was	  published	  in	  2014).	  Moreover,	  
in	  2013,	  the	  EU	  adopted	  the	  regulations	  establishing	  the	  Single	  Supervisory	  Mechanism	  
(SSM),	   which	   places	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank	   (ECB)	   as	   the	   central	   prudential	  
supervisor	  of	  financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  euro	  area.	  The	  ECB	  will	  directly	  supervise	  the	  
largest	   banks,	   while	   the	   national	   supervisors	  will	   continue	   to	  monitor	   the	   remaining	  
banks.	   Lastly,	   to	   ensure	   an	   orderly	   resolution	   of	   failing	   banks	  with	  minimal	   costs	   for	  
taxpayers	   and	   to	   the	   real	   economy,	   a	   Single	   Resolution	   Mechanism	   (SRM)	   will	   be	  
applied	   to	  banks	   covered	  by	   the	  SSM.	  By	  moving	   responsibility	   for	  potential	   financial	  
support	   —and	   the	   associated	   banking	   supervision—	   to	   a	   shared	   level,	   the	   banking	  
union	   would	   reduce	   financial	   fragmentation	   and	   weaken	   the	   vicious	   circle	   of	   rising	  
sovereign	  and	  bank	  borrowing	  costs	  in	  many	  countries	  (Goyal	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  
This	   essay	   analyzes	   several	   factors	   that	   the	   literature	   suggests	   influence	   bank	  
risk,	   including	  bank-­‐specific	   variables	   (Arena,	   2008;	  Poghosyan	  and	  Čihak,	   2011)	   and	  
macroeconomic	   variables	   (Borio	   and	   Lowe,	   2002;	   Festic	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   The	   global	  
financial	  crisis	  has	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  early	  identification	  of	  riskier	  banks,	  
as	   this	  allows	  solving	   the	  problems	  at	  a	   lower	  cost.	  The	  bank	  bailout	  costs	  associated	  
with	   the	   current	   global	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	   large	   output	   losses	   experienced	   in	  
several	  European	  countries	  clearly	  indicate	  the	  need	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  
determinants	   of	   bank	   risk.	   We	   focus	   on	   the	   Eurozone	   because	   these	   countries	   must	  
coordinate	   their	   economic	   and	   fiscal	   policies	   closely	   –	   much	  more	   so	   than	   other	   EU	  
member	  states.	  As	  stated	  by	  Poghosyan	  and	  Čihak	  (2011),	  an	   important	  motivation	   in	  
favor	  of	  a	  more	  centralized	  banking	  regulation	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  risks	  in	  the	  
banking	   sectors	  of	  EU	  members	  have	  become	   increasingly	  homogenous.	  An	   improved	  
understanding	   of	   the	   determinants	   of	   bank	   risk	   in	   the	   euro	   area	   is	   important	   for	  
regulators	   and	   supervisors	   concerned	   about	   benchmarking	   and	   validation	   issues	  
related	  to	  the	  new	  EU	  banking	  rules,	  but	  they	  may	  also	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
financial	  market	  participants,	  including	  borrowers,	  shareholders	  and	  bondholders.	  
The	   non-­‐performing	   loan	   ratio	   (NPLr),	   defined	   as	   the	   proportion	   of	   non-­‐
performing	  loans	  to	  gross	  loans,	  has	  been	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  a	  measure	  
of	  bank	  soundness	  (Berger	  and	  De	  Young,	  1997;	  Delis	  and	  Kouretas,	  2011;	  Festic	  et	  al.,	  
2011).	   Because	   NPLr	   expresses	   the	   quality	   of	   a	   loan	   portfolio,	   we	  may	   expect	   that	   a	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higher	   (lower)	   value	   for	   this	   ratio	  will	   denote	   a	  higher	   (lower)	  probability	   of	   default.	  
There	   is	  broad	  consensus	  concerning	   the	   inverse	  relationship	  of	  asset	  quality	   to	  bank	  
risk.	   Poghosyan	   and	   Čihak	   (2011)	   go	   even	   further	   and	   advocate	   considering	   asset	  
quality	  in	  addition	  to	  bank	  capitalization	  when	  designing	  pan-­‐European	  benchmarks	  for	  
sound	  banking	   conduct.	   These	   authors	   conclude	   that	   bank	   earnings	   and	   asset	   quality	  
have	  a	  greater	  economic	   impact	  on	  bank	  distress	  than	  capitalization,	  which	  reinforces	  
our	  choice	  of	  the	  NPLr	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  bank	  risk.	  
As	   a	   complementary	   indicator,	   we	   use	   the	   Z-­‐score,	   which	   has	   also	   been	  
frequently	   used	   to	   analyze	   the	   determinants	   of	   bank	   risk	   in	   the	   recent	   literature	  
(Laeven	   and	   Levine,	   2009;	   Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   and	   Huizinga,	   2010;	   Köhler,	   2015).	   This	  
metric	   is	  defined	  as	   the	  number	  of	   standard	  deviations	   that	  a	  bank’s	   return	  on	  assets	  
must	  fall	  below	  the	  mean	  for	  the	  bank	  to	  become	  insolvent.	  The	  Z-­‐score	  is	  considered	  a	  
better	   measure	   of	   bank	   risk	   than	   the	   NPLr	   because	   non-­‐performing	   loans	   are	  
traditionally	   backward	   looking	   and	   highly	   procyclical	   (Laeven	   and	   Majnoni,	   2003;	  
Bikker	  and	  Metzemakers,	  2005).	  In	  addition,	  NPLr	  only	  measures	  credit	  risk,	  while	  the	  
Z-­‐score	   is	   an	   overall	  measure	   of	   bank	   risk	   that	   captures	   not	   only	   credit	   risk	   but	   also	  
liquidity	   and	  market	   risk,	  which	   arises	   primarily	   from	   non-­‐lending	   activities	   (Köhler,	  
2015).	  
This	  essay	  contributes	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  in	  various	  ways.	  First,	  this	  work	  
complements	  the	  previous	  literature	  by	  analyzing	  the	  factors	  (bank-­‐specific	  and	  macro)	  
that	   influence	  bank	  risk	   in	  euro	  area	  commercial	  banks.	  The	  selected	   time	  span,	   from	  
2001	  to	  2012,	  considers	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  on	  the	  
Eurozone	   banking	   system.	   To	   the	   best	   of	   our	   knowledge,	   little	   research	   has	   been	  
conducted	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  both	  bank-­‐specific	  and	  macroeconomic	  variables	  on	  the	  risk	  
of	  European	  commercial	  banks	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  on-­‐going	   financial	   crisis.7	  Second,	  
we	  use	   the	   generalized	  method	  of	  moments	   (GMM)	  estimator,	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  
                                                
7	  Cipollini	  and	  Fiordelisi	  (2012)	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  liquidity,	  size,	  income	  diversification,	  market	  power,	  
concentration	   and	  GDP	  growth	  on	  bank	   financial	   distress	  using	   a	   sample	  of	   308	  European	   commercial	  
banks	   (from	   both	   Eurozone	   and	   non-­‐Eurozone	   countries)	   between	   1996	   and	   2009.	   Haq	   and	   Heaney	  
(2012)	   examine	   the	   impact	   of	   bank	   capital,	   charter	   value,	   off-­‐balance	   sheet	   activities,	   dividend	   payout	  
ratio,	  size,	  operating	  leverage,	  regulation,	   industry	  concentration	  and	  GDP	  growth	  on	  risk	  for	  117	  listed	  
banks	   (bank	   holding	   companies,	   commercial	   banks,	   savings	   banks	   and	   credit	   cooperatives)	   across	   15	  
European	  countries	  (10	  Eurozone	  and	  5	  non-­‐Eurozone	  countries)	  over	  the	  period	  1996-­‐2010.	  
Essays	  on	  Bank	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  Diversification,	  and	  Ethics	  during	  the	  Financial	  Crisis	  
 
48	  
system-­‐GMM	   estimator,	   developed	   for	   dynamic	   panel	   models	   by	   Arellano	   and	   Bover	  
(1995)	   and	   Blundell	   and	   Bond	   (1998).	   It	   allows	   us	   to	   control	   for	   unobserved	  
heterogeneity	   as	   well	   as	   for	   endogeneity.	   This	   new	   technique	   has	   only	   been	   used	   in	  
recent	  studies	  on	   the	  determinants	  of	  bank	  risk	   (e.g.,	  Delis	  and	  Staikouras,	  2011;	  Haq	  
and	  Heaney,	  2012;	  Louzis	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
The	   essay	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   Section	   2	   reviews	   the	   most	   significant	  
empirical	   studies	   and	  presents	   our	   research	  hypotheses.	   Section	  3	  describes	   the	  data	  
and	   methodology	   employed	   in	   the	   empirical	   research	   and	   defines	   the	   explanatory	  
variables.	  Section	  4	  presents	  and	  discusses	  the	  results	  obtained.	  Section	  5	  summarizes	  
the	  results	  obtained	  and	  the	  conclusions	  drawn.	  
2 Literature	  review	  and	  research	  hypotheses	  
According	  to	  the	  literature,	  the	  factors	  that	  influence	  bank	  risk	  fall	  into	  two	  main	  
groups.	  First,	   there	   is	  a	  group	  of	   risk	  determinants	   that	  are	   specific	   to	  each	  bank	  and	  
that,	   in	  many	  cases,	   are	   the	  direct	   result	  of	  managerial	  decisions.	  These	  determinants	  
include	   asset	   structure,	   capitalization,	   non-­‐deposit	   funding,	   profitability,	   efficiency,	  
revenue	  diversification	  and	  size.	  The	  second	  group	  of	  determinants	  includes	  factors	  that	  
relate	   bank	   risk	   to	   the	   industry	   structure	   and	   to	   the	   macroeconomic	   environment	  
within	  which	   the	   banking	   system	  operates,	   such	   as	   industry	   concentration,	   economic	  
growth,	  inflation,	  unemployment	  and	  interest	  rates.	  
2.1 Asset	  structure	  
One	  of	   the	  most	  criticized	  practices	   in	  banking	  has	  been	  the	  ease	  with	  which	   it	  
has	  provided	   loans	   in	   times	  of	   economic	  expansion.	  The	   share	  of	   loans	   to	   the	  private	  
sector	   in	   total	   banking	   assets	   is	   considered	   an	   important	   driver	   of	   credit	   risk.	   Many	  
studies	   have	   found	   that	   the	   relative	   percentage	   of	   loans	   to	   total	   assets	   is	   positively	  
correlated	  with	  banking	  problems,	   increasing	  NPL	  and	   insolvency	   as	   a	   result	   of	   long-­‐
term	  bank	  mismanagement	  (De	  Nicoló	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Blasco	  and	  Sinkey,	  2006;	  Männasoo	  
and	   Mayes,	   2009;	   among	   others).	   This	   greater	   relative	   proportion	   of	   loans	   in	   the	  
portfolio	   of	   the	   bank	   is	   usually	   coupled	  with	   a	   greater	   liquidity	   risk	   arising	   from	   the	  
banks’	  inability	  to	  accommodate	  decreases	  in	  liabilities	  or	  to	  fund	  increases	  on	  the	  asset	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side	   of	   the	   balance	   sheet	   (Trujillo-­‐Ponce,	   2013).	   Consequently,	   a	   bank	   holding	   a	   high	  
proportion	  of	  loan	  assets	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  also	  have	  lower	  Z-­‐score	  ratios.8	  
Therefore,	  we	  hypothesize	  the	  following	  relationship:	  
Hypothesis	  1:	  There	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  relative	  percentage	  of	  loans	  in	  
the	  assets	  of	  a	  bank	  and	  its	  risk.	  
2.2 Capitalization	  	  
The	  need	  to	  regulate	  bank	  capital	  is	  based,	  among	  other	  reasons,	  on	  the	  important	  
role	  of	  capital	  requirements	  as	  a	  disincentive	  to	  risk-­‐taking	  by	  bank	  shareholders,	  who	  
may	  be	   conditioned	  by	   limited	   liability	   (Behr	  et	  al.,	   2010),	   as	  well	   as	   the	  well-­‐known	  
moral	   hazard	   problem	   that	   often	   accompanies	   the	   deposit	   insurance	   system	   or	   the	  
expectation	  of	  a	  bailout	  with	  public	   funds	   (Santos,	  2001;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  et	  al.,	   2013).	  
Therefore,	   Capital	   Accords	   (i.e.,	   Basel	   I,	   II	   and	   III)	  were	   primarily	   designed	   to	   reduce	  
bank	   risk.	   By	   investing	   their	   own	  money,	   bank	   shareholders	   assume	   part	   of	   the	   risk	  
caused	   by	   an	   inappropriate	   investment	   strategy.	   However,	   both	   the	   theoretical	   and	  
empirical	  literature	  provides	  conflicting	  results	  about	  the	  effect	  of	  capital	  on	  bank	  risk.	  
Theoretical	   models	   by	   Koenh	   and	   Santomero	   (1980)	   and	   Kim	   and	   Santomero	  
(1988)	   state,	  with	   incomplete	  market	   settings,	   that	   regulators	   introducing	   flat	   capital	  
requirements	   force	   banks	   to	   reduce	   leverage,	   and	   bankers	   may	   choose	   a	   riskier	  
portfolio	  to	  compensate	  the	  loss	  in	  utility	  caused	  by	  this	  reduction.	  Furlong	  and	  Keeley	  
(1989)	  and	  Keeley	  and	  Furlong	  (1990)	  conclude	  that	  increased	  capital	  standards	  reduce	  
bank	  risk-­‐taking,	  improving	  the	  moral	  hazard	  generated	  by	  deposit	  insurance	  systems.	  
Gennotte	  and	  Pyle	  (1991)	  find	  that,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  required	  increases	  in	  bank	  capital	  
reduce	   the	   probability	   of	   default.	   Santos	   (1999)	   also	   concludes	   that	   more	   stringent	  
capital	  requirements	  reduce	  banks’	  risk	  of	  insolvency.	  Blum	  (1999)	  and	  Calem	  and	  Rob	  
(1999)	  rely	  on	  dynamic	  models.	  Blum	  (1999)	  concludes	  that	  capital	  requirements	  may	  
increase	   bank	   risk.	   However,	   Calem	   and	   Rob	   (1999)	   conclude	   that	   the	   relationship	  
between	   capital	   and	   bank	   risk-­‐taking	   is	   U-­‐shaped.	   When	   capital	   is	   lower	   than	   the	  
                                                
8	  However,	  banks	  with	  higher	  liquid	  assets	  (e.g.,	  cash,	  government	  securities)	  may	  also	  be	  less	  profitable,	  
and	  therefore,	  high	  liquidity	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  lower	  Z-­‐scores	  (Delis	  and	  Staikouras,	  2011).	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regulatory	  minimum,	   banks	   choose	   a	   very	   risky	   loan	   portfolio	   to	  maximize	   the	   risk-­‐
shifting	   benefits	   of	   deposit	   insurance.	   As	   capital	   increases	   and	   future	   default	   become	  
less	  likely,	  the	  incentives	  to	  be	  riskier	  decrease	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  bank	  charter	  value.	  
Lastly,	   overcapitalized	   banks	   take	  more	   risk	   because	   their	   portfolio	   choices	   ensure	   a	  
very	   low	  probability	  of	   insolvency.	  More	  recently,	  Kopecky	  and	  VanHoose	  (2006)	   find	  
that	  the	  imposition	  of	  regulatory	  capital	  requirements	  has	  an	  initially	  ambiguous	  effect	  
on	   aggregate	   loan	   quality,	   although	   once	   such	   requirements	   are	   in	   place,	   further	  
increases	   in	   required	   capital	   ratios	   cause	   the	   overall	   credit	   quality	   in	   the	   banking	  
system	  to	  increase.	  Behr	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  conclude	  that	  capital	  regulation	  is	  only	  effective	  in	  
mitigating	  risk	  taking	  in	  markets	  with	  a	  low	  degree	  of	  concentration.	  
We	  test	  the	  following	  two	  hypotheses	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  capital	  on	  bank	  risk:	  
Hypothesis	  2a:	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  bank	  capitalization	  and	  risk.	  
Hypothesis	  2b:	  There	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  bank	  capitalization	  and	  risk.	  
2.3 Non-­‐deposit	  funding	  
When	  a	  firm	  relies	  on	  short-­‐term	  wholesale	  funds	  to	  support	   long-­‐term	  illiquid	  
assets,	   it	   becomes	   vulnerable	   to	   runs	   by	   its	   creditors.	   The	   recent	   financial	   crisis	   has	  
clearly	  exposed	  the	  risks	  of	  a	  bank´s	  excessive	  reliance	  on	  non-­‐deposit	  funding,	  as	  many	  
firms	   experienced	   an	   outflow	   of	   wholesale	   funds	   following	   the	   failure	   of	   Lehman	  
Brothers	   in	   September	   2008.	   Huang	   and	   Ratnovski	   (2011),	   for	   example,	   state	   that	  
wholesale	  financiers	  could	  have	  lower	  incentives	  to	  conduct	  costly	  monitoring	  and	  may	  
thus	  withdraw	  their	  funds	  precipitately	  based	  on	  a	  noisy	  public	  signal	  on	  bank	  solvency.	  
The	   price	   of	   wholesale	   funding	   could	   also	   adjust	   more	   quickly	   to	   reflect	   a	   bank’s	  
riskiness	   (Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   and	   Huizinga,	   2010).	   Customer	   deposits,	   in	   contrast,	   are	  
slower	   to	   be	   re-­‐priced	   and	   are	  more	   stable,	   not	   least	   because	   they	   are	   protected	   by	  
deposit	  insurance	  systems	  (Shleifer	  and	  Vishny,	  2010;	  Köhler,	  2015).	  
We	  hypothesize	  the	  following	  relationship:	  
Hypothesis	  3:	  There	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  share	  of	  non-­‐deposit	  funds	  in	  the	  
liabilities	  of	  a	  bank	  and	  its	  risk.	  
Pablo	  de	  Olavide	  University,	  Seville	  (Spain)	   	  
 




2.4 	  Profitability	  
More	  profitable	   banks	  may	  be	  more	   likely	   to	   have	   high	   franchise	   value,	  which	  
could	   influence	   their	   risk-­‐taking	   behavior	   (Behr	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   There	   is	   widespread	  
consensus	   about	   the	   negative	   relationship	   between	   bank	   performance	   and	   risk.	  
Poghosyan	  and	  Čihak	  (2011)	  show	  how	  European	  banks	  with	  good	  earnings	  profiles	  are	  
less	   likely	   to	   experience	  distress	   in	   the	  upcoming	  year.	   Louzis	  et	  al.	   (2012)	   state	   that	  
worse	   performance	   may	   be	   a	   proxy	   for	   lower-­‐quality	   skills	   with	   respect	   to	   lending	  
activities.	   Furthermore,	   these	   authors	   provide	   empirical	   evidence	   that	   performance	  
may	  serve	  as	  a	  leading	  indicator	  of	  future	  problem	  loans.	  	  
Based	  on	  these	  findings,	  we	  expect	  to	  find	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  bank	  
profitability	  and	  risk.	  
Hypothesis	  4:	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  a	  bank’s	  returns	  and	  its	  risk.	  
2.5 Efficiency	  
Many	  studies	  show	  that	  inefficiency	  is	  a	  source	  of	  bank	  risk.	  Recent	  studies	  use	  
the	  cost-­‐to-­‐income	  ratio	  (CIR)	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  efficiency	  or	  managerial	  quality	  (Mänasoo	  
and	  Myers,	   2009;	   Poghosyan	   and	   Čihak,	   2011;	   Louzis	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   among	   others).	   In	  
their	  Bad	  Management	  I	  Hypothesis,	  Louzis	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  state	  that	  low	  cost	  efficiency	  is	  
positively	  associated	  with	  increases	  in	  future	  NPLs,	  as	  long	  as	  bad	  management	  leads	  to	  
poor	   skills	   in	   credit	   scoring,	   appraisal	   of	   pledged	   collaterals	   and	   monitoring	   of	  
borrowers.	   Other	   authors,	   focusing	   either	   on	   cost	   efficiency	   (Berger	   and	   De	   Young,	  
1997;	  Williams,	  2004)	  or	  on	  profit	  or	  revenue	  efficiency	  (Berger	  and	  Bonaccorsi	  di	  Patti,	  
2006;	  Fiordelisi	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  report	  similar	  findings.	  
Our	  fourth	  hypothesis	  is,	  therefore,	  the	  following:	  
Hypothesis	  5:	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  bank	  efficiency	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
2.6 Revenue	  diversification	  
Bank	   activity	   has	   evolved	   over	   the	   last	   few	   decades,	   resulting	   in	   a	   more	  
diversified	  balance	  sheet.	  There	  are	  various	  activities	  that	  provide	  non-­‐interest	  income,	  
such	  as	  fees,	  commissions	  and	  trading.	  The	  greater	  the	  proportion	  of	  these	  activities	  in	  a	  
bank’s	   portfolio,	   the	  more	   diversified	   the	   bank	   is.	   There	   is	   plenty	   of	   literature	   about	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how	   diversification	   influences	   bank	   risk,	   and	   the	   conclusions	   differ,	   in	   several	   cases,	  
from	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  traditional	  portfolio	  and	  banking	  theories	  (Deng	  et	  al.,	  
2007).	  
Portfolio	  theory,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  traditional	  arguments	  based	  on	  Diamond	  (1984),	  
suggests	   that	   diversification	   effects	   contribute	   to	   the	   reduction	   of	   risk	   in	   all	   types	   of	  
firms,	   including	   financial	   intermediaries.	   In	   this	   vein,	   Lee	   et	   al.	   (2014)	   conclude	   that	  
non-­‐interest	   income	   activities	   play	   a	   strong	   role	   in	   reducing	   risk	   of	   Asian	   banks.	  
Similarly,	  Köhler	  (2015)	  states	  that	  retail-­‐oriented	  banks	  are	  significantly	  more	  stable	  if	  
they	   increase	   their	   share	  of	   non-­‐interest	   income	   in	   total	   operating	   income,	   indicating	  
that	  substantial	  benefits	  are	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  revenue	  diversification.	  However,	  many	  
authors	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  diversification	  not	  only	  does	  not	  reduce	  bank	  risk	  but	  may,	  
in	   fact,	  encourage	   it.	  One	  such	  author	   is	  De	   Jonghe	  (2010),	  who	  states	   that	   traditional	  
banking	   activities	   are	   less	   risky.	  He	   concludes	   that	   the	  banks	   that	  profitably	   focus	  on	  
lending	  activities	  contribute	  more	  to	  banking	  system	  stability	  than	  diversified	  banks.	  In	  
this	   vein,	   Stiroh	   (2002)	   finds	   that	   during	   the	   period	   from	   the	   late	   1970s	   to	   2001,	   a	  
greater	  reliance	  on	  non-­‐interest	  income	  by	  U.S.	  banks,	  particularly	  on	  trading	  revenue,	  
was	  associated	  with	  higher	  risk	  and	   lower	  risk-­‐adjusted	  profits	  at	   the	   individual	  bank	  
level.	   Lastly,	   Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   and	   Huizinga	   (2010)	   analyze	   a	   sample	   of	   international	  
banks	   for	   the	   1995-­‐2007	   period.	   They	   conclude	   that	   although	   expansion	   into	   non-­‐
interest	   income-­‐generating	   activities	   such	   as	   trading	   could	   offer	   some	   risk	  
diversification	   benefits,	   banking	   strategies	   that	   rely	   prominently	   on	   generating	   non-­‐
interest	  income	  are	  very	  risky,	  consistent	  with	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  US	  investment	  banking	  
sector.	  
The	  ambiguity	  of	   the	  results	  on	   this	  subject	   leads	  us	   to	  propose	  hypotheses	  6a	  
and	  6b:	  
Hypothesis	   6a:	  There	   is	   a	  negative	   relationship	  between	   the	   revenue	  diversification	  of	   a	  
bank	  and	  its	  risk.	  	  
Hypothesis	   6b:	   There	   is	   a	   positive	   relationship	   between	   the	   revenue	   diversification	   of	   a	  
bank	  and	  its	  risk.	  	  
Pablo	  de	  Olavide	  University,	  Seville	  (Spain)	   	  
 





Bank	  size	  has	  become	  a	  popular	  research	  topic,	  particularly	  during	  this	  financial	  
crisis,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  studies	  related	  to	  too-­‐big-­‐
to-­‐fail	  entities	  and	  systemic	  important	  banks	  (SIBs).	  There	  is	  a	  widespread	  theory	  that	  
larger	  banks	  tend	  to	  be	  riskier	  due	  to	  a	  moral	  hazard	  problem	  (Uhde	  and	  Heimeshoff,	  
2009;	  De	  Jonghe,	  2010).	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  larger	  entities	  may	  be	  more	  attracted	  
to	   amplifying	   risk	   taking,	   reducing	   market	   discipline	   and	   creating	   competitive	  
distortions	  because	  they	  know	  they	  will	  be	  bailed	  out.	  Paradoxically,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  view	  
that	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   larger	   banks	   are	   less	   prone	   to	   risk	   because	   of	   their	  
managerial	  capacity	  and	  efficiency.	  This	  view	  is	  expressed	  by	  Boyd	  and	  Prescott	  (1986)	  
and	  Salas	  and	  Saurina	  (2002)	  among	  others.	  These	  authors	  state	  that	  larger	  banks	  may	  
be	   able	   to	   diversify	   loan	   portfolio	   risks	  more	   efficiently	   due	   to	   greater	   economies	   of	  
scale	  and	  scope.	  Thus,	  we	  formulate	  two	  hypotheses	  of	  different	  signs.	  
Hypothesis	  7a:	  There	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  size	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
Hypothesis	  7b:	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  size	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
2.8 Industry	  concentration	  
There	  has	  been	  a	  tendency	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  toward	  concentration	  in	  the	  
financial	   sector,	   a	   tendency	   that	   has	   increased	   substantially	   in	   recent	   years.	   We	   are	  
experiencing	   the	   greatest	   era	   of	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   in	   European	   history,	  
especially	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  Empirical	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  
influence	  of	  concentration	  on	  bank	  risk	  could	  be	  positive	  or	  negative.	  According	  to	  the	  
so-­‐called	   concentration	   stability	   view,	   a	   less	   concentrated	   banking	   sector	   with	  many	  
banks	  is	  more	  prone	  to	  financial	  crises	  than	  a	  concentrated	  banking	  sector	  with	  a	  few	  
banks	   (Allen	   and	   Gale,	   2000).	   First,	   monopolistic	   banks	   in	   concentrated	   banking	  
systems	   may	   enhance	   profits	   and	   thus	   reduce	   financial	   fragility	   by	   providing	   higher	  
capital	   buffers	   that	   increase	   their	   charter	   value	   and	   thus	   reduce	   incentives	   for	   bank	  
owners	  and	  managers	  to	  take	  excessive	  risks	  (Keeley,	  1990;	  Park	  and	  Peristiani,	  2007).	  
Second,	   bank	   supervision	   will	   be	   more	   effective	   in	   concentrated	   banking	   systems	  
because	  they	  are	  substantially	  easier	  to	  monitor,	  and	  thus,	  systemic	  crises	  will	  be	   less	  
pronounced	   (Allen	   and	   Gale,	   2000).	   Contrary	   to	   this	   viewpoint,	   there	   is	   also	   a	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concentration	   fragility	   view	   that	   is	   supported,	   among	   others,	   by	   Boyd	   and	   De	   Nicoló	  
(2005).	   Their	   findings	   postulate	   that	   large	   entities	  with	  monopoly	   power	   can	   charge	  
higher	   interest	   to	   their	   clients,	   who	   then	   need	   to	   engage	   in	   riskier	   investments	   to	  
meet	  their	  financing	  costs.	  This	  situation	  results	  in	  more	  loan	  defaults,	  which	  increases	  
the	  likelihood	  of	  bank	  failure.	  Again,	  we	  propose	  two	  opposing	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  tested.	  
Hypothesis	  8a:	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  industry	  concentration	  and	  bank	  
risk.	  
Hypothesis	  8b:	  There	   is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  industry	  concentration	  and	  bank	  
risk.	  
2.9 Economic	  growth	  
With	   few	   exceptions,	   the	   banking	   sector	   has	   exhibited	   a	   clearly	   cyclical	  
behavior.9	  Most	  of	  the	  literature	  states	  that	  higher	  rates	  of	  growth	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  
more	   stable	   macroeconomic	   environment	   and	   a	   relatively	   low	   likelihood	   of	   bank	  
distress	   (e.g.,	   Borio	   and	   Lowe,	   2002,	   Festic	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Pophosyan	   and	   Cihak,	   2011;	  
among	  others).	  Marcucci	   and	  Quagliariello	   (2008)	  analyze	   the	  behavior	  of	   the	  default	  
rates	  of	  Italian	  bank	  borrowers	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  and	  confirm	  that	  the	  default	  
rates	   follow	   a	   cyclical	   pattern.	   It	   was	   observed	   that	   the	   rates	   decrease	   during	   good	  
macroeconomic	   times	   and	   increase	   during	   downturns.	   Similarly,	   Borio	   and	   Lowe	  
(2002)	  analyze	  a	  sample	  of	  35	  countries	  and	  state	  that,	  since	  1970,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  risk	  
of	  greater	  amplitude	  in	  financial	  cycles	  going	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  more	  disruptive	  booms	  
and	  busts	  in	  real	  economic	  activity.	  
Therefore,	  we	  expect	  a	  negative	  association	  between	  economic	  growth	  and	  bank	  
risk.	  
Hypothesis	  9:	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  economic	  growth	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
                                                
9	  These	  exceptions	  refer	   to	   the	  Australian	  market	  over	   the	  1990-­‐1999	  period	  (Arpa	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  and	  to	  
Canadian	  banks	  over	  the	  1982-­‐2009	  period	  (Guidara	  et	  al.,	  2013).	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Arpa	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  conclude	  that	  the	  share	  of	  risk	  provisions	  in	  the	  total	  loans	  of	  
the	  banking	  sector	  varies	  directly	  with	   inflation	  (both	  consumer	  price	  index	  (CPI)	  and	  
real	  estate	  price	  inflation).	  Likewise,	  Baboucek	  and	  Jancar	  (2005)	  show	  that	  increasing	  
inflation	  ratios	  deteriorate	  the	  NPLr.	  Uhde	  and	  Heimeshoff	  (2009)	  state	  that	  the	  effect	  
of	  changes	  in	   inflation	  rates	  depends	  on	  whether	   inflation	  is	  anticipated	  by	  banks	  and	  
whether	  it	  coincides	  with	  general	  economic	  fragility.	  
Therefore,	  we	  expect	  a	  positive	  association	  between	  inflation	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
Hypothesis	  10:	  There	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  inflation	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
2.11 Unemployment	  
Some	  researchers	  also	  use	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  to	  explain	  bank	  risk.	  Bofondi	  
and	  Ropele	  (2011),	  for	  example,	  state	  that	  increasing	  unemployment	  had	  a	  significantly	  
adverse	  effect	  on	  loan	  portfolio	  quality	  for	  a	  sample	  of	  Italian	  banks	  during	  the	  period	  
1990	  to	  2010.	  Similarly,	  Louzis	  et	  al.	   (2012)	   find	  that	  unemployment	  has	  a	  direct	  and	  
significant	   impact	   on	   all	   NPL	   categories	   (business	   loans,	   consumer	   loans	   and	  
mortgages),	  with	  mortgages	  being	  the	  least	  sensitive	  NPL	  type.	  
Therefore,	  we	  hypothesize	   a	   positive	   relationship	  between	  unemployment	   and	  
bank	  risk.	  	  
Hypothesis	  11:	  There	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  unemployment	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
2.12 Interest	  rates	  
Lastly,	   there	   is	  considerable	  research	  that	  supports	  the	  view	  that	   interest	  rates	  
have	   a	   strong	   influence	   on	   bank	   risk.	   Hoggarth	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   find	   that	   the	   important	  
factors	   indirectly	   influencing	   financial	   stability	   and	   loan	   portfolio	   quality	   are	   the	  
dynamics	  of	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  recent	  line	  of	  research	  
that	   shows	  how	   the	   low-­‐interest-­‐rate	   environment	  of	   the	   last	   decade	  has	   encouraged	  
bank	  risk	  taking	  in	  search	  of	  yield	  (e.g.,	  Delis	  and	  Kouretas,	  2011;	  Agur	  and	  Demertzis,	  
2012).	  
Therefore,	  we	  formulate	  the	  following	  hypothesis:	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Hypothesis	  12:	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  interest	  rates	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
3 Data	  and	  Methodological	  Aspects	  
3.1 Sample	  
Our	   sample	   consists	   of	   204	   commercial	   banks	   operating	   in	   14	   European	  
countries	  over	   the	  period	  2001	   to	  2012.	  We	   focus	  on	  countries	   that	  belong	   to	   the	  EU	  
and	  that	  have	  adopted	  the	  Euro	  as	  their	  common	  currency	  (Eurozone).10	  By	  sharing	  the	  
same	  currency,	  euro	  area	  countries	  must	  coordinate	  their	  economic	  and	  fiscal	  policies	  
closely.	  We	   also	   limit	   our	   analysis	   to	   commercial	   banks,	   as	   different	   bank	   types	   (e.g.,	  
commercial	  banks,	  savings	  banks,	  cooperative	  banks,	   investment	  banks)	  have	  singular	  
characteristics	   that	  may	  affect	  bank	  risk-­‐taking	  (see,	   for	  example,	  Delgado	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  
Iannotta	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  among	  others).	  
We	  chose	  banks	  based	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  data	   from	  the	  Bankscope	  database	  
maintained	   by	   Bureau	   Van	   Dijk	   in	   order	   to	   implement	   the	   system-­‐GMM	   estimator	  
described	   in	   Section	   3.2.	  We	   require	   sample	   banks	   to	   have	   information	   for	   all	   of	   the	  
variables	  analyzed	  over	  at	  least	  five	  consecutive	  years	  during	  the	  period	  considered	  (to	  
test	   for	   the	  absence	  of	   second-­‐order	  serial	   correlation).	   Indicators	  are	  calculated	  on	  a	  
non-­‐consolidated	   basis,	   meaning	   that	   banking	   subsidiaries	   and	   foreign	   branches	   are	  
considered	   separate	   credit	   institutions.	   This	   reduces	   the	   possibility	   of	   introducing	  
aggregation	   bias	   in	   the	   results	   (Delis	   and	   Staikouras,	   2011).	   Merged	   banks	   are	  
considered	  separate	  entities	  before	  the	  merger	  and	  a	  single	  entity	  subsequently.	  All	  of	  
the	   ratios	   capturing	   bank-­‐specific	   characteristics	   are	   calculated	   based	   on	   the	  
standardized	  global	  accounting	   format.	  Those	  entities	   that	  present	  abnormal	  ratios	  or	  
extreme	   values	   were	   eliminated	   from	   the	   sample	   as	   outliers.	   After	   completing	   this	  
filtering,	   we	   obtain	   a	   final	   dataset	   consisting	   of	   an	   unbalanced	   panel	   with	   1,423	  
observations.11 	  In	   contrast	   to	   other	   studies	   that	   examine	   only	   listed	   banks	   (e.g.,	  
                                                
10	  We	   restrict	   the	   analysis	   to	   countries	   that	   have	   adopted	   the	  Euro	  during	   the	   sample	   period	   and	   thus	  
have	  a	  common	  monetary	  policy.	  We	  exclude	  the	  cases	  of	  Cyprus,	  Estonia	  and	  Malta	  because	  we	  do	  not	  
have	  at	  least	  five	  consecutive	  years	  of	  data	  after	  these	  countries	  adopted	  the	  Euro.	  Slovakia	  is	  included	  in	  
the	  sample	  because	  its	  currency	  has	  been	  pegged	  to	  the	  Euro	  since	  2008.	  
11	  The	  number	  of	  observations	  (banks)	  was	  reduced	  from	  1,423	  (204)	  to	  1,132	  (181)	  when	  the	  Z-­‐score	  
was	  used	  as	  the	  bank	  risk	  proxy.	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Altunbas	  et	  al.,	   2011;	  Haq	  and	  Heaney,	   2012),	  most	  banks	   in	  our	   sample	   are	  unlisted	  
(approximately	   73	   percent),	   which	   gives	   a	   more	   representative	   picture	   of	   the	   EU	  
banking	  sector,	  as	  unlisted	  banks	  account	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  banks	  in	  Europe	  (Köhler,	  
2015).	   However,	   this	   implies	   the	   use	   of	   accounting	  measures	   of	   bank	   risk,	   and	   these	  
measures	  have	  some	  limitations.	  As	  Altunbas	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  state,	  managers	  could	  make	  
use	  of	  some	  timing	  discretion	  over	  these	  metrics	  to	  minimize	  regulatory	  costs.	  They	  are	  
also	  backward	  looking.	  
Table	  1	  shows	  the	  number	  of	  banks	  and	  observations	  in	  the	  sample	  by	  country.	  
Table	  1.	  Commercial	  banks	  in	  the	  sample	  by	  country	  
Country Commercial banks Observations 
Austria 6 51 
Belgium 4 29 
Finland 3 19 
France 58 426 
Germany 8 56 
Greece 7 50 
Ireland 7 51 
Italy 53 367 
Luxembourg 3 19 
Netherlands 8 56 
Portugal 9 63 
Slovakia 6 30 
Slovenia 12 68 
Spain 20 138 
Total Eurozone 204 1,423 
3.2 Methodology	  
The	   bank-­‐specific	   factors	   that	   influence	   bank	   risk	   may	   be	   endogenous.	   For	  
instance,	   banks	   could	   have	   incentives	   to	   increase	   their	   stock	   of	   liquid	   assets	   if	   they	  
become	  more	   risky	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   themselves	   against	   premature	  withdrawals	   of	  
funds	  (Köhler,	  2015),	  and	  influences	  on	  risk	  could	  also	  cause	  banks	  to	  adjust	  their	  fee	  
income	   and	   non-­‐deposit	   funding	   shares	   (Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   and	   Huizinga,	   2010).	   In	  
addition,	  some	  characteristics	  that	  affect	  bank	  risk	  (e.g.,	  managerial	  ability)	  are	  difficult	  
to	  measure	  or	   identify	   in	  an	  equation	  (the	  so-­‐called	  unobserved	  heterogeneity).	   If	   the	  
influence	  of	  such	  characteristics	  is	  not	  considered,	  then	  one	  could	  observe	  correlations	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between	  some	  of	  the	  coefficients	  of	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  and	  the	  error	  terms	  that	  
bias	   these	   coefficients.	   Lastly,	   the	   persistence	   of	   bank	   risk	   is	  well	   documented	   in	   the	  
literature	  (e.g.,	  Delis	  and	  Kouretas,	  2011).	  To	  address	  these	  concerns,	  we	  use	  the	  GMM	  
estimator	   developed	   for	   dynamic	   panel	   models	   by	   Arellano	   and	   Bover	   (1995)	   and	  
Blundell	  and	  Bond	  (1998),	  also	  referred	   to	  as	   the	  system-­‐GMM	  estimator.	  We	  employ	  
the	   two-­‐step	   estimation	   procedure	   with	   finite-­‐sample	   corrected	   standard	   errors	   as	  
proposed	   by	  Windmeijer	   (2005).	   This	   provides	   less	   biased	   coefficient	   estimates	   and	  
more	  accurate	  standard	  errors.	  
The	   system-­‐GMM	   estimator	   addresses	   endogeneity	   by	   means	   of	   suitable	  
instruments.	  We	  treat	  all	  bank	  characteristics	  as	  endogenous	  covariates	  by	  employing	  
lagged	  first	  differences	  of	  the	  bank-­‐specific	  explanatory	  variables	  as	  instruments	  for	  the	  
equation	   in	   levels	   and	   the	   lagged	   values	   of	   the	   explanatory	   variables	   in	   levels	   as	  
instruments	  for	  the	  equation	  in	  differences	  (in	  line	  with	  Arellano	  and	  Bover,	  1995,	  and	  
Blundell	   and	   Bond,	   1998).	   Industry	   concentration	   and	   macroeconomic	   variables	   are	  
treated	   as	   strictly	   exogenous.	   Similar	   to	  Delis	   and	   Staikouras	   (2011),	  we	   assume	   that	  
banks	  and	  regulators	  choose	  their	  strategy	  when	  they	  observe	  economic	  conditions	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  period.	  We	  verify	  that	  the	  instruments	  are	  statistically	  valid	  using	  a	  
Hansen	  J-­‐test	  of	  overidentifying	  restrictions.	  
Our	  baseline	  equation	  is	  as	  follows:	  
Yi,j,t	  =	  α	  +	  δ	  ·	  Yi,j,t-­‐1	  +	  β	  ·	  𝐵𝑆!,!,!	  +	  γ	  ·	  𝑀!,!	  +	  θ	  ·	  𝑅!,!!!	  +	  η	  ·	  Li,j,t	  +	  εi,j,t	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  
where	  Y	  denotes	  the	  variable	  used	  to	  measure	  the	  risk	  of	  bank	   i	   in	  country	   j	  at	  year	  t;	  
Yi,j,t-­‐1	  represent	  its	  lagged	  value;	  δ	  measures	  the	  speed	  of	  mean	  reversion	  (a	  value	  of	  δ	  
that	  is	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  0	  implies	  that	  bank	  risk	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  high	  
speed	  of	  adjustment,	  whereas	  a	  value	  that	  is	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  1	  means	  the	  
adjustment	   is	   very	   slow);	  BSi,j,t	  and	  Mj,t	  denote,	   respectively,	   the	   bank-­‐specific	   and	   the	  
industry	   and	  macroeconomic	   variables	   considered	   in	   our	   study;	  Rj,t-­‐1	  refers	   to	   several	  
bank	   regulation	   and	   supervision	   control	   variables;	   Li,j,t	   represents	   a	   dummy	   variable	  
controlling	   for	   the	   public	   status	   of	   the	   bank	   (it	   takes	   value	   1	   for	   listed	   banks	   and	   0	  
otherwise);	   and	  β,	  γ,	   and	  θ	   are	   vectors	   of	   coefficient	   estimates.	   Lastly,	   εi,t	   is	   the	  
disturbance	   term	   that	   contains	   the	   unobserved	   bank-­‐specific	   effect	   (ηi)	   and	   the	  
idiosyncratic	  error	  (νi,t).	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As	  previously	  stated,	  we	  proxy	  bank	  risk	  using	  two	  complementary	  metrics	  that	  
are	  intuitive	  and	  easily	  measured:	  the	  NPLr	  and	  the	  Z-­‐score.	  We	  take	  natural	  logarithms	  
to	   control	   for	   the	   skewness	   exhibited	   by	   the	   two	   original	   variables.	   The	   Z-­‐score	   is	  
calculated	   as	   the	   sum	   of	   the	   return	   on	   assets	   (ROA)	   and	   the	   equity-­‐to-­‐assets	   ratio	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  
	  
ROA	  is	  computed	  as	  pre-­‐tax	  profits	  divided	  by	  total	  assets.	  Following	  Agoraki	  et	  
al.	   (2011)	  and	  Delis	   and	  Staikouras	   (2011),	  we	  use	  data	   from	   the	   two	  previous	  years	  
(i.e.,	   t	   -­‐1,	   t	   -­‐2)	   to	   calculate	  σ(ROA)	   at	   time	   t.	  We	   also	   verify	   that	   using	   three	   or	   four	  
years	  gives	  similar	  results.	  	  
The	   Z-­‐score	   indicates	   the	   number	   of	   standard	   deviations	   below	   the	   expected	  
value	  of	  a	  bank’s	  ROA	  at	  which	  equity	  is	  depleted	  and	  the	  bank	  is	  insolvent	  (Boyd	  et	  al.,	  
1993;	  Boyd	  and	  Runkle,	  1993).	  Therefore,	   this	   index	  can	  be	   interpreted	  as	  an	   inverse	  
measure	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  insolvency,	  i.e.,	  a	  higher	  Z-­‐score	  implies	  that	  a	  bank	  incurs	  
fewer	  risks	  and	  is	  more	  stable	  (Köhler,	  2015).	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Table	  2.	  Explanatory	  variables	  	  





Source	   References	  	  
Bank-­‐specific	  variables	  
Asset	  structure	   Loans/Total	  Assets	  (%)	   Loan/TA	   H1	  (+)	  
Bankscope	  
Männasoo	  and	  Mayes	  
(2009)	  
Capitalization	   Equity/Total	  Assets	  (%)	   Eq/TA	   H2a	  (-­‐);	  H2b	  (+)	  
Poghosyan	  and	  Čihak	  
(2011)	  






NonDep/TL	   H3	  (+)	   Köhler	  (2015)	  
Profitability	   Return	  on	  Assets	  (%)	   ROA	   H4	  (-­‐)	  
Poghosyan	  and	  Čihak	  
(2011)	  
Efficiency	   Cost-­‐to-­‐Income	  Ratio	  (%)	   CIR	   H5	  (+)	  
Männasoo	  and	  Mayes	  
(2009)	  




Hirschman	  Index	   HHIRD	   H6a	  (-­‐);	  H6b	  (+)	  
Stiroh	  and	  Rumble	  (2006)	  
Size	   Natural	  Log	  of	  Total	  Assets	  	   Size	   H7a	  (+),	  H7b	  (-­‐)	   Louzis	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  




Hirschman	  Index	   HHIIC	   H8a	  (-­‐),	  H8b	  (+)	   ECB	  
Uhde	  and	  Heimeshoff	  
(2009)	  




Annual	  Real	  GDP	  
Growth	  Rate	  (%)	   GDP	   H9	  (-­‐)	  
Eurostat	  




Rate	  Change	  in	  CPI	  
(%)	  
Inflation	   H10	  (+)	   Männasoo	  and	  Mayes	  (2009)	  
Unemployment	  	   Unemployment	  Rate	  (%)	   UR	   H11	  (+)	   Bofondi	  and	  Ropele	  (2011)	  
Interest	  rates	  
Interest	  Rate	  on	  
the	  MRO	  of	  the	  ECB	  
(%)	  
Interest	   H12	  (-­‐)	   ECB	   Uhde	  and	  Heimeshoff	  (2009)	  
	  
Pablo	  de	  Olavide	  University,	  Seville	  (Spain)	   	  
 




Table	  2	  summarizes	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  considered	  in	  the	  current	  study	  
and	  their	  expected	  signs	  for	  bank	  risk.	  To	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  asset	  structure	  on	  bank	  
risk	  (H1),	  we	  use	  the	  ratio	  of	  loans	  to	  total	  assets	  (Loan/TA).	  To	  examine	  whether	  the	  
level	   of	   capitalization	   is	   a	   determining	   factor	   in	   bank	   risk	   (H2a,	   H2b),	   we	   use	   the	  
Eq/TA.	   Similar	   to	   Köhler	   (2015),	   we	   use	   the	   share	   of	   non-­‐deposit	   funding	   in	   total	  
liabilities	   (NonDep/TL)	   to	   test	   the	   effect	   of	   wholesale	   funds	   on	   bank	   risk	   (H3).	   To	  
measure	  the	  effect	  of	  profitability	  on	  bank	  risk	  (H4),	  we	  choose	  the	  ROA.	  Following	  the	  
example	  of	  other	  researchers,	  we	  use	  the	  CIR	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  operational	  efficiency	  (H5).	  
This	  ratio	  measures	  the	  overhead	  or	  running	  costs	  (the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  which	  is	  
normally	  salaries)	  of	  a	  bank	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  income	  generated	  before	  provisions.	  To	  
analyze	   the	   effect	   of	   income	   diversification	   on	   bank	   risk	   (H6a,	   H6b),	   we	   use	   an	  
adjusted	  Herfindahl–Hirschman	  index	  (HHIRD).	  This	  variable	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
where	  INT	  denotes	  the	  gross	  interest	  income;	  COM	  denotes	  the	  gross	  commission	  and	  
fee	  revenue;	  TRAD	  denotes	  the	  trading	  revenue;	  OTH	  denotes	  all	  other	  gross	  operating	  
income;	  and	  TOR	  denotes	   the	   total	  operating	  revenue	  and	   is	  equal	   to	   the	  sum	  of	   the	  
absolute	  values	  of	  INT,	  COM,	  TRAD	  and	  OTH.	  
Lastly,	  because	  the	  effect	  of	  size	  on	  bank	  risk	  appears	  to	  be	  non-­‐linear,	  we	  use	  
the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  bank	  assets	  to	  accommodate	  this	  relationship	  (H7a,	  H7b).	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   variables	   that	   are	   exogenous	   to	   the	   banks,	   industry	  
concentration	  (H8a,	  H8b)	  is	  also	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  Herfindahl–Hirschman	  index	  
(HHIIC),	  which	  is	  calculated	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  squares	  of	  all	  credit	  institutions’	  market	  
shares	   within	   a	   country	   in	   terms	   of	   total	   assets	   (in	   percentage).	   This	   index	   more	  
accurately	  reflects	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  and	  smaller	  banks	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  single	  bank	  
with	   a	   very	   large	  market	   share.	   It	   is	   often	   said	   that	   a	  market	   is	   highly	   concentrated	  
when	  the	  index	  exceeds	  1,800	  (or	  0.18,	  if	  we	  use	  units	  instead	  of	  percentages)	  and	  is	  
unconcentrated	  when	  the	  index	  is	  below	  1,000	  (or	  0.1).	  The	  data	  on	  the	  HHIIC	  in	  the	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database	  of	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (ECB).1	  We	  use	  the	  annual	  growth	  rate	  of	   the	  
real	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  of	  the	  country	  to	  explore	  the	  association	  between	  
economic	   growth	   and	   bank	   risk	   (H9).	   We	   measure	   the	   effect	   of	   inflation	   on	   bank	  
profitability	   (H10)	   through	   the	   consumer	   price	   index	   (CPI)	   annual	   average	   rate	   of	  
change.	  To	  assess	  the	  effect	  of	  unemployment	  on	  bank	  risk	  (H11),	  we	  use	  the	  annual	  
average	   unemployment	   rate	   from	   Eurostat,	   which	   represents	   unemployed	   persons	  
(aged	  15	   to	  74)	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	   the	   labor	   force	  of	   the	   country.	  We	   lastly	   take	   the	  
interest	  rate	  of	  the	  main	  refinancing	  operations	  (MRO)	  of	  the	  ECB,	  which	  provides	  the	  
bulk	   of	   the	   liquidity	   to	   the	   European	   banking	   system,	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   interest	   rates	  
(H12).	  	  
3.3 Control	  variables	  
Despite	  Eurozone	  members	  sharing	  similar	  banking	  rules,	  some	  differences	   in	  
the	  regulatory	  and	  supervisory	  environment	  still	  exist	  between	  each	  country’s	  banking	  
system	  during	   the	   analyzed	  period	   (these	  differences	   should	   tend	   to	  disappear	   after	  
the	   banking	   union	   comes	   into	   force).	   We	   use	   four	   indicators	   from	   the	  World	   Bank	  
database	   on	   Bank	   Regulation	   and	   Supervision	   developed	   by	   Barth	   et	   al.	   (2001)	   to	  
control	   for	  this	  circumstance	   in	  our	  empirical	  specification,	  as	  the	   literature	  suggests	  
that	   they	  may	   affect	   bank	   risk.2	  The	   first	   indicator,	   capital	   stringency,	   evaluates	   the	  
regulatory	  approach	  to	  assessing	  and	  verifying	  the	  degree	  of	  capital	  at	  risk	   in	  a	  bank	  
(Laeven	   and	   Levine,	   2009).3	  The	   second	   indicator	   is	   an	   index	   of	   official	   supervisory	  
                                                
1	  Updated	  values	  are	  available	  from	  the	  ECB	  website	  at	  
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn2869.	  
2	  This	  approach	  has	  also	  been	   followed	  by	  Agoraki	  et	  al.	   (2011)	  and	  Delis	  et	  al.	   (2012),	  among	  others.	  
This	  database	  is	  based	  on	  four	  surveys	  conducted	  by	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Survey	  I	  was	  released	  in	  2001,	  and,	  
for	   most	   of	   the	   countries,	   the	   information	   corresponds	   to	   1999.	   Survey	   II	   describes	   the	   regulatory	  
situation	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2002.	   Survey	   III	   describes	   the	   regulatory	   environment	   in	   2005-­‐2006.	   Lastly,	  
Survey	   IV	   provides	   information	   on	   bank	   regulation	   and	   supervision	   in	   125	   countries	   for	   2011	   (with	  
some	  corrections	  in	  2012)	  (Barth	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  This	  database	  is	  available	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  website	  
at	  http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0.	  
3	  The	  capital	  stringency	   index	  is	  built	  by	  adding	  two	  measures	  of	  capital	  stringency:	  overall	  and	   initial	  
capital	   stringency.	   Overall	   capital	   stringency	   indicates	   whether	   risk	   elements	   and	   value	   losses	   are	  
considered	   while	   calculating	   the	   regulatory	   capital.	   It	   is	   based	   on	   the	   following	   questions:	   (i)	   Is	   the	  
minimum	  capital-­‐asset	  ratio	  requirement	  risk	  weighted	  in	   line	  with	  the	  Basel	  guidelines?	  (ii)	  Does	  the	  
minimum	   ratio	   vary	   as	   a	   function	   of	   credit	   risk?	   (iii)	   Does	   the	   minimum	   ratio	   vary	   as	   a	   function	   of	  
market	   risk?	   (iv)	   Are	   market	   values	   of	   loan	   losses	   not	   realized	   in	   accounting	   books	   deducted	   from	  
capital?	   (v)	   Are	   unrealized	   losses	   in	   securities	   portfolios	   deducted	   from	   capital?	   (vi)	   Are	   unrealized	  
foreign	   exchange	   losses	   deducted	   from	   capital?	   (vii)	  What	   fraction	   of	   revaluation	   gains	   is	   allowed	   as	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power	  that	  reflects	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  country’s	  bank	  supervisory	  agency	  has	  the	  
authority	  to	  take	  specific	  actions	  (e.g.,	  force	  a	  bank	  to	  change	  its	  internal	  organizational	  
structure).4	  The	   third	   indicator,	   private	   monitory	   index,	   shows	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  
banks	  are	  forced	  to	  disclose	  accurate	  information	  to	  the	  public	  and	  whether	  there	  are	  
incentives	   to	   increase	   market	   discipline. 5 	  We	   lastly	   add	   a	   composite	   index	   of	  
regulatory	   restrictions	   on	   bank	   activities	   (activity	   restrictions).	   This	   index	  measures	  
                                                                                                                                                
part	   of	   capital?	   Initial	   capital	   stringency	   refers	   to	   whether	   certain	   funds	   may	   be	   used	   to	   initially	  
capitalize	  a	  bank	  and	  whether	  they	  are	  officially	  verified.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  questions:	  (viii)	  Are	  
the	  sources	  of	  funds	  to	  be	  used	  as	  capital	  verified	  by	  the	  regulatory	  or	  supervisory	  authorities?	  (ix)	  Can	  
the	  initial	  disbursement	  or	  subsequent	  injections	  of	  capital	  be	  performed	  with	  assets	  other	  than	  cash	  or	  
government	  securities?	  (x)	  Can	  the	  initial	  disbursement	  of	  capital	  be	  performed	  with	  borrowed	  funds?	  
We	   assign	   a	   value	   of	   1	   if	   the	   answer	   to	   questions	   (i),	   (ii),	   (iii),	   (iv),	   (v),	   (vi)	   and	   (viii)	   is	   yes	   and	   0	  
otherwise,	  while	  the	  opposite	  holds	  in	  the	  case	  of	  questions	  (ix)	  and	  (x).	  In	  addition,	  we	  assign	  a	  value	  of	  
1	  if	  the	  fraction	  of	  revaluation	  gains	  that	  is	  allowed	  to	  count	  as	  regulatory	  capital	  (question	  (vii))	  is	  less	  
than	  0.75.	  Otherwise,	  we	  assign	  a	  value	  of	  0.	  By	  adding	  all	  these	  values	  together,	  we	  create	  the	  variable	  
capital	   stringency	   index,	   which	   ranges	   in	   value	   from	   0	   to	   10,	   with	   higher	   values	   indicating	   greater	  
stringency.	  	  
4	  This	   index	   is	   a	  measure	   of	   the	   power	   of	   supervisory	   agencies,	   indicating	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   these	  
authorities	   can	   take	   specific	   actions	   against	   bank	  management	   and	   directors,	   shareholders	   and	   bank	  
auditors.	  This	  variable	   is	  determined	  by	  adding	  1	   if	   the	  answer	   is	  yes	  and	  0	  otherwise	   for	  each	  of	   the	  
following	  14	  questions:	  (i)	  Does	  the	  supervisory	  agency	  have	  the	  right	  to	  meet	  with	  external	  auditors	  to	  
discuss	  their	  report	  without	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  bank?	  (ii)	  Are	  auditors	  legally	  required	  to	  communicate	  
directly	  to	  the	  supervisory	  agency	  any	  presumed	  involvement	  of	  bank	  directors	  or	  senior	  managers	  in	  
illicit	  activities,	  fraud,	  or	  insider	  abuse?	  (iii)	  Can	  supervisors	  take	  legal	  action	  against	  external	  auditors	  
for	  negligence?	   (iv)	  Can	   the	   supervisory	  authorities	   force	  a	  bank	   to	   change	   its	   internal	  organizational	  
structure?	   (v)	   Does	   the	   institution	   disclose	   off-­‐balance-­‐sheet	   items	   to	   supervisors?	   (vi)	   Can	   the	  
supervisory	  agency	  order	  the	  bank’s	  directors	  or	  management	  to	  constitute	  provisions	  to	  cover	  actual	  or	  
potential	  losses?	  (vii)	  Can	  the	  supervisory	  agency	  suspend	  directors’	  decisions	  to	  distribute	  dividends?	  
(viii)	   Can	   the	   supervisory	   agency	   suspend	   directors’	   decisions	   to	   distribute	   bonuses?	   (ix)	   Can	   the	  
supervisory	  agency	  suspend	  directors’	  decisions	  to	  distribute	  management	  fees?	  (x)	  Can	  the	  supervisory	  
agency	  supersede	  bank	  shareholder	  rights	  and	  declare	  the	  bank	  insolvent?	  (xi)	  Does	  banking	  law	  allow	  
a	   supervisory	   agency	   or	   any	   other	   government	   agency	   (other	   than	   a	   court)	   to	   suspend	   some	   or	   all	  
ownership	   rights	   at	   a	   problem	   bank?	   (xii)	   Regarding	   bank	   restructuring	   and	   reorganization,	   can	   the	  
supervisory	  agency	  or	  any	  other	  government	  agency	  (other	  than	  a	  court)	  supersede	  shareholder	  rights?	  
(xiii)	   Regarding	   bank	   restructuring	   and	   reorganization,	   can	   the	   supervisory	   agency	   or	   any	   other	  
government	   agency	   (other	   than	   a	   court)	   remove	   and	   replace	   management?	   (xiv)	   Regarding	   bank	  
restructuring	  and	   reorganization,	   can	   the	   supervisory	   agency	  or	   any	  other	   government	   agency	   (other	  
than	   a	   court)	   remove	   and	   replace	   directors?	   This	   index	   takes	   values	   between	   0	   and	   14,	   with	   higher	  
values	  indicating	  more	  supervisory	  power.	  
5	  To	  control	  for	  market	  discipline,	  we	  use	  the	  private	  monitoring	  index.	  This	  index	  examines	  the	  degree	  
to	   which	   regulatory	   and	   supervisory	   policies	   encourage	   the	   private	   monitoring	   of	   banks,	   and	   it	   is	  
composed	  of	  information	  on	  (i)	  whether	  bank	  directors	  and	  officials	  are	  legally	  liable	  for	  the	  accuracy	  of	  
information	  disclosed	  to	  the	  public,	  (ii)	  whether	  banks	  must	  publish	  consolidated	  accounts,	  (iii)	  whether	  
banks	  must	   be	   audited	  by	   certified	   international	   auditors,	   (iv)	  whether	  100	  percent	   of	   the	   largest	   10	  
banks	  are	  rated	  by	  international	  rating	  agencies,	  (v)	  whether	  off-­‐balance	  sheet	  items	  are	  disclosed	  to	  the	  
public,	  (vi)	  whether	  banks	  must	  disclose	  their	  risk	  management	  procedures	  to	  the	  public,	  (vii)	  whether	  
accrued,	   though	   unpaid,	   interest/principal	   enters	   the	   income	   statement	   while	   the	   loan	   is	   still	   non-­‐
performing,	  (viii)	  whether	  subordinated	  debt	  is	  allowable	  as	  part	  of	  capital	  and	  (ix)	  whether	  there	  is	  no	  
explicit	  deposit	  insurance	  system	  and	  no	  insurance	  was	  paid	  the	  last	  time	  a	  bank	  failed.	  The	  maximum	  
value	  of	   the	  private	  monitoring	   index	   is	  12,	  and	  the	  minimum	  value	   is	  0,	  where	   larger	  values	   indicate	  
greater	  regulatory	  empowerment	  of	  the	  monitoring	  of	  banks	  by	  private	  investors.	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the	  degree	  to	  which	  banks	  face	  regulatory	  restrictions	  on	  their	  activities	  in	  securities	  
markets,	   insurance,	  and	  real	  estate	  and	  on	  owning	  shares	   in	  nonfinancial	   firms,	  with	  
higher	   values	   indicating	   greater	   restrictions	   (Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   and	   Huizinga,	   2010).6	  
Because	  regulatory	  initiatives	  are	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  the	  risk-­‐taking	  behavior	  of	  banks	  in	  
the	   immediate	   term,	  we	  use	   the	   first	   lag	  of	   the	  corresponding	   indices	   (Agoraki	  et	  al.,	  
2011;	   Delis	   and	   Staikouras,	   2011).	   We	   also	   assume	   that	   regulators	   may	   change	  
banking	   rules	   to	   prevent	   financial	   turbulence	   if	   they	   observe	   excess	   risk-­‐taking;	  
therefore,	   similar	   to	   Delis	   and	   Staikouras	   (2011),	   these	   indicators	   are	   treated	   as	  
endogenous	  in	  our	  regression.	  	  
We	   also	   control	   for	   the	   public	   status	   of	   the	   bank,	   as	   previous	   studies	   (e.g.,	  
Nichols	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  report	   that	  market	  discipline	  exerted	  by	  the	  stock	  market	  might	  
affect	  bank	  risk-­‐taking.	  However,	  the	  effect	  of	  market	  exposure	  on	  bank	  risk	  is	  unclear	  
(Barry	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Although	  market	   discipline	   should	   impose	   strong	   incentives	   on	  
banks	   to	   conduct	   their	   business	   in	   a	   safe,	   sound	   and	   efficient	   manner,	   this	   greater	  
control	  may	   also	   force	   the	  managers	   of	   listed	  banks	   to	   expand	   into	  more	   risky	  non-­‐
interest	  income	  activities,	  such	  as	  securitization,	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  a	  higher	  return,	  
particularly	  if	  a	  bank	  underperformed	  its	  peers	  and	  if	  this	  is	  controlled	  by	  institutional	  
investors	   (Köhler,	   2015).	   The	  public	   status	   of	   the	  bank	   is	   considered	   endogenous	   in	  
our	   baseline	   equation,	   as	   banks	   may	   choose	   to	   become	   listed	   or	   not	   based	   on	   the	  
expected	  future	  changes	  in	  risk.	  
4 Results	  
4.1 Determinants	  of	  bank	  risk	  in	  the	  euro	  area	  	  
Table	  3	  provides	  an	  initial	  outline	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  banking	  situation	  from	  2001	  
to	  2012.	  The	  financial	  crisis	  has	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  bank	  risk.	  The	  deteriorating	  
loan	   quality	   in	   the	   euro	   area’s	   commercial	   banking	   sector	   has	   been	   perceptible	   in	   a	  
steady	   and	   broad-­‐based	   increase	   in	   non-­‐performing	   loans	   since	   2008.	  While	   the	   US	  
                                                
6	  The	   score	   for	   this	   variable	   is	   determined	   based	   on	   the	   level	   of	   regulatory	   restrictiveness	   for	   bank	  
participation	  in:	  (i)	  securities	  activities,	  (ii)	  insurance	  activities,	  (iii)	  real	  estate	  activities	  and	  (iv)	  bank	  
ownership	   of	   non-­‐financial	   firms.	   These	   activities	   can	   be	   unrestricted,	   permitted,	   restricted,	   or	  
prohibited	  and	  can	  receive	  values	  of	  1,	  2,	  3,	  or	  4,	  respectively.	  We	  create	  an	  overall	  index	  by	  calculating	  
the	  summation	  value	  of	  the	  four	  categories.	  This	  index	  ranges	  from	  4	  to	  16,	  with	  higher	  values	  indicating	  
higher	  restrictions.	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  de	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economy	  has	  shown	  increasing	  signs	  of	  recovery	  following	  the	  2008-­‐2009	  sub-­‐prime	  
crisis	  period,	  the	  European	  banking	  sector	  has	  faced	  a	  second,	  more	  euro-­‐area-­‐focused,	  
phase	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  that	  includes	  a	  weak	  economic	  environment	  in	  many	  
countries.	  The	  Z-­‐score	  index	  also	  worsens	  in	  the	  crisis	  period,	  with	  the	  lowest	  average	  
Z-­‐score	  being	   reported	   in	  2012.	  Regarding	  bank-­‐specific	   variables,	   the	  proportion	  of	  
total	   loans	   in	   euro	   area	   commercial	   banks’	   assets	   remains	  broadly	  unchanged	  on	  an	  
aggregated	   level,	   despite	   drops	   in	   individual	   countries.	   However,	   the	   weakening	  
macroeconomic	  conditions	  and	   increased	  pressure	  on	  banks	   to	  deleverage	  may	  have	  
reduced	   the	   Loan/TA	   ratio	   in	   2011	   and	   2012.	   This	  may	   also	   be	   due	   to	   transfers	   of	  
distressed	   loans	   to	   asset	  management	   companies	   or	   bad	   banks.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
euro	   area	   commercial	   banks	   continue	   to	   reduce	   their	   dependence	   on	   wholesale	  
funding,	  with	  the	  average	  share	  of	  non-­‐deposit	  funding	  in	  liabilities	  falling	  to	  44%	  from	  
49%	   in	   2007.	  We	   also	   observe	   an	   increase	   in	   capital	   ratios	   until	   2010.	   Profitability	  
levels	   have	   remained	   low	   since	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   crisis	   in	   2008	   and	   have	   been	  
characterized	  by	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  heterogeneity,	  with	  negative	  mean	  values	  for	  ROA	  in	  
2011	   and	   2012.	   The	   worsening	   in	   asset	   quality,	   which	   called	   for	   increases	   in	  
impairment	  charges	  and	  provisions,	  and	  restructuring	  costs	  mainly	  drove	  this	  decline	  
in	  profitability.	  The	  average	  CIR	  for	  the	  euro	  area	  commercial	  banking	  sector	  declined	  
from	   73%	   in	   2008	   to	   65%	   in	   2012.	   Given	   the	   drop	   in	   revenue,	   this	   improvement	  
reveals	   considerable	   cost-­‐cutting	   efforts	   by	   banks	   in	   general.	   Table	   3	   also	   reports	   a	  
drop	   in	   income	   diversification	   during	   the	   crisis	   period,	   whereas	   the	   average	   size	   of	  
commercial	   banks	   remains	   stable.	   Lastly,	   the	   evolution	   of	   macroeconomic	   variables	  
shows	   the	   deterioration	   of	   the	   economic	   situation	   in	   the	   Eurozone	   after	   2007.	   The	  
decline	   in	   the	   number	   of	   credit	   institutions,	   especially	   in	   the	   crisis	   period,	   has	  
increased	  market	  concentration	  in	  the	  euro	  area.	  
	   	  




Table	  3.	  Summary	  statistics	  for	  Eurozone	  commercial	  banks	  
	   Bank	  risk	  proxies	   Bank-­‐specific	  variables	  
	  
NPLr	   Z-­‐score	   Loan/TA	   Eq/TA	   NonDep/TL	   ROA	   CIR	   HHIRD	   Size	  
2001	   8.22	   3.84	   61.99	   5.55	   32.37	   0.67	   64.45	   0.61	   15.06	  
	   (4.84)	   (1.36)	   (15.78)	   (1.89)	   (25.45)	   (0.47)	   (12.46)	   (0.07)	   (2.94)	  
2002	   7.67	   3.70	   59.95	   5.35	   35.45	   0.61	   68.81	   0.61	   15.39	  
	   (4.41)	   (0.87)	   (20.06)	   (2.41)	   (23.07)	   (0.54)	   (12.18)	   (0.07)	   (2.92)	  
2003	   6.93	   3.87	   55.87	   5.78	   38.93	   0.58	   72.40	   0.62	   15.18	  
	   (3.64)	   (1.13)	   (22.16)	   (2.90)	   (23.91)	   (0.59)	   (19.59)	   (0.06)	   (2.64)	  
2004	   4.30	   3.95	   61.46	   6.45	   44.57	   0.67	   66.07	   0.60	   16.13	  
	   (3.28)	   (1.33)	   (18.60)	   (3.07)	   (20.05)	   (0.36)	   (14.87)	   (0.11)	   (2.39)	  
2005	   3.58	   3.73	   57.68	   6.88	   49.39	   0.80	   63.98	   0.61	   16.46	  
	   (2.76)	   (1.40)	   (20.68)	   (4.28)	   (21.15)	   (0.68)	   (13.43)	   (0.08)	   (2.21)	  
2006	   3.19	   3.86	   59.03	   6.96	   49.16	   0.90	   62.62	   0.59	   16.29	  
	   (2.58)	   (1.37)	   (22.03)	   (4.00)	   (21.56)	   (0.97)	   (17.03)	   (0.12)	   (2.26)	  
2007	   3.43	   4.08	   59.53	   7.36	   49.26	   0.80	   64.35	   0.53	   16.10	  
	   (3.24)	   (1.30)	   (21.37)	   (5.55)	   (21.78)	   (0.89)	   (22.63)	   (0.44)	   (2.33)	  
2008	   4.25	   3.92	   61.26	   7.50	   48.41	   0.39	   72.77	   0.31	   15.94	  
	   (3.72)	   (1.25)	   (22.03)	   (6.38)	   (23.62)	   (1.21)	   (45.58)	   (0.46)	   (2.29)	  
2009	   5.92	   3.66	   61.55	   8.12	   47.03	   0.31	   64.80	   0.16	   15.97	  
	   (4.73)	   (1.43)	   (21.30)	   (6.72)	   (22.69)	   (1.39)	   (23.40)	   (4.75)	   (2.25)	  
2010	   6.87	   3.41	   62.44	   8.18	   46.83	   0.23	   65.33	   0.47	   15.98	  
	   (6.56)	   (1.53)	   (20.98)	   (7.09)	   (22.46)	   (2.01)	   (22.69)	   (0.75)	   (2.26)	  
2011	   8.63	   3.27	   61.73	   7.94	   46.74	   -­‐0.14	   67.27	   0.17	   15.99	  
	   (8.84)	   (1.56)	   (21.36)	   (6.37)	   (21.92)	   (1.89)	   (37.71)	   (5.21)	   (2.24)	  
2012	   9.76	   3.19	   61.45	   7.76	   44.53	   -­‐0.17	   64.77	   (0.46	   16.06	  
	   (8.96)	   (1.61)	   (21.66)	   (5.95)	   (21.22)	   (1.56)	   (31.31)	   (0.28)	   (2.25)	  
Total	   6.01	   3.73	   61.15	   7.60	   47.11	   0.34	   67.38	   0.25	   16.04	  
	   (6.34)	   (1.45)	   (21.35)	   (5.99)	   (22.22)	   (1.48)	   (29.69)	   (4.46)	   (2.28)	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Table	  3.	  (Continued)	  
	   Industry	  and	  macroeconomic	  variables	  
	   HHIC	   GDP	   Inflation	   UR	   Interest	  
2001	   506.44	   1.77	   1.71	   8.60	   3.25	  
	   (197.55)	   (0.15)	   (0.15)	   (0.40)	   	  
2002	   434.60	   0.65	   1.77	   8.63	   2.75	  
	   (187.42)	   (0.44)	   (0.24)	   (0.05)	   	  
2003	   506.87	   0.64	   1.79	   8.27	   2.00	  
	   (173.34)	   (0.53)	   (0.47)	   (1.68)	   	  
2004	   606.22	   2.64	   2.26	   8.68	   2.00	  
	   (298.67)	   (0.82)	   (0.49)	   (2.25)	   	  
2005	   651.38	   1.92	   2.15	   8.11	   2.25	  
	   (502.60)	   (1.28)	   (0.58)	   (1.55)	   	  
2006	   626.14	   2.93	   2.19	   7.49	   3.50	  
	   (492.49)	   (1.09)	   (0.74)	   (1.56	   	  
2007	   702.83	   2.90	   2.16	   6.85	   4.00	  
	   (483.53)	   (1.41)	   (0.83)	   (1.52)	   	  
2008	   725.70	   0.22	   3.44	   7.19	   2.50	  
	   (548.73)	   (1.60)	   (0.80)	   (1.89)	   	  
2009	   715.63	   -­‐4.48	   0.22	   9.24	   1.00	  
	   (530.96)	   (1.50)	   (1.04)	   (3.39)	   	  
2010	   753.61	   1.38	   1.58	   10.07	   1.00	  
	   (532.79)	   (1.59)	   (0.79	   (3.96)	   	  
2011	   760.67	   0.93	   2.66)	   10.43	   1.00	  
	   (544.78)	   (1.88)	   (0.57)	   (4.61)	   	  
2012	   735.50	   -­‐1.28	   2.46	   11.85	   0.75	  
	   (499.19)	   (1.68)	   (0.52)	   (5.55)	   	  
Total	   712.04	   0.34	   2.09	   9.04	   1.88	  
	   (513.33)	   (2.79	   (1.19	   (3.83)	   (1.14)	  
Notes:	  This	   table	   reports	   the	  means	  and	   standard	  deviations	   (in	  parentheses)	   for	   the	  entire	   sample	   for	  each	  year.	  The	   sample	  
comprises	  204	  commercial	  banks	  (1,423	  observations).	  Z-­‐score	  and	  Size	  are	  in	  logarithmic	  form.	  See	  Table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  
the	  variables.	  
	  
Table	  4	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  the	  empirical	  estimation	  of	  Equation	  (1)	  for	  both	  
measures	   of	   bank	   risk	   (NPLr	   and	   Z-­‐score)	   in	   the	   Eurozone	   during	   the	   period	   from	  
2001	  through	  2012	  using	  the	  system-­‐GMM	  estimator	  suggested	  by	  Arellano	  and	  Bover	  
(1995)	   and	  Blundell	   and	  Bond	   (1998).	   The	   high	   levels	   of	   significance	   for	   the	   lagged	  
risk	  variables	  confirm	  the	  dynamic	  character	  of	  the	  model	  specification.	  The	  values	  of	  
δ	   indicate	   a	   strong	   persistence	   in	   bank	   risk,	   as	   found	   in	   previous	   studies	   of	   the	  
European	  banking	  sector	  (e.g.,	  Delis	  and	  Kouretas,	  2011).	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Table	  4.	  Determinants	  of	  bank	  risk	  in	  the	  euro	  area	  
	   (1)	   (2)	  
Variables	   NPLr	   Z-­‐score	  












































































z1	   235.03	  (18,	  203)	   13.16	  (18,	  180)	  
m1	   -­‐3.12	   -­‐6.00	  
m2	   -­‐0.60	   -­‐0.35	  
Hansen	   191.41	  (426)	   165.44	  (359)	  
Number	  of	  obs.	   1,423	   1,132	  
Number	  of	  banks	   204	   181	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   presents	   the	   determinants	   of	   bank	   risk	   in	   the	   Eurozone	   during	   the	   period	   2001–2012	   using	   the	   system-­‐GMM	  
estimator	  developed	  by	  Arellano	  and	  Bover	   (1995)	  and	  Blundell	  and	  Bond	   (1998).	  See	  Table	  2	   for	  a	  description	  of	   the	   independent	  
variables.	   Except	   for	   HHIIC,	   GPD,	   Inflation,	   UR	   and	   Interest,	   all	   variables	   are	   considered	   endogenous	   in	   our	   model.	   We	   report	  
heteroskedasticity-­‐consistent	   asymptotic	   standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses,	   and	   significance	   levels	   are	   indicated	   as	   follows:	   ***=	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significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level;	  **=	  significant	  at	  the	  5%	  level;	  and	  *=	  significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  z1	  is	  a	  Wald	  test	  of	  the	  joint	  significance	  
of	   the	   reported	  coefficients,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  F	  under	   the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	   significance,	  with	  degrees	  of	   freedom	   in	  
parentheses.	  mi	  is	  a	  serial	  correlation	  test	  of	  order	  i	  using	  residuals	  in	  first	  differences,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  N(0,1)	  under	  the	  
null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  serial	  correlation.	  Hansen	  is	  a	  test	  of	  the	  over-­‐identifying	  restrictions,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  χ2	  under	  the	  
null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	  instruments	  and	  the	  error	  term,	  with	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  parentheses.	  
We	  confirm	  our	  first	  hypothesis,	   in	  which	  we	  predicted	  a	  positive	  relationship	  
between	  the	  relative	  percentage	  of	  loans	  in	  the	  assets	  of	  a	  bank	  and	  its	  risk,	  based	  on	  
the	  literature	  that	  finds	  that	  laxity	  in	  lending	  may	  be	  a	  source	  of	  banking	  problems	  (e.g.,	  
De	   Nicoló	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Männasoo	   and	   Mayers,	   2009;	   Festic	   et	   al.,	   2011).	  
Notwithstanding,	  this	  variable	  does	  not	  become	  significant	  when	  the	  Z-­‐score	  is	  used	  as	  
a	   risk	   proxy,	   which	   may	   be	   attributable	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   liquidity	   risk	   is	   not	   fully	  
reflected	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  loans	  over	  assets.	  Consistent	  with	  previous	  studies	  (e.g.,	  
Lehar,	   2005;	   Poghosyan	   and	   Čihak,	   2011),	   a	   negative	   relationship	   between	   bank	  
capitalization	  and	   risk	  may	  be	  expected	  due	   to	   the	  potential	  danger	  of	   leverage.	  Our	  
results	  confirm	  this	  hypothesis	  (H2a):	  the	  lower	  the	  capitalization,	  the	  higher	  the	  bank	  
risk.	  Berger	  and	  DeYoung	  (1997)	  state	  that	  low-­‐capital	  banks	  respond	  to	  moral	  hazard	  
incentives	  by	  increasing	  the	  riskiness	  of	  their	  loan	  portfolios,	  which	  results	  in	  a	  higher	  
number	  of	  non-­‐performing	  loans,	  on	  average,	  in	  the	  future.	  Mehran	  and	  Thakor	  (2011)	  
argue	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  capital	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  intensive	  screening	  of	  borrowers,	  thus	  
reducing	   bank	   risk.	  We	   also	   report	   that	   a	   greater	   dependence	   on	  wholesale	   funding	  
may	  negatively	  affect	  commercial	  banks’	  risk,	  i.e.,	  higher	  levels	  of	  non-­‐deposit	  funding	  
result	   in	   higher	   bank	   risk	   (H3).	   The	   financial	   crisis	   has	   clearly	   exposed	   the	   risk	   of	  
wholesale	  funding,	  especially	  after	  the	  bankruptcy	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  in	  2008.	  When	  
a	   bank	   relies	   on	   short-­‐term	  wholesale	   funds	   to	   support	   long-­‐term	   illiquid	   assets,	   it	  
becomes	   vulnerable	   to	   runs	   by	   its	   creditors.	   Recent	   empirical	   studies	   report	   similar	  
results	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  non-­‐deposit	  funding	  on	  bank	  risk.	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  and	  Huizinga	  
(2010)	  find	  that	  although	  banks,	  at	  low	  levels	  of	  non-­‐deposit	  funding,	  may	  have	  some	  
risk	  diversification	  benefits	  from	  increasing	  those	  funds,	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  wholesale	  
funding	  further	  increases	  result	  in	  higher	  bank	  risk.	  Köhler	  (2015)	  also	  conclude	  that	  
retail-­‐oriented	   banks	   (savings	   and	   cooperative	   banks)	   are	   significantly	   less	   stable	   if	  
they	  increase	  their	  share	  of	  non-­‐deposit	  funds.	  Investment	  banks,	  in	  contrast,	  are	  more	  
stable,	   supporting	   the	   disciplining	   effect	   that	   comes	   from	   sophisticated	   wholesale	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financiers.7	  We	   find	   an	   inverse	   relationship	   between	   bank	   profitability	   and	   risk,	  
supported	   by	   the	   high	   levels	   of	   significance	   for	   ROA	   in	   the	   equations.	   This	   finding	  
proves	  our	  fourth	  hypothesis,	  in	  which	  we	  state	  that	  more	  profitable	  banks	  tend	  to	  be	  
more	   stable,	   a	   statement	   broadly	   agreed	   upon	   in	   the	   literature	   (e.g.,	   Köhler,	   2015).	  
Similarly,	  inefficiency	  (CIR)	  is	  shown	  to	  increase	  bank	  risk	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  Z-­‐score	  
(H5).	   As	   stated	   previously,	   cost	   efficiency	   is	   negatively	   associated	   with	   bank	   risk,	  
linking	   ‘bad’	  management	  with	  poor	   skills	   in	   credit	   scoring,	   the	  appraisal	  of	  pledged	  
collateral	   and	   the	   monitoring	   of	   borrowers	   (Louzis	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   This	   finding	   is	   in	  
accordance	   with	   recent	   empirical	   studies	   such	   as	   Uhde	   and	   Heimeshoff	   (2009)	   and	  
Delis	   et	   al.	   (2012).	   Income	   diversification	   is	   statistically	   insignificant	   in	   both	  
specifications,	  confirming	  the	  results	  of,	  e.g.,	  Weiß	  et	  al.	  (2014).	  Larger	  banks	  appear	  to	  
be	   less	  risky	  compared	  with	  smaller	  banks	  (Hypothesis	  7b),	   in	  agreement	  with	  other	  
authors	   (e.g.,	   Agoraki	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Delis	   and	   Staikouras,	   2011).	   This	   finding	  may	   be	  
explained	  by	  the	  better	  diversification	  of	  larger	  banks	  (Boyd	  and	  Prescott,	  1986;	  Salas	  
and	   Saurina,	   2002;	   among	   others).	   Furthermore,	   because	   larger	   banks	   have	   better	  
access	   to	   the	   capital	  markets,	   they	  may	   have	  more	   flexibility	   to	  manage	   unexpected	  
liquidity	  shortfalls	  (Konishi	  and	  Yasuda,	  2004).	  Additionally,	  these	  banks	  are	  argued	  to	  
have	   comparative	   advantages	   in	   providing	   credit	   monitoring	   services	   (Uhde	   and	  
Heimeshoff,	  2009).	  	  
Industry	   concentration	   has	   an	   inverse	   relationship	   with	   bank	   risk,	  
corroborating	   hypothesis	   8a,	   which	   states	   that	   the	   less	   concentrated	   the	   banking	  
sector,	   the	  higher	  the	  risk	  tends	  to	  be.	   It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  monopolistic	  banks	   in	  
concentrated	   banking	   systems	   may	   enhance	   profits,	   reducing	   financial	   fragility.	  
Reduced	  concentration	  may	  have	  also	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  financial	  system	  stability	  by	  
improving	  bank	  supervision.	  This	  result	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  provided	  
by	  Beck	  et	  al.	   (2006)	   and	  Caprio	  et	  al.	   (2014),	  who	   find	   that	   crises	   are	   less	   likely	   to	  
occur	   in	   economies	   with	   more	   concentrated	   banking	   systems.	   Among	   the	  
macroeconomic	   variables,	   GDP	   and	   inflation	   are	   highly	   significant	   in	   our	   equations,	  
exhibiting	   positive	   and	   negative	   relationships,	   respectively,	   to	   risk.	   These	   findings	  
confirm	  hypotheses	  9	  and	  10	  regarding	  the	  abundant	  support	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  the	  
                                                
7	  Calomiris	   and	  Kahn	   (1991)	   conclude	   that	  wholesale	   funding	  may	   reduce	  bank	   risk	   through	   a	   better	  
monitoring	  of	  banks	  by	  sophisticated	  financiers	  and	  a	  better	  diversification	  of	  funding	  sources.	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view	  that	  bank	  risk	  exhibits	  clear	  cyclical	  behavior	  (Marcucci	  and	  Quagliariello,	  2008;	  
Uhde	   and	   Heimeshoff,	   2009).	   As	   suggested	   by	   Delis	   et	   al.	   (2012),	   these	   results	   are	  
expected	  because	  in	  economies	  with	  high	  growth	  rates	  and	  stable	  monetary	  conditions,	  
bank	   failure	   problems	   are	   less	   frequent,	   fewer	   resources	   are	   employed	   by	   banks	   to	  
forecast	   the	   future	   levels	   of	   inflation	   and	   loan	  demand	   is	   stronger.	  We	   also	   reveal	   a	  
negative	   relationship	  between	  bank	   risk	   and	   interest	   rates.	  Thus,	   a	   low-­‐interest-­‐rate	  
environment	   increases	   risk-­‐related	   bank	   assets	   and	   alters	   the	   composition	   of	  
Eurozone	   bank	   portfolios	   toward	   a	   more	   risky	   position,	   as	   we	   anticipated	   in	  
hypothesis	   12.	   This	   finding	   coincides	   with	   the	   results	   reported	   on	   euro	   area	   banks	  
over	  the	  period	  2001–2008	  by	  Delis	  and	  Kouretas	  (2011).	  The	  unemployment	  rate	  is	  
found	   not	   to	   be	   significant	   in	   our	  model.	  Most	   of	   the	   recent	   literature	   that	   shows	   a	  
relationship	   between	   unemployment	   and	   bank	   risk	   focuses	   on	   countries	   that	   have	  
been	  strongly	  affected	  by	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  such	  as	  Italy	  (Bofondi	  and	  Ropele,	  2011)	  
and	  Greece	  (Louzis	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
Lastly,	  regarding	  control	  variables,	  we	  do	  not	  find	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  risk	  
between	   listed	   and	   non-­‐listed	   banks,	   suggesting	   that	   market	   forces	   do	   not	   strongly	  
influence	  the	  risk	  behavior	  of	  listed	  banks	  in	  a	  specific	  way.	  This	  result	  is	  in	  accordance	  
with	  Barry	  et	  al.	  (2011).	  We	  report	  a	  negative	  and	  significant	  association	  between	  the	  
capital	  requirement	  index	  and	  bank	  risk,	  a	  finding	  consistent	  with	  Barth	  et	  al.	  (2004),	  
Kopecky	   and	   VanHoose	   (2006)	   and	   Agoraki	   et	   al.	   (2011),	   among	   others.	   The	  
supervisory	  power	  index	  shows	  a	  negative	  association	  with	  bank	  risk,	  suggesting	  that	  
more	  banking	   supervision	   implies	   less	   risk	   taking	   (in	   line	  with	  Delis	   and	  Staikouras,	  
2011).	  We	   also	   observe	   that	   financial	   disclosures	   and	   other	   incentives	   that	   improve	  
market	   discipline	   may	   be	   an	   effective	   tool	   for	   reducing	   bank	   risk,	   as	   suggested	   by	  
previous	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Barth	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Fernández	  and	  González,	  2005;	  Agoraki	  et	  al.,	  
2011).	  However,	  we	  donot	  find	  that	  bank	  activity	  restrictions	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  risk.	  
4.2 	  Robustness	  checks	  	  
To	  confirm	  the	  aforementioned	   findings,	  we	  conduct	  a	  number	  of	  robustness	  checks.	  
First,	   we	   evaluate	   the	   method	   of	   estimation	   used	   in	   the	   analysis	   by	   using	   simpler	  
statistical	  methodologies.	  Second,	  we	  consider	  four	  alternative	  measures	  of	  bank	  risk.	  
Third,	  we	  re-­‐estimate	  our	  equation,	  changing	  some	  of	  the	  variables	  used	  as	  regressors.	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As	   a	   final	   robustness	   check,	   we	   divide	   the	   sample	   into	   a	   pre-­‐crisis	   and	   relatively	  
economically	  stable	  period	  and	  a	  crisis	  period.	  
4.2.1 Alternative	  estimation	  models	  
Similar	   to	   earlier	   studies	   on	   bank	   risk	   (e.g.,	   Williams,	   2004),	   we	   employ	   an	  
ordinary	   least	   squares	   (OLS)	   regression	   to	   estimate	   our	   equations.	   The	   results	  
obtained	   do	   not	   differ	   substantially	   from	   those	   obtained	   previously;	   most	   of	   the	  
explanatory	   variables	   retain	   both	   their	   signs	   and	   their	   statistical	   significance	   (see	  
Table	   5).	   However,	   we	   find	   that	   the	   revenue	   diversification	   variable	   shows	   a	  
statistically	  significant	  positive	  relationship	  with	  the	  Z-­‐score	  index	  (meaning,	  therefore,	  
that	   a	   greater	   diversification	   may	   reduce	   bank	   risk).	   This	   result	   is	   in	   line	   with	   the	  
empirical	   evidence	   shown	   by	   Köhler	   (2015),	   who	   states	   that	   a	   larger	   share	   of	   non-­‐
interest	   income	   will	   make	   retail-­‐oriented	   banks	   more	   stable.	   Additionally,	   the	   OLS	  
regression	  reports	  a	  statistically	  significant	  inverse	  association	  between	  the	  NPLr	  and	  
the	   unemployment	   rate.	   Because	   panel	   data	   are	   used,	   we	   can	   also	   re-­‐estimate	   the	  
models	   using	   either	   fixed	   or	   random	   effects.	   Hausman	   tests	   suggest	   that	   the	   fixed	  
effects	  estimator	  is	  more	  appropriate	  in	  our	  case.	  This	  methodology	  has	  similarly	  been	  
applied	  in	  previous	  studies	  to	  test	  bank	  risk	  determinants	  (e.g.,	  Festic	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  We	  
assume	   that	   the	   omitted	   variables	   (e.g.,	   corporate	   governance)	   may	   potentially	  
correlate	  with	  the	  existing	  regressors.	  Again,	  our	  findings	  do	  not	  change	  substantially	  
from	  those	  obtained	  for	  the	  baseline	  equations,	  except	  that	  larger	  banks	  now	  appear	  to	  
be	   riskier	   compared	   with	   smaller	   banks,	   as	   indicated	   by	   the	   statistically	   significant	  
negative	  relationship	  between	  size	  and	  the	  Z-­‐score	  index.	  This	  result	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  
work	  of	  Haq	  and	  Heaney	  (2012),	  which	  analyzes	  15	  European	  countries	  (10	  Eurozone	  
and	  5	  non-­‐Eurozone	  countries)	  over	  the	  period	  1996-­‐2010.	  This	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  
moral	  hazard	  problem	  coherent	  with	  the	  too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail	  policy,	  where	  large	  banks	  have	  
greater	  incentive	  to	  take	  higher	  risks,	  as	  they	  know	  they	  will	  likely	  be	  bailed	  out.	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Table	  5.	  Robustness	  checks	  (I):	  Alternative	  model	  specifications	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	   Pool	  OLS	   Fixed-­‐effects	   Pool	  OLS	   Fixed-­‐effects	  
Variables	   NPLr	   NPLr	   Z-­‐score	   Z-­‐score	  
























































































































































R2	   0.3295	   0.5359	  (within)	   0.2522	   0.3045	  (within)	  
Hausman	   -­‐	   925.18	  (17)	   -­‐	   48.81	  (17)	  
Number	  of	  obs.	   1,423	   1,423	   1,132	   1,132	  
Number	  of	  banks	   204	   204	   181	   181	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   presents	   alternative	   model	   specifications	   for	   our	   baseline	   equations.	   The	   models	   in	   columns	   (1)	   and	   (3)	   are	  
estimated	  using	  an	  ordinary	  least	  squares	  (OLS)	  regression	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  bank	  (reported	  in	  parentheses).	  
The	  models	  in	  columns	  (2)	  and	  (4)	  use	  fixed-­‐effects	  (within)	  regressions,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  bank	  (reported	  in	  
parentheses).	  See	  Table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  independent	  variables.	  R2	  is	  the	  proportion	  of	  variation	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable	  
explained	  by	  the	  model.	  Hausman	  is	  a	  test	  that	  compares	  the	  fixed	  versus	  random	  effects,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  χ2	  under	  the	  
null	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   individual	   effects	   are	   uncorrelated	   with	   the	   other	   regressors	   in	   the	   model,	   with	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   in	  
parentheses.	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4.2.2 Alternative	  proxies	  of	  bank	  risk	  
We	  now	  consider	  four	  alternative	  measures	  of	  bank	  risk	  (see	  Table	  6).	  The	  first	  
of	   these	  metrics,	   the	   stock	  of	  NPLs,	  which	  has	   also	  been	  used	   in	   recent	   studies	   (e.g.,	  
García-­‐Herrero	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   yields	   the	   expected	   signs	   and	   significance,	   which	   are	  
similar	  to	  those	  of	  our	  original	  models.	  We	  also	  use	  the	  reserve	  for	  losses,	  expressed	  as	  
a	  percentage	  of	  total	  loans	  (LLR/GL)	  (Barry	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  ratio	  indicates	  how	  much	  
of	   the	   total	   loan	   portfolio	   is	   covered	   by	   the	   bank’s	   current	   reserves.	   Given	   a	   similar	  
charge-­‐off	  policy,	   a	  higher	   ratio	   corresponds	   to	  a	   lower-­‐quality	   loan	  portfolio.	  Again,	  
the	  significance	  and	  the	  signs	  agree	  with	  the	  baseline	  models.	  Another	  metric	  used	  to	  
proxy	   bank	   risk	   is	   the	   loan	   loss	   provision	   (as	   a	   percentage	   of	   net	   interest	   revenue)	  
ratio	   (e.g.,	  Williams,	   2004).	   Using	   this	  metric,	   results	   similar	   to	   those	   for	   the	   initial	  
models	  are	  obtained	  for	  all	  variables.	  We	  lastly	  employ	  the	  Sharpe	  ratio	  to	  represent	  
bank	   risk.	  The	   Sharpe	   ratio	   is	   a	   risk-­‐adjusted	   rate	   of	   return	   that	   is	   calculated	   as	   the	  
mean	   ROE	   divided	   by	   the	   standard	   deviation	   of	   this	   return	   (Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   and	  
Huizinga,	  2010).	  Once	  again,	  the	  results	  obtained	  using	  the	  Sharpe	  ratio	  mostly	  agree	  
with	  those	  for	  our	  original	  model	  except	  that	  size	  has	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  Sharpe	  
ratio,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   results	   reported	   previously	   for	   the	   Z-­‐score	   fixed-­‐effects	  
regression.	  
Table	  6.	  Robustness	  checks	  (II):	  Alternative	  proxies	  of	  bank	  risk	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Variables	   NPLs	   LLR/GL	   LLP/NIR	   Sharpe	  
































































HHIIC	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   0.001**	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   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Variables	   NPLs	   LLR/GL	   LLP/NIR	   Sharpe	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  
























































































z1	   74.83	  (18,	  203)	   88.35	  (18,	  203)	   41.21	  (18,	  197)	   7.80	  (18,	  168)	  
m1	   -­‐1.23	   -­‐3.98	   -­‐5.83	   -­‐5.42	  
m2	   0.97	   0.48	   1.79	   -­‐0.88	  
Hansen	   188.74	  (426)	   192.26	  (426)	   179.88	  (404)	   146.56	  (339)	  
Number	  of	  obs.	   1,423	   1,423	   1,367	   1,086	  
Number	  of	  banks	   204	   204	   198	   181	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  presents	  the	  regressions	  for	  alternative	  measures	  of	  bank	  risk	  using	  the	  system-­‐GMM	  estimator	  developed	  by	  Arellano	  
and	  Bover	  (1995)	  and	  Blundell	  and	  Bond	  (1998).	  The	  dependent	  variables	  are	  as	  follows:	  (column	  1)	  stocks	  of	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  
(NPLs)	  (in	  logarithmic	  form),	  (column	  2)	  loan	  loss	  reserve	  divided	  by	  gross	  loans	  (LLR/GL)	  (in	  logarithmic	  form),	  (column	  3)	  loan	  loss	  
provisions	  divided	  by	  net	  interest	  revenue	  (LLP/NIR)	  (in	  logarithmic	  form),	  and	  (column	  4)	  the	  Sharpe	  ratio	  (in	  logarithmic	  form).	  See	  
Table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  independent	  variables.	  Except	  for	  HHIIC,	  GPD,	  Inflation,	  UR,	  and	  Interest,	  all	  variables	  are	  considered	  
endogenous	  in	  our	  model.	  We	  report	  heteroskedasticity-­‐consistent	  asymptotic	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses,	  and	  significance	  levels	  
are	   indicated	  as	   follows:	  ***=	  significant	  at	   the	  1%	  level;	  **=	  significant	  at	   the	  5%	  level;	  and	  *=	  significant	  at	   the	  10%	  level.	  z1	   is	  a	  
Wald	   test	   of	   the	   joint	   significance	   of	   the	   reported	   coefficients,	   asymptotically	   distributed	   as	   F	   under	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   no	  
significance,	   with	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   in	   parentheses.	   mi	   is	   a	   serial	   correlation	   test	   of	   order	   i	   using	   residuals	   in	   first	   differences,	  
asymptotically	   distributed	   as	   N(0,1)	   under	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   no	   serial	   correlation.	   Hansen	   is	   a	   test	   of	   the	   over-­‐identifying	  
restrictions,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  χ2	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	  instruments	  and	  the	  error	  term,	  
with	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  parentheses.	  
	  
4.2.3 Alternative	  explanatory	  variables	  
We	   also	   re-­‐estimate	   our	   equations	   by	   changing	   some	   of	   the	   variables	   used	   as	  
regressors	   (see	  Table	  7).	  First,	  because	  size	  seems	   to	  be	  a	  controversial	  variable,	  we	  
include	  the	  square	  of	  the	  logarithm	  of	  total	  assets	  to	  control	  for	  a	  potential	  non-­‐linear	  
relationship	  between	  size	  and	  risk.	  However,	  neither	  linear	  terms	  nor	  quadratic	  terms	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enter	   the	  regression	  significantly,	  which	  suggests	   that	  our	   findings	  about	  size	  should	  
be	  taken	  with	  caution.	  We	  also	  consider	  non-­‐interest	   income	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	   total	  
operating	  income	  (NonII/TOR)	  as	  a	  revenue	  diversification	  measure	  (De	  Jonghe,	  2010)	  
instead	  of	  HHIRD,	  although,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  previously	  reported	  results	  for	  the	  HHIRD,	  
this	  variable	  is	  not	  found	  to	  be	  significant.	  Because	  liquidity	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  an	  
important	  issue	  in	  banking	  during	  the	  recent	  European	  financial	  crisis,	  we	  replace	  the	  
ratio	  of	  loans	  to	  total	  assets	  with	  the	  ratio	  of	  liquid	  to	  total	  assets	  to	  analyze	  the	  effect	  
of	  the	  asset	  structure	  on	  bank	  risk.8	  As	  expected,	  the	  most	  liquid	  banks	  are	  also	  those	  
with	   lower	   risk.	   This	   finding	   is	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   greater	   importance	   given	   to	  
liquidity	  standards	  in	  the	  recent	  set	  of	  reforms	  developed	  by	  the	  Basel	  Committee	  on	  
Banking	  Supervision	  to	  promote	  a	  more	  resilient	  banking	  sector	  (commonly	  known	  as	  
Basel	   III).	  We	  lastly	  remove	  Eq/TA	  and	  ROA	  from	  the	  explanatory	  variables	   in	  the	  Z-­‐
score	  regression,	  as	  these	  variables	  take	  also	  part	  in	  the	  Z-­‐score	  equation.	  Once	  again,	  
our	   results	   do	   not	   change	   substantially,	   as	   most	   of	   the	   coefficients	   (both	   signs	   and	  
statistical	  significances)	  are	  not	  affected.	  	  
Table	  7.	  Robustness	  checks	  (III):	  Alternative	  explanatory	  variables	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	  






























	   	  
-­‐0.511***	  
(0.162)	  






































































                                                
8	  Another	   source	   of	   potential	   liquidity	   risk	   (as	   well	   as	   interest	   rate	   risk)	   for	   a	   bank	   is	   the	   maturity	  
mismatch	   between	   its	   assets	   and	   its	   liabilities	   (i.e.,	   long-­‐term	   loans	   are	   granted	   using	   short-­‐term	  
deposits).	  The	  loan	  to	  deposit	  ratio	  is	  used	  for	  this	  purpose	  (the	  higher	  the	  ratio,	  the	  greater	  the	  risk).	  
Our	  results	  (not	  reported)	  corroborate	  the	  inverse	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	  and	  bank	  risk.	  
Pablo	  de	  Olavide	  University,	  Seville	  (Spain)	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m1	   -­‐3.12	   -­‐3.13	   -­‐3.15	   -­‐6.01	   -­‐5.99	   -­‐5.93	   -­‐5.74	  
m2	   -­‐0.58	   -­‐0.66	   -­‐0.72	   -­‐0.39	   -­‐0.34	   -­‐0.37	   -­‐0.31	  














Number	  of	  obs.	   1,423	   1,423	   1,423	   1,132	   1,132	   1,132	   1,132	  
Number	   of	  
banks	   204	   204	   204	   181	   181	   181	   181	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   presents	   the	   results	   for	   our	   baseline	   equations	   after	   changing	   some	   of	   the	   explanatory	   variables.	   The	  models	   in	  
columns	   (1)	  and	   (4)	   include	   Size2	   (the	   square	  of	   ln	   (assets)).	   The	  models	   in	   columns	   (2)	  and	   (5)	   consider	  NonII/TOR	   (non-­‐interest	  
income	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  operating	  revenue)	  in	  place	  of	  HHIRD.	  The	  models	  in	  columns	  (3)	  and	  (6)	  consider	  Liq/TA	  (liquid	  to	  
total	  assets	  ratio)	  in	  place	  of	  Loan/TA.	  The	  model	  in	  column	  (7)	  excludes	  Eq/TA	  and	  ROA.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  variables	  remain	  the	  same	  
(see	   Table	   2).	   Regressions	   use	   the	   system-­‐GMM	  estimator	   developed	   by	  Arellano	   and	  Bover	   (1995)	   and	  Blundell	   and	  Bond	   (1998).	  
Except	  for	  HHIIC,	  GPD,	  Inflation,	  UR,	  and	  Interest,	  all	  variables	  are	  considered	  endogenous	  in	  our	  model.	  We	  report	  heteroskedasticity-­‐
consistent	  asymptotic	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses,	  and	  significance	  levels	  are	  indicated	  as	  follows:	  ***=	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level;	  
**=	  significant	  at	  the	  5%	  level;	  and	  *=	  significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  z1	  is	  a	  Wald	  test	  of	  the	  joint	  significance	  of	  the	  reported	  coefficients,	  
asymptotically	   distributed	   as	   F	   under	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   no	   significance,	  with	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   in	   parentheses.	  mi	   is	   a	   serial	  
correlation	  test	  of	  order	  i	  using	  residuals	  in	  first	  differences,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  N(0,1)	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  serial	  
correlation.	   Hansen	   is	   a	   test	   of	   the	   over-­‐identifying	   restrictions,	   asymptotically	   distributed	   as	  χ2	   under	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   no	  
correlation	  between	  the	  instruments	  and	  the	  error	  term,	  with	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  parentheses.	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4.2.4 	  Pre-­‐crisis	  and	  crisis	  period	  
As	  a	  final	  robustness	  check,	  we	  now	  divide	  the	  sample	  into	  two	  periods:	  a	  pre-­‐
crisis	   and	   relatively	   economically	   stable	   period	   (2001	   to	   2007)	   and	   a	   crisis	   period	  
(2008	   to	   2012).9 	  We	   use	   this	   approach	   to	   examine	   possible	   differences	   in	   our	  
regression	  due	  to	  the	   impact	  of	  both	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  
crisis	  starting	   in	  2010	  in	  the	  European	  banking	  sector.	  Although	  the	  results	  obtained	  
using	   this	   approach	   resemble	   those	   of	   our	   baseline	   models,	   we	   notice	   certain	  
differences	   between	   the	   two	   periods	   (before	   the	   crisis	   and	   during	   the	   crisis)	   with	  
respect	  to	  certain	  explanatory	  variables	  (see	  Table	  8).	  We	  observe	  that	  during	  the	  pre-­‐
crisis	  period,	  the	  Eq/TA	  ratio	  loses	  its	  statistical	  significance,	  although	  it	  maintains	  the	  
anticipated	  sign	   in	   its	  relationship	   to	  NPLr.	  This	   finding	  coincides	  with	   that	  reported	  
by	   Haq	   and	   Heaney	   (2012),	   and	   it	   seems	   to	   indicate	   that	   a	   greater	   capitalization	  
further	   reduces	   bank	   risk	   during	   the	   crisis	   period.	   Similarly,	   the	   NonDep/TL	   ratio	  
becomes	   non-­‐significant	   in	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period,	   which	   means	   the	   recourse	   to	  
wholesale	  funding	  seems	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  significantly	  higher	  risk	  in	  the	  banking	  
industry	  only	  during	  crisis.	  Most	  of	   the	   industry	  and	  macroeconomic	  variables	  retain	  
their	   signs	   and	   statistical	   significance.	   However,	  when	   the	  NPLr	   is	   used	   as	   the	   bank	  
risk	  proxy,	  a	  higher	  unemployment	  rate	  is	  related	  to	  increased	  bank	  risk	  in	  the	  crisis	  
period.	  Lastly,	  our	  control	  variable	  results	  suggest	  that	  a	  greater	  incentive	  for	  private	  
sector	  monitoring	  may	  only	  reduce	  bank	  risk	  in	  periods	  of	  economic	  instability.	  
Table	  8.	  Robustness	  checks	  (IV):	  Pre-­‐crisis	  and	  crisis	  period	  
	   Pre-­‐crisis	  period	  (2001-­‐2007)	   Crisis	  period	  (2008-­‐2012)	  
Variables	   NPLr	   Z-­‐score	   NPLr	   Z-­‐score	  
































                                                
9	  Similar	  to	  Haq	  and	  Heaney	  (2012),	  we	  chose	  2008	  as	  the	  start	  of	  the	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  in	  
Europe.	  Our	  data	  also	  show	  a	  change	  in	  the	  trend	  of	  bank	  risk	  proxies	  (as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  macroeconomic	  
variables)	  coinciding	  with	  that	  year.	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   Pre-­‐crisis	  period	  (2001-­‐2007)	   Crisis	  period	  (2008-­‐2012)	  
Variables	   NPLr	   Z-­‐score	   NPLr	   Z-­‐score	  
































































































































z1	   131.54	  (18,	  111)	   8.31	  (18,	  80)	   138.09	  (18,	  117)	   8.54	  (18,	  90)	  
m1	   -­‐3.09	   -­‐3.00	   -­‐3.96	   -­‐3.16	  
m2	   -­‐1.48	   -­‐0.48	   -­‐0.97	   -­‐0.21	  
Hansen	   99.64	  (129)	   66.70	  (109)	   106.03	  (129)	   81.21	  (113)	  
Number	  of	  obs.	   560	   405	   590	   455	  
Number	  of	  banks	   112	   81	   118	   91	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  our	  regressions	  for	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  (2001-­‐2007)	  and	  crisis	  (2008-­‐2012)	  periods	  using	  the	  system-­‐
GMM	   estimator	   developed	   by	   Arellano	   and	   Bover	   (1995)	   and	   Blundell	   and	   Bond	   (1998).	   See	   Table	   2	   for	   a	   description	   of	   the	  
independent	  variables.	  Except	   for	  HHIIC,	  GPD,	   Inflation,	  UR	  and	   Interest,	  all	  variables	  are	  considered	  endogenous	   in	  our	  model.	  We	  
report	  heteroskedasticity-­‐consistent	  asymptotic	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses,	  and	  significance	  levels	  are	  indicated	  as	  follows:	  ***=	  
significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level;	  **=	  significant	  at	  the	  5%	  level;	  and	  *=	  significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  z1	  is	  a	  Wald	  test	  of	  the	  joint	  significance	  
of	   the	  reported	  coefficients,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  F	  under	   the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  significance,	  with	  degrees	  of	   freedom	   in	  
parentheses.	  mi	  is	  a	  serial	  correlation	  test	  of	  order	  i	  using	  residuals	  in	  first	  differences,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  N(0,1)	  under	  the	  
null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  serial	  correlation.	  Hansen	  is	  a	  test	  of	  the	  over-­‐identifying	  restrictions,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  χ2	  under	  the	  
null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	  instruments	  and	  the	  error	  term,	  with	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  parentheses.	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5 Summary	  and	  conclusions	  
Financial	   institutions	   in	   Europe	   continue	   to	   be	   confronted	   with	   significant	  
challenges,	   primarily	   related	   to	   a	   weak	   economic	   environment	   that	   has	   dampened	  
profitability	   and	   increased	   credit	   risk.	   This	   essay	   empirically	   analyzes	   the	   factors	  
influencing	  bank	  risk	   in	   the	  Eurozone	   from	  2001	  to	  2012	  using	  an	  unbalanced	  panel	  
data	  set	  of	  1,423	  observations.	  This	  time	  span	  allows	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
recent	   financial	   and	   economic	   crisis	   on	   the	   Eurozone	   banking	   system.	  We	   apply	   the	  
system-­‐GMM	   estimator	   developed	   for	   dynamic	   panel	  models	   by	   Arellano	   and	   Bover	  
(1995)	   and	   Blundell	   and	   Bond	   (1998),	   which	   has	   only	   recently	   been	   used	   in	   a	   few	  
studies	   on	   the	   determinants	   of	   bank	   risk	   (e.g.,	   Delis	   and	   Staikouras,	   2011;	   Haq	   and	  
Heaney,	   2012;	   Louzis	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   We	   examine	   both	   the	   bank-­‐specific	   and	  
macroeconomic	   determinants	   of	   bank	   risk,	   analyzing	   12	   variables	   that	   have	   been	  
proven	   to	   influence	   bank	   risk:	   asset	   structure,	   capitalization,	   non-­‐deposit	   funding,	  
profitability,	  efficiency,	  revenue	  diversification,	  size,	  industry	  concentration,	  economic	  
growth,	   inflation,	   unemployment	   and	   interest	   rates.	   We	   proxy	   bank	   risk	   using	   two	  
complementary	  metrics	  that	  are	  intuitive	  and	  easily	  measured:	  NPLr,	  which	  focuses	  on	  
credit	  risk,	  and	  the	  Z-­‐score,	  which	  is	  an	  overall	  measure	  of	  bank	  risk	  that	  also	  includes	  
liquidity	  and	  market	  risk.	  
Our	  results	  indicate	  that	  capitalization,	  profitability,	  efficiency	  and	  liquidity	  are	  
inversely	   and	   significantly	   related	   to	   bank	   risk.	   However,	   the	   recourse	   to	  wholesale	  
funding	   by	   banks	   seems	   to	   increase	   their	   risk.	   We	   also	   find	   that	   less	   concentrated	  
markets,	   lower	   interest	   rates,	   higher	   inflation	   rates	   and	   a	   context	   of	   economic	   crisis	  
(with	  a	  falling	  GDP)	  increase	  bank	  risk.	  We	  apply	  different	  robustness	  checks,	  first	  by	  
using	  simpler	  statistical	  methodologies,	  such	  as	  OLS,	  and	  re-­‐estimating	  our	  panel	  data	  
model	  using	   fixed	  effects	   and	   then	  by	   considering	   four	  alternative	  measures	  of	  bank	  
risk:	   the	   stock	   of	   NPLs,	   the	   reserve	   of	   losses	   to	   total	   loans	   (LLR/GL),	   the	   loan	   loss	  
provision	   to	   net	   interest	   revenue	   and	   the	   Sharpe	   ratio.	   We	   also	   re-­‐estimate	   the	  
baseline	   equation	   using	   alternative	   regressors.	   The	   results	   of	   these	   tests	   yield	   signs	  
and	  significance	   levels	   that	  are	  similar	   to	   those	   in	   the	  original	  model	   for	  most	  of	   the	  
independent	   variables,	   thus	   proving	   their	   robustness.	  Nevertheless,	  we	   find	   that	   the	  
effect	  of	  size	  exhibits	  contradictory	  behavior,	  which	  makes	  this	  variable	  a	  noteworthy	  
topic	  for	  further	  research.	  As	  a	  final	  robustness	  check,	  we	  divide	  the	  sample	  into	  two	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periods	  to	  examine	  possible	  differences	  in	  our	  regression	  because	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  both	  
the	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  starting	  in	  2010	  in	  the	  European	  
banking	   sector.	  Although	   the	   results	  obtained	  using	   this	   approach	   resemble	   those	  of	  
our	  baseline	  models,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  a	  reduced	  capitalization	  and	  the	  recourse	  
to	   wholesale	   funding	   seem	   to	   be	   associated	   with	   significantly	   higher	   risk	   in	   the	  
banking	   industry	   only	   in	   the	   crisis	   period.	   Similarly,	   a	   higher	   unemployment	   rate	   is	  
related	   to	   increased	   bank	   risk	   in	   the	   2008-­‐2012	   period	   (but	   only	   when	   the	   non-­‐
performing	  loan	  ratio	  is	  used	  as	  the	  bank	  risk	  proxy).	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Essay	   2:	   Effects	   of	   Revenue	   Diversification	   on	   Non-­‐
Performing	  Loans	  in	  Europe	  
	  
	  Abstract	  
This	  essay	  analyzes	  the	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  of	  
banks	   in	  14	  European	  countries	   from	  1999	   to	  2012.	  Our	  main	   finding	   is	   that	   revenue	  
diversification	   significantly	   reduces	   non-­‐performing	   loans	   of	   Eurozone	   banks.	   In	  
addition,	  our	   results	   show	  that	  higher	  proportions	  of	   commission	  and	   fee	   income	  and	  
other	   operating	   income	   in	   total	   income	   contribute	   to	   increase	   asset	   quality.	  We	   also	  
conclude	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   revenue	   diversification	   and	   non-­‐performing	  
loans	   is	   enhanced	   during	   the	   financial	   crisis	   period	   and	   that	   regulations	   restricting	  




During	   the	   last	   several	   decades,	   deregulation	   of	   the	   banking	   industry	   has	  
fostered	  the	  emergence	  of	  numerous	  alternative	  sources	  of	  income	  for	  banks,	  including	  
underwriting	   and	   trading	   securities,	   brokerage	   and	   investment	   banking,	   and	   other	  
activities	  that	  generate	  non-­‐interest	  income	  (Meslier	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Many	  studies,	  ranging	  
from	   the	  Markowitz	  portfolio	   theory	   (1952)	   to	  more	   recent	  works	   (e.g.,	  Köhler,	  2014,	  
2015;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  show	  that	  diversification	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  of	  bank	  default.	  
However,	   an	   important	   strand	   of	   the	   literature	   supports	   the	   argument	   that	   financial	  
institutions	   should	   concentrate	   on	   lending	   activities	   because	   alternative	   sources	   of	  
income,	   particularly	   trading,	   are	   associated	   with	   higher	   risks	   (Jensen	   and	   Meckling,	  
1976;	   Mercieca	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   Moreover,	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   less	   traditional	   banking	  
industry	  is	  said	  to	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  
global	  financial	  crisis	  (Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  and	  Huizinga,	  2010).	  	  
Given	   the	   lack	   of	   consensus	   regarding	   the	   effect	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	  
bank	   risk,	  we	  examine	  how	  revenue	  diversification	  affects	  non-­‐performing	   loan	   ratios	  
(NPLR)	   of	   European	   banks.	  We	   use	   a	   Herfindahl-­‐Hirschman	   index	   (HHIRD)	   to	   assess	  
revenue	   diversification	   and	   separately	   analyze	   which	   types	   of	   operating	   income	  
(commissions	   and	   fees,	   interest,	   trading	   and	   other	   operating	   income)	   significantly	  
contribute	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  impaired	  loans.	  Then,	  we	  test	  whether	  the	  diversification	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effects	   differ	   among	   banks	   according	   to	   their	   classification	   (commercial	   banks	   versus	  
saving	   and	   cooperative	   banks)	   and	   to	   their	   degree	   of	   specialization	   (bank-­‐	   versus	  
market-­‐oriented	  banks).	  	  
Our	   sample	   includes	  a	  maximum	  of	  2,265	  banks	   in	   the	  Eurozone	   from	  1998	   to	  
2012.	  We	  use	  the	  general	  method	  of	  moments	  (GMM)	  estimator	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  
system	   GMM	   estimator)	   developed	   for	   dynamic	   panel	   data	   models	   by	   Arellano	   and	  
Bover	   (1995)	   and	   Blundell	   and	   Bond	   (1998).	   This	   estimator	   allows	   us	   to	   control	   for	  
unobserved	  heterogeneity	  and	  endogeneity	  by	  means	  of	  suitable	  instruments.	  
We	   conduct	   a	   series	   of	   additional	   checks	   to	   provide	   robustness	   to	   our	   results.	  
First,	   we	   control	   for	   the	   financial	   crisis	   period	   by	   including	   a	   dummy	   variable	   that	  
equals	  one	   if	   the	  year	   is	  between	  2008	  and	  2012	  and	  equals	   zero	  otherwise.	  We	  also	  
include	  an	  alternative	  dependent	  variable,	   the	  Z-­‐score,	  which	  has	  been	  widely	  used	   in	  
the	  literature	  to	  assess	  both	  risk-­‐adjusted	  performance	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  financial	  distress	  
or	   default	   (Lepetit	   et	  al.,	   2008;	   Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   and	  Huizinga,	   2010;	   Sanya	   and	  Wolfe,	  
2010;	  Köhler,	  2014,	  2015;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  and	  Meslier	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Moreover,	  we	  test	  
our	   results	   using	   different	   revenue	   diversification	   proxies,	   and	   finally,	   we	   provide	  
robust	   results	   after	   using	   alternative	   panel	   data	   methodologies	   (fixed	   and	   random	  
effects).	  
This	   essay	   contributes	   to	   the	   existing	   body	   of	   banking	   literature	   on	   revenue	  
diversification	   in	   the	   following	   respects.	   First,	   studies	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	  
the	  quality	  of	  loan	  portfolios	  and	  revenue	  diversification	  are	  relatively	  scarce,	  and	  those	  
that	  do	  exist	  are	  inconclusive	  (e.g.,	  Louzis	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Chaibi	  and	  Ftiti,	  2015)1.	  Second,	  
similar	   to	  Elsas	  et	  al.	   (2010),	  Baselga-­‐Pascual	  et	  al.	   (2014),	   and	  Trujillo-­‐Ponce	   (2013),	  
we	  use	  an	  adjusted	  Herfindahl-­‐Hirschman	  index	  (HHIRD)	  that	  considers	  different	  types	  
of	  revenue	  to	  proxy	   for	  revenue	  diversification	  rather	   than	  using	   less	  specific	  revenue	  
diversification	  measures	  that	  reflect	  only	  interest	  and	  non-­‐interest	  income	  (e.g.,	  Lepetit	  
et	  al.,	  2008;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  and	  Huizinga,	  2010;	  Sawada,	  2013).	  Third,	  we	  consider	  the	  
different	   effects	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   NPLR	   between	   commercial	   banks	   and	  
                                                
1	  A	  notable	  exception	  is	  Lee	  et	  al.	  (2014)	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savings	   and	   cooperative	   banks	   and	   between	   bank-­‐	   and	   market-­‐oriented	   institutions.	  
Fourth,	  we	  control	  for	  possible	  differences	  in	  bank	  regulatory	  schemes	  by	  including	  four	  
indicators	   (capital	   stringency,	   official	   supervisory	   power,	   private	   monitory	   index	   and	  
activity	  restrictions	  index)	  obtained	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  database	  on	  Bank	  Regulation	  
and	  Supervision	  developed	  by	  Barth	  et	  al.	  (2001).	  
The	  essay	   is	  structured	  as	   follows:	  section	  2	  provides	  a	  review	  of	   the	   literature	  
on	   the	   effects	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   bank	   risk	   and	   performance;	   section	   3	  
describes	  the	  data	  and	  variables	  used	  in	  this	  analysis;	  section	  4	  presents	  the	  empirical	  
analysis;	  and	  finally,	  section	  5	  highlights	  the	  main	  conclusions	  of	  this	  study.	  
2. Literature	  review	  
In	   this	   section,	  we	   summarize	   the	  main	   findings	   in	   the	   literature	   regarding	   the	  
effects	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  bank	  performance.	  First,	  advocates	  of	   the	   focused	  
view,	   including	   DeYoung	   and	   Rice	   (2004),	   Laeven	   and	   Levine	   (2007),	   Mercieca	   et	   al.	  
(2007),	   Lepetit	  et	  al.	   (2008),	   and	  De	   Jonghe	   (2010),	   state	   that	   revenue	  diversification	  
reduces	   bank	   performance	   by	   increasing	   bank	   risk	   and	   reducing	   returns	   because	   the	  
agency	   problems	   associated	  with	   different	   sources	   of	   income	   imply	   costs	   that	   exceed	  
the	   benefits	   obtained	   from	   economies	   of	   scope;	   therefore,	   the	   benefits	   of	   revenue	  
diversification	   do	   not	   compensate	   for	   the	   increased	   risk	   generated	   by	   non-­‐traditional	  
banking	   activities.	   Using	   a	   European	   sample,	   Mercieca	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   find	   an	   inverse	  
association	   between	   non-­‐interest	   income	   and	   performance	   for	   small	   banks.	   Similarly,	  
Lepetit	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   show	   that	   expansion	   into	   non-­‐interest	   income	   activities,	  
particularly	   into	   activities	   with	   increased	   commissions	   and	   fees,	   presents	   a	   higher	  
insolvency	  risk	  for	  small	  European	  banks,	  and	  De	  Jonghe	  (2010)	  states	  that	  non-­‐interest	  
income	   generating	   activities	   increase	   the	   systemic	   risk	   of	   Eurozone	   banks.	   Likewise,	  
DeYoung	  and	  Rice	   (2004)	   show	   that	   increased	  non-­‐interest	   income	   is	   associated	  with	  
poorer	  risk-­‐return	  tradeoffs	  in	  US	  banks.	  Finally,	  Laeven	  and	  Levine	  (2007)	  examine	  an	  
international	   sample	   of	   financial	   conglomerates	   and	   find	   that	   their	   respective	  market	  
values	  reflect	  a	  diversification	  discount.	  	  
Second,	   some	   authors	   argue	   that	   revenue	   diversification	   increases	   both	   bank	  
returns	  and	  bank	  risk	  (e.g.,	  Stiroh	  and	  Rumble,	  2006;	  Baele	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  and	  Demirgüç-­‐
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Kunt	   and	   Huizinga,	   2010).	   Stiroh	   and	   Rumble	   (2006)	   focus	   on	   financial	   holding	  
companies	   in	   the	   US	   and	   find	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	   income	   diversification,	   in	   terms	   of	  
higher	  returns,	  are	  offset	  by	  the	  increased	  volatility	  of	  non-­‐interest	  activities.	  Similarly,	  
Baele	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  investigate	  whether	  functionally	  diversified	  banks	  in	  Europe	  have	  a	  
comparative	  advantage	  in	  terms	  of	  long-­‐term	  performance/risk	  profile	  relative	  to	  their	  
specialized	   counterparts;	   their	   results	   show	   that	   a	   higher	   percentage	   of	   non-­‐interest	  
income	   in	   total	   income	   positively	   affects	   banks’	   franchise	   values	   but	   also	   increases	  
systematic	  risk.	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  and	  Huizinga	  (2010)	  analyze	  an	  international	  sample	  of	  
banks	   and	   conclude	   that	   non-­‐interest	   income	   generating	   activities,	   such	   as	   trading,	  
increase	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  assets	  but	  also	  reduce	  the	  distance	  to	  default.	  	  
Third,	   there	   are	   studies	   that	   find	   no	   significant	   relationship	   between	   revenue	  
diversification	  and	  bank	  risk-­‐taking	  (e.g.,	  Louzis	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Sawada,	  2013;	  and	  Chaibi	  
and	  Ftiti,	   2015).	  Louzis	  et	  al.	   (2012)	   focus	  on	   the	  Greek	  banking	   sector	  and	   study	   the	  
determinants	   of	   NPL	   separately	   for	   each	   loan	   category	   (i.e.,	   consumer,	   business	   and	  
mortgage).	  Their	  “diversification	  hypothesis”	  posits	  a	  negative	  sign	  between	  the	  share	  of	  
non-­‐interest	   income	   in	   total	   income	   (NIIr)	   and	   NPLR,	   but	   they	   do	   not	   find	   any	  
statistically	   significant	   relationship	   between	   them.	   Similarly,	   Chaibi	   and	   Ftiti	   (2015)	  
compare	   the	   determinants	   of	   non-­‐performing	   loans	   held	   by	   commercial	   banks	   in	   a	  
market-­‐based	  economy	  (France)	  and	  in	  a	  bank-­‐based	  economy	  (Germany)	  and	  find	  no	  
statistically	   significant	   relationship	   between	   non-­‐interest	   income	   (as	   a	   proxy	   for	  
revenue	   diversification)	   and	   NPLR	   in	   either	   economy.	   Sawada	   (2013)	   tests	   whether	  
revenue	  diversification	   increases	   Japanese	  banks’	  profitability	  and,	  consequently,	   their	  
market	  valuations	  but	  finds	  no	  evidence	  that	  revenue	  diversification	  reduces	  systematic,	  
idiosyncratic	  or	  total	  bank	  risk.	  
Finally,	  authors	   including	  Chiorazzo	  et	  al.	   (2008),	  Elsas	  et	  al.	   (2010),	  Sanya	  and	  
Wolfe	   (2010),	   Köler	   (2014,	   2015),	   Lee	   et	  al.	   (2014)	   and	  Meslier	   et	  al.	   (2014),	   among	  
others,	  support	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  revenue	  diversification	  and	  performance	  
and	   argue	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	   diversification	   exceed	   both	   the	   costs	   of	   increased	  
complexity	   and	   the	   associated	   agency	   costs	   of	   diversification.	   Chiorazzo	   et	   al.	   (2008)	  
find	   that	   non-­‐interest	   income	   increases	   risk-­‐adjusted	   returns	   and	   that	   this	   relation	   is	  
enhanced	   for	   large	   Italian	   banks;	   however,	   they	   also	   find	   limits	   on	   the	   benefits	   of	  
diversification	  as	  banks	  grow	  larger.	  Similarly,	  Köhler	  (2015)	  shows	  that	  an	  increase	  in	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non-­‐interest	   income	   improves	  European	  banks’	   risk-­‐adjusted	  returns;	   the	  benefits	  are	  
greatest	   for	   savings	   and	   cooperative	   banks,	   whereas	   investment	   banks	   experience	  
increased	   risk.	  Köhler	   (2014)	   finds	   similar	   results	  using	  a	  German	  sample.	  Elsas	  et	  al.	  
(2010)	  consider	  a	  sample	  of	  large	  banks	  from	  Australia,	  Canada,	  Europe	  and	  the	  US	  and	  
show	   that	   diversification	   increases	   bank	   profitability	   and,	   consequently,	   bank	  market	  
valuation.	  Sanya	  and	  Wolfe	  (2010)	  and	  Meslier	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  focus	  on	  banks	  in	  emerging	  
economies	  and	  provide	  empirical	  evidence	   that	  an	  observed	  shift	   toward	  non-­‐interest	  
income	  generating	   activities	   has	   a	   positive	   effect	   on	  bank	  performance	   and	  decreases	  
the	   risk	   of	   insolvency.	   Lee	   et	  al.	   (2014)	   study	   the	   effect	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	  
bank	  risk	  and	  performance	  in	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interaction	  between	  
revenue	  diversification	  and	  regulation	  policies;	   their	   results	  also	  confirm	  the	  portfolio	  
diversification	  effect.	  	  
Appendix	  1	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  on	  revenue	  diversification	  
in	  the	  banking	  literature.	  
Although	   the	   subject	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   has	   been	  widely	   studied	   in	   the	  
banking	  literature,	  whether	  revenue	  diversification	  should	  be	  encouraged	  or	  banned	  by	  
regulators	   remains	   unclear.	   The	   lack	   of	   consensus	   and	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   these	  
policies	   on	   the	   real	   economy	   make	   it	   necessary	   to	   examine	   the	   effects	   of	   bank	  
diversification	  more	  deeply.	  
3. Data	  	  
3.1. Sample	  
Our	   essay	   studies	   the	   effect	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   non-­‐performing	   loan	  
ratios	  using	  unbalanced	  panel	  data	  covering	  a	  maximum	  of	  2,132	  individual	  banks	  from	  
14	  Eurozone	  countries	  (for	  a	  maximum	  of	  32,028	  observations)	  over	  the	  period	  1999	  to	  
2012.	  We	  focus	  on	  countries	  that	  belong	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  have	  adopted	  the	  euro	  as	  their	  
common	   currency	   (i.e.,	   the	   Eurozone)	   during	   the	   sample	   period.	   Cyprus,	   Estonia	   and	  
Malta	   are	   excluded	   from	   our	   sample	   because	   these	   countries	   were	   only	   recently	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  euro	  area	  and	  the	  methodology	  used,	  the	  system	  GMM	  estimator	  
(which	   is	   explained	   further	   in	   section	   4.3),	   requires	   data	   for	   at	   least	   five	   consecutive	  
years	   to	   test	   for	   the	   absence	   of	   second-­‐order	   serial	   correlation.	   As	   is	   common	   in	   the	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literature,	  we	  include	  credit	  cooperatives,	  commercial	  banks,	  and	  savings	  banks	  in	  our	  
sample.	  	  
Indicators	   are	   calculated	   on	   a	   non-­‐consolidated	   basis,	   meaning	   that	   banking	  
subsidiaries	   and	   foreign	   branches	   are	   considered	   separate	   credit	   institutions.	   This	  
reduces	   the	   possibility	   of	   introducing	   aggregation	   bias	   into	   the	   results	   (Delis	   and	  
Staikouras,	  2011).	  Merged	  banks	  are	   considered	   separate	   entities	  prior	   to	   the	  merger	  
and	   a	   single	   entity	   subsequent	   to	   the	   merger.	   All	   ratios	   that	   capture	   bank-­‐specific	  
characteristics	   are	   calculated	   based	   on	   the	   standardized	   global	   accounting	   format.	  
Entities	   that	   present	   abnormal	   ratios	   or	   extreme	   values	   were	   eliminated	   from	   the	  
sample	  as	  outliers.	  In	  contrast	  to	  other	  studies	  that	  examine	  only	  listed	  banks	  (e.g.,	  Baele	  
et	  al.,	   2007;	  Laeven	  and	  Levine,	  2007;	  Elsas	  et	  al.,	   2010),	  only	  5%	  of	   the	  banks	   in	  our	  
sample	   are	   publically	   listed.	   This	   sample	   composition	   yields	   a	   more	   representative	  
picture	   of	   the	   EU	   banking	   sector	   because	   unlisted	   banks	   account	   for	   the	   majority	   of	  
European	  banks	  (Köhler,	  2015).	  
Table	  1	  shows	  observations	  per	  country	  and	  bank	  type.	  
Table	  1:	  Observations	  per	  country	  and	  bank	  type	  
Country	   Commercial	   Cooperatives	   Savings	   Total	   Percent	  
Austria	   1,162	   1,845	   1,542	   4,549	   14.20	  
Belgium	   534	   75	   60	   669	   2.09	  
Germany	   1,871	   7,147	   0	   9,018	   28.16	  
Spain	   944	   957	   277	   2,178	   6.80	  
Finland	   130	   29	   25	   184	   0.57	  
France	   2,056	   1,231	   399	   3,686	   11.51	  
Greece	   174	   15	   0	   189	   0.59	  
Ireland	   203	   0	   0	   203	   0.63	  
Italy	   1,602	   6,344	   555	   8,501	   26.54	  
Luxemburg	   1,230	   32	   28	   1,290	   4.03	  
Netherlands	   537	   14	   16	   567	   1.77	  
Portugal	   381	   31	   60	   472	   1.47	  
Slovenia	   240	   28	   31	   299	   0.93	  
Slovakia	   191	   0	   32	   223	   0.70	  
Total	   11,255	   17,748	   3,025	   32,028	   100.00	  
Percent	   35.14	   55.41	   9.44	   100	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3.2. Variables	  definition	  
5.1.1 Non	  performing	  Loan	  ratio	  
We	  use	  the	  non-­‐performing	  loan	  ratio	  expressed	  in	  natural	  logarithm	  (NPLR)	  as	  
our	   main	   dependent	   variable.	   NPLR	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   proportion	   of	   non-­‐performing	  
loans	   to	   gross	   loans;	   higher	   (lower)	   values	   of	  NPLR	   represent	   lower	   (higher)	   quality	  
loan	  portfolios.	  
NPLR	   is	   commonly	   used	   in	   the	   literature	   as	   a	   proxy	   of	   bank	   asset	   quality,	  
soundness	  and	  credit	  risk	  (e.g.,	  Louzis	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Baselga-­‐Pascual	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Chaibi	  
and	   Ftiti,	   2015).	   Moreover,	   Poghosyan	   and	   Čihak	   (2011)	   consider	   asset	   quality	   in	  
addition	   to	   bank	   capitalization	   when	   designing	   pan-­‐European	   benchmarks	   for	   sound	  
banking	   conduct	   because	   they	   believe	   that	   bank	   earnings	   and	   asset	   quality	   have	   a	  
greater	  impact	  on	  bank	  distress	  than	  capitalization	  does.	  
5.1.2 	  Revenue	  diversification	  
We	  proxy	   revenue	   diversification	  with	   a	  Herfindahl–Hirschman	   index	   (HHIRD)	  
that	   reflects	   the	   balance	   of	   different	   types	   of	   income,	   including	   net	   interest,	   net	  
commissions,	   trading,	   and	   other	   operating	   income.	   We	   follow	   Elsas	   et	   al.	   (2010),	  
Baselga-­‐Pascual	  et	  al.	  (2014),	  and	  Lee	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  and	  calculate	  HHIRD	  as	  follows:	  












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [1]	  
where	   INT	   denotes	   gross	   interest	   income;	   COM	   denotes	   gross	   commission	   and	   fee	  
revenue;	  TRAD	  denotes	  trading	  revenue;	  OTH	  denotes	  all	  other	  gross	  operating	  income;	  
and	  TOR	  denotes	  total	  operating	  revenue	  and	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  absolute	  values	  
of	   INT,	   COM,	   TRAD	   and	   OTH.	   HHIRD	   can	   take	   values	   between	   0	   (no	   revenue	  
diversification)	  and	  0.75	  (indicating	  a	  bank	  that	  generates	  a	  fully	  balanced	  revenue	  mix	  
from	  all	  four	  business	  areas).	  
To	  identify	  whether	  each	  source	  of	  income	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  NPLR	  of	  
European	  banks	  and	  to	  increase	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  results,	  we	  use	  the	  share	  of	  each	  
revenue	  source	  in	  total	  revenue	  as	  an	  alternative	  proxy	  for	  diversification:	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  These	   four	  diversification	  proxies	   are	   commonly	  used	   in	   the	   literature.	  Higher	  
revenue	   diversification	   is	   represented	   by	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   non-­‐interest	   income	  
generated	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  businesses	  (e.g.,	  underwriting,	  securitizing,	  
distributing	   insurance	   policies,	   etc.)	   that	   have	   low	   correlations	   with	   conventional	  
sources	  of	   interest	   income	   (Baele	  et	  al.,	   2007;	  Laeven	  and	  Levine,	  2007;	  Lepetit	  et	  al.,	  
2008;	  Sanya	  and	  Wolfe,	  2010;	  and	  Köhler,	  2014).	  Therefore,	  we	  expect	  higher	  (lower)	  
diversification	   for	   higher	   (lower)	   values	   of	   COMr,	   TRADr	   and	   OTHr.	   The	   opposite	  
relationship	  is	  expected	  for	  INTr.	  
5.1.3 Control	  variables	  
We	  control	  for	  several	  bank-­‐specific	  variables	  that	  influence	  NPLR,	  as	  is	  common	  
in	   the	   literature	   (e.g.,	   Louzis	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Baselga-­‐Pascual	   et	   al.,	   2014;	   Köhler,	   2015;	  
Chaibi	  and	  Ftiti,	  2015).	  Asset	  structure	   is	  measured	  as	  the	  proportion	  of	   loans	   in	   total	  
assets	   (LoanTA);	   bank	   size	   is	  measured	   as	   the	   natural	   logarithm	  of	   total	   assets	   (Size)	  
and	  alternatively	  as	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  equals	  1	  if	  the	  bank	  is	   in	  the	  first	  tertile	  of	  
total	   assets	   (Large);	   growth	   is	   measured	   as	   the	   annual	   growth	   of	   total	   assets;	  
capitalization	   is	   proxied	   by	   the	   ratio	   of	   equity	   to	   total	   assets	   (EqTA);	   profitability	   is	  
proxied	   by	   return	   on	   assets	   (ROA);	   and	   inefficiency	   is	   proxied	   by	   the	   cost-­‐to-­‐income	  
ratio	  (CIR)	  that	  captures	  the	  overhead	  or	  running	  costs	  (the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  which	  
is	  usually	  salaries)	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	   income	  generated	  before	  provisions.	  Finally,	   like	  
previous	  studies	  (Baselga-­‐Pascual	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Köhler	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  we	  
control	   for	   (i)	   the	   public	   status	   of	   the	   bank	   (Listed);	   (ii)	   bank	   type,	   using	   a	   dummy	  
variable	  that	  equals	  1	  for	  commercial	  banks	  and	  equals	  0	  for	  savings	  banks	  and	  credit	  
cooperatives	   (Commercial);	   and	   (iii)	   degree	   of	   specialization,	   using	   a	   dummy	   variable	  
that	  equals	  1	  for	  institutions	  that	  are	  among	  the	  median	  share	  in	  terms	  of	  non-­‐interest	  
income	  over	  total	  income	  (Market).	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Following	  previous	  studies	  of	  NPLR	  determinants	  (e.g.,	  Festic	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Louzis	  
et	  al.,	  2012;	  Baselga-­‐Pascual	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  we	  also	  control	  for	  industry	  concentration	  and	  
for	   various	   macroeconomic	   variables.	   Industry	   concentration	   is	   measured	   by	   a	  
Herfindahl–Hirschman	  index	  (HHIIC)	  that	  is	  calculated	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  squares	  of	  the	  
market	   shares	   (based	   on	   total	   assets)	   of	   all	   credit	   institutions	   within	   a	   country	   (in	  
percentage	  form).	  The	  HHIIC	  is	  more	  accurate	  than	  an	  index	  calculated	  using	  the	  asset	  
share	  of	   three	  or	   the	   five	   largest	  banks	   is	  because	   the	  HHIIC	  reflects	   the	  entry	  of	  new	  
and	   smaller	   banks	   into	   the	  market	   as	  well	   as	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   single	  bank	  with	   a	   very	  
large	   market	   share.	   A	   value	   higher	   than	   1,800	   indicates	   that	   the	   market	   is	   highly	  
concentrated,	  whereas	  a	  value	  less	  than	  1,000	  indicates	  an	  unconcentrated	  market.	  The	  
HHIIC	   data	   for	   the	   euro	   area	   countries	   are	   obtained	   from	   the	   Banking	   Structural	  
Financial	   Indicators	  database	  of	   the	  European	  Central	  Bank	   (ECB).	  We	  use	   the	  annual	  
growth	   rate	   of	   the	   real	   gross	   domestic	   product	   of	   the	   country	   in	   which	   the	   bank	   is	  
located	   (GDPG)	   to	   explore	   the	   association	   between	   economic	   growth	   and	   non-­‐
performing	  loans.	  We	  measure	  the	  effect	  of	  inflation	  (Inflation)	  using	  the	  annual	  average	  
rate	  of	  change	  in	  the	  consumer	  price	  index	  (CPI).	  Unemployment	  (UR)	  is	  proxied	  by	  the	  
annual	   average	   unemployment	   rate	   obtained	   from	   Eurostat,	   which	   represents	   the	  
percentage	  of	  unemployed	  persons	  (aged	  15	  to	  74)	  in	  the	  country’s	  labor	  force.	  We	  also	  
use	   the	   interest	   rate	   of	   the	   main	   refinancing	   operations	   (MRO)	   of	   the	   ECB,	   which	  
provides	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  liquidity	  of	  the	  European	  banking	  system,	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  interest	  
rates	  (Interest).	  	  	  
Finally,	   because	   differences	  may	   continue	   to	   exist	   between	   the	   regulatory	   and	  
supervisory	   environments	   in	   each	   Eurozone	   country,	   we	   use	   four	   indices	   from	   the	  
World	   Bank	   database	   on	   Bank	   Regulation	   and	   Supervision	   developed	   by	   Barth	   et	   al.	  
(2001)	   to	   control	   for	   regulation	   in	   our	   equation	   specification	   (Baselga-­‐Pascual	   et	   al.,	  
2014).	   Capital	   stringency	   (Capregind)	   measures	   the	   extent	   of	   regulatory	   oversight	   of	  
bank	   capital,	   which	   assesses	   and	   verifies	   the	   degree	   of	   capital	   risk	   in	   a	   bank;	   official	  
supervisory	   power	   (Suppowind)	   reflects	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   country’s	   bank	  
supervisory	   agency	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   take	   specific	   actions	   (e.g.,	   to	   force	   a	   bank	   to	  
change	   its	   internal	  organizational	   structure);	   the	  private	  monitory	   index	   (Privmonind)	  
shows	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  banks	  are	   forced	   to	  publicly	  disclose	  accurate	   information	  
and	  whether	  there	  are	  incentives	  to	  increase	  market	  discipline;	  and	  activity	  restrictions	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(Actrestind)	   measures	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   regulations	   restrict	   banks’	   activities	   in	  
securities	  markets,	  insurance,	  and	  real	  estate	  and/or	  restrict	  banks’	  ownership	  shares	  in	  
nonfinancial	   firms,	   with	   higher	   values	   indicating	   greater	   restrictions	   (Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  
and	  Huizinga,	  2010).	  We	  use	  the	  first	  lag	  of	  these	  indices	  because	  regulatory	  initiatives	  
are	   unlikely	   to	   immediately	   affect	   NPLR	   (Agoraki	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Delis	   and	   Staikouras,	  
2011).	  	  
Table	  2	  contains	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  variables	  used.	  
Table	  2:	  Description	  of	  variables	  
Classification	   Variable	   Description	   Source	  
Dependent	  
variable	  
NPLr	   Ratio	   of	   non-­‐performing	   loans	   to	   total	   loans	   in	  





HHIRD	   1-­‐(INTr2+COMr2+TRADr2+OTHr2)	  
Bankscope	  
COMr	   Net	  commissions	  and	  fees/	  total	  operating	  income	  
TRADr	   Net	  trading/	  total	  operating	  income	  
OTHr	   All	  other	  net	  revenue/	  total	  operating	  income	  
INTr	   Net	  interests/	  total	  operating	  income.	  Also	  known	  as	  
the	  inverse	  of	  non-­‐interest	  income	  over	  total	  income	  
(NIIr)	  
HHIREV	   (NON/TOR)	   2+	   (INT/TOR)	   2.	   Where	   NON	   =	   non-­‐
interest	  income;	  TOR	  =	  Total	  operating	  income;	  INT	  
=	  net	  interest	  income.	  
RDLL	   1-­‐ABS	  ((INT-­‐NON)/TOR)	  
HHINON	   (COM/NON)	  2+(TRAD/NON)	  2+(OTH/NON)	  2	  
Diversified	   Dummy	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  HHIRD	  >	  median	   	  
Bank	   specific	  
controls	  
LoanTA	   Loans/	  Total	  assets	  
Bankscope	  
Size	   Natural	  logarithm	  of	  total	  assets	  
GTA	   Growth	  rate	  of	  total	  assets	  
EqTA	   Equity/	  Total	  assets	  
ROA	   Return	  on	  assets	  
CIR	   Cost	  /Income	  
Listed	   Dummy	  variable	  equal	   to	  1	   if	   the	  bank	   is	  publically	  
traded.	  
	   Market	   Dummy	   variable	   equal	   to	   1	   if	   the	   bank	   is	   market	  
oriented	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  	   	  
	   Large	   Dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  bank	  is	  among	  the	  
33%	  largest	  banks	  (in	  terms	  of	  total	  assets)	   	  
	   Commercial	   Dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  bank	  is	  classified	  as	  
Commercial	  bank.	   	  
Macroeconomic	  
controls	  
HHIIC	   Herfindahl-­‐Hirschman	   Index	   of	   industry	  
concentration.	  
ECB	  
Interest	   Interest	  rate	  on	  the	  MRO	  of	  the	  ECB	  
GDPG	   Annual	  real	  GDP	  Growth	  Rate	   Eurostat	  
Inflation	   Annual	  Average	  Rate	  Change	  in	  CPI	  
UR	   Unemployment	  rate	  
Crisis	  period	   Crisis	   Dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  year	  >2007	   	  
Regulation	  
controls	  
Capregind	   Capital	  stringency	  index	   Barth	   et	   al.	  
(2001)	   and	  Suppowind	   Official	  supervisory	  power	  index	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Classification	   Variable	   Description	   Source	  
Privmonind	   Private	  monitory	  index	   updates.	  
Actrestind	   Activity	  restrictions	  index	  
4. Empirical	  analysis	  
4.1. Descriptive	  statistics	  
Table	  3	  shows	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  (means	  and	  standard	  deviations)	  for	  the	  
main	   variables	   in	   our	   study.	   Most	   macroeconomic	   and	   bank-­‐specific	   variables	   are	  
affected	  by	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  NPLR	  and	  ROA,	  each	  of	  which	  shows	  a	  
drastic	  decreasing	   trend	   since	  2008.	  GTA	   and	  GDPG	   reach	   their	   lowest	   levels	   in	  2009,	  
whereas	  UR	   starts	   to	   increase	   in	   2008	   and	  maintains	   that	   trend	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
sample	   period.	   Similarly,	   Interest	   decreases	   significantly	   after	   2008	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
European	  Central	  Bank	  policies	  aimed	  at	  stimulating	  the	  Eurozone	  economy.	  However,	  
other	  variables,	  such	  as	  HHIIC	  and	  HHIRD,	  are	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  and	  
exhibit	   changes	   that	   are	  most	   likely	   related	   to	   the	   deregulation	   trend	   in	   the	   financial	  
sector	  during	   the	   last	   several	  decades.	  Revenue	  diversification	   increases	  slightly	  more	  
than	  10%	  during	  the	  sample	  period,	  with	  COMr	  exhibiting	  the	  largest	  growth	  (30%);	  the	  
share	  of	   interest	   income	  in	  total	   income	  decreases	  by	  20%,	  and	  OTHr	   increases	  by	  the	  
same	   percentage.	   The	   only	   account	   that	   suffers	   a	   crisis	   effect	   is	   TRADr,	   which	  
experienced	  negative	  values	  in	  2008.	  
Table	  3:	  Descriptive	  statistics	  
	   	   Bank	  specific	  controls	  
Year	   NPLR	   Size	   GTA	   EqTA	   ROA	   CIR	  
1999	   9.95	  	   13.12	  	   11.24	  	   7.39	  	   0.47	  	   68.92	  	  
	   (12.76)	   (1.19)	   (28.08)	   (9.22)	   (1.12)	   (23.17)	  
2000	   5.26	  	   13.15	  	   9.70	  	   7.71	  	   0.45	  	   71.99	  	  
	   (2.54)	   (1.24)	   (29.37)	   (9.61)	   (0.93)	   (33.76)	  
2001	   6.03	  	   13.20	  	   10.75	  	   8.01	  	   0.35	  	   73.41	  	  
	   (4.08)	   (1.31)	   (28.80)	   (10.08)	   (1.36)	   (30.61)	  
2002	   6.71	  	   13.24	  	   7.78	  	   8.43	  	   0.31	  	   73.37	  	  
	   (4.90)	   (1.31)	   (35.55)	   (10.79)	   (2.92)	   (45.02)	  
2003	   8.72	  	   13.25	  	   6.10	  	   8.56	  	   0.43	  	   71.37	  	  
	   (6.81)	   (1.31)	   (28.07)	   (10.21)	   (1.91)	   (29.85)	  
2004	   7.84	  	   13.49	  	   6.54	  	   8.56	  	   0.44	  	   69.47	  	  
	   (5.00)	   (1.59)	   (21.49)	   (9.45)	   (2.15)	   (26.23)	  
2005	   3.97	  	   13.40	  	   10.75	  	   10.00	  	   0.73	  	   68.49	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   Bank	  specific	  controls	  
Year	   NPLR	   Size	   GTA	   EqTA	   ROA	   CIR	  
	   (3.36)	   (1.77)	   (29.65)	   (9.58)	   (1.30)	   (19.02)	  
2006	   3.67	  	   13.48	  	   10.03	  	   10.56	  	   0.79	  	   64.76	  	  
	   (3.01)	   (1.84)	   (19.22)	   (11.35)	   (1.60)	   (21.20)	  
2007	   5.61	  	   13.59	  	   12.05	  	   10.42	  	   0.83	  	   65.78	  	  
	   (4.43)	   (1.88)	   (34.70)	   (10.86)	   (2.38)	   (24.69)	  
2008	   5.27	  	   13.63	  	   10.80	  	   10.30	  	   0.50	  	   68.00	  	  
	   (4.21)	   (1.86)	   (25.12)	   (11.44)	   (1.46)	   (23.23)	  
2009	   5.81	  	   13.72	  	   6.14	  	   10.27	  	   0.35	  	   68.89	  	  
	   (4.42)	   (1.88)	   (25.39)	   (10.84)	   (1.93)	   (29.68)	  
2010	   6.87	  	   13.78	  	   5.29	  	   10.30	  	   0.29	  	   69.79	  	  
	   (4.95)	   (1.92)	   (23.99)	   (10.70)	   (3.00)	   (31.28)	  
2011	   7.59	  	   13.82	  	   6.39	  	   10.47	  	   0.24	  	   69.79	  	  
	   (5.56)	   (1.89)	   (38.06)	   (11.60)	   (1.54)	   (33.68)	  
2012	   8.48	  	   14.11	  	   7.06	  	   9.36	  	   0.22	  	   67.18	  	  
	   (7.57)	   (1.88)	   (25.33)	   (7.87)	   (1.34)	   (22.75)	  
Total	   8.67	  	   13.55	  	   8.51	  	   9.58	  	   0.47	  	   68.87	  	  
	   (6.98)	   (1.74)	   (28.41)	   (10.47)	   (1.90)	   (27.88)	  
	  
Table	  3:	  (Continued)	  
	   Industry	  concentration	  and	  macroeconomic	  controls	  
Year	   HHIIC	   GDPG	   Inflation	   UR	   Interest	  
1999	   377.58	  	   2.81	  	   1.21	  	   8.89	  	   3.00	  	  
	   (343.03)	   (1.75)	   (1.12)	   (3.10)	   (0.00)	  
2000	   401.50	  	   3.85	  	   2.36	  	   8.06	  	   4.75	  	  
	   (362.40)	   (1.27)	   (1.24)	   (2.82)	   (0.00)	  
2001	   435.45	  	   1.83	  	   2.62	  	   7.55	  	   3.25	  	  
	   (378.21)	   (0.79)	   (0.97)	   (2.56)	   (0.00)	  
2002	   446.07	  	   1.00	  	   2.13	  	   7.83	  	   2.75	  	  
	   (394.84)	   (1.21)	   (0.81)	   (2.37)	   (0.00)	  
2003	   447.25	  	   0.54	  	   2.01	  	   8.23	  	   2.00	  	  
	   (416.90)	   (1.22)	   (1.00)	   (2.31)	   (0.00)	  
2004	   446.58	  	   2.13	  	   2.11	  	   8.48	  	   2.00	  	  
	   (424.87)	   (0.96)	   (0.62)	   (2.23)	   (0.00)	  
2005	   462.06	  	   1.69	  	   2.03	  	   8.53	  	   2.25	  	  
	   (439.97)	   (1.34)	   (0.52)	   (2.30)	   (0.00)	  
2006	   448.46	  	   3.26	  	   1.95	  	   7.84	  	   3.50	  	  
	   (427.53)	   (1.06)	   (0.63)	   (2.09)	   (0.00)	  
2007	   475.14	  	   3.04	  	   2.13	  	   6.95	  	   4.00	  	  
	   (418.25)	   (1.33)	   (0.52)	   (1.71)	   (0.00)	  
2008	   465.76	  	   0.31	  	   3.19	  	   6.83	  	   2.50	  	  
	   (437.83)	   (1.21)	   (0.69)	   (1.82)	   (0.00)	  
2009	   450.47	  	   -­‐4.73	  	   0.38	  	   8.13	  	   1.00	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   Industry	  concentration	  and	  macroeconomic	  controls	  
Year	   HHIIC	   GDPG	   Inflation	   UR	   Interest	  
	   (409.83)	   (1.16)	   (0.52)	   (3.01)	   (0.00)	  
2010	   506.39	  	   2.29	  	   1.51	  	   8.29	  	   1.00	  	  
	   (396.58)	   (1.38)	   (0.46)	   (3.64)	   (0.00)	  
2011	   514.16	  	   1.85	  	   2.64	  	   8.04	  	   1.00	  	  
	   (385.62)	   (1.54)	   (0.55)	   (4.18)	   (0.00)	  
2012	   496.97	  	   -­‐0.60	  	   2.46	  	   8.93	  	   0.75	  	  
	   (350.59)	   (1.54)	   (0.46)	   (5.16)	   (0.00)	  
Total	   451.46	  	   1.47	  	   2.01	  	   8.24	  	   2.26	  	  
	   (396.96)	   (2.40)	   (1.02)	   (3.30)	   (1.26)	  
	  
Table	  3:	  (Continued)	  
	   Revenue	  diversification	  proxies	  
Year	   HHIRD	   INTR	   TRADR	   COMR	   OTHR	  
1999	   52.51	  	   57.73	  	   0.99	  	   17.86	  	   23.98	  	  
	   (10.74)	   (25.20)	   (3.67)	   (12.55)	   (15.54)	  
2000	   53.86	  	   57.23	  	   0.82	  	   18.51	  	   23.95	  	  
	   (9.59)	   (23.03)	   (4.31)	   (11.60)	   (14.43)	  
2001	   51.40	  	   54.70	  	   0.62	  	   18.82	  	   26.55	  	  
	   (10.65)	   (95.15)	   (5.17)	   (28.55)	   (87.84)	  
2002	   50.57	  	   61.44	  	   0.41	  	   16.34	  	   22.28	  	  
	   (10.36)	   (66.20)	   (3.69)	   (27.66)	   (62.43)	  
2003	   52.59	  	   58.35	  	   1.44	  	   17.42	  	   23.72	  	  
	   (11.02)	   (58.76)	   (6.00)	   (30.68)	   (29.58)	  
2004	   54.20	  	   55.14	  	   1.20	  	   19.28	  	   25.06	  	  
	   (10.62)	   (51.45)	   (4.62)	   (26.39)	   (26.10)	  
2005	   54.37	  	   55.87	  	   0.96	  	   18.05	  	   25.55	  	  
	   (10.18)	   (34.41)	   (3.80)	   (17.56)	   (18.27)	  
2006	   55.55	  	   52.61	  	   1.14	  	   18.80	  	   28.06	  	  
	   (9.63)	   (83.86)	   (4.24)	   (42.68)	   (42.19)	  
2007	   53.40	  	   57.42	  	   1.20	  	   17.72	  	   24.40	  	  
	   (11.23)	   (45.08)	   (9.50)	   (21.82)	   (24.15)	  
2008	   50.30	  	   62.88	  	   -­‐0.02	  	   17.02	  	   20.61	  	  
	   (13.19)	   (91.32)	   (4.85)	   (43.67)	   (54.39)	  
2009	   55.08	  	   52.89	  	   1.63	  	   19.69	  	   26.33	  	  
	   (9.29)	   (84.02)	   (4.99)	   (45.63)	   (46.99)	  
2010	   54.25	  	   55.13	  	   0.18	  	   19.83	  	   25.12	  	  
	   (10.44)	   (29.85)	   (4.35)	   (14.68)	   (17.25)	  
2011	   54.00	  	   54.92	  	   0.35	  	   20.52	  	   24.65	  	  
	   (10.33)	   (47.22)	   (4.74)	   (21.40)	   (28.58)	  
2012	   56.27	  	   52.96	  	   1.35	  	   19.96	  	   26.03	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   Revenue	  diversification	  proxies	  
Year	   HHIRD	   INTR	   TRADR	   COMR	   OTHR	  
	   (9.25)	   (60.22)	   (4.99)	   (26.96)	   (36.91)	  
Total	   53.63	  	   56.33	  	   0.86	  	   18.58	  	   24.74	  	  
	   (10.68)	   (62.07)	   (5.23)	   (29.79)	   (38.95)	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   reports	   the	   means	   and	   standard	   deviations	   (in	   parentheses)	   for	   the	   entire	   sample	   for	   each	   year.	   The	   sample	  
comprises	  a	  maximum	  of	  2000	  banks	  (32,028	  observations).	  NPLR	  and	  Size	  are	  in	  Logarithm	  form.	  See	  table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  
variables.	  	  
In	   the	   following	  sections,	  we	   implement	  several	  statistical	   techniques	   to	  deeply	  
analyze	  and	  provide	  robust	  results	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  the	  quality	  
of	  loan	  portfolios	  held	  by	  European	  banks.	  
4.2. Univariate	  tests	  
First,	  we	  implement	  univariate	  tests	  to	  examine	  whether	  market-­‐oriented	  banks,	  
defined	  as	  institutions	  with	  higher	  shares	  of	  non-­‐interest	  generating	  income	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  
2014),	  are	  also	  better	  diversified	  and	  exhibit	   lower	  NPLRs.	  To	   that	  end,	  we	  divide	  our	  
sample	  into	  two	  subsamples	  based	  on	  the	  ratio	  of	  non-­‐interest	  income	  to	  total	  operating	  
income;	   the	   “Market”	   subsample	   comprises	   banks	   that	   generate	   more	   non-­‐interest	  
income	   than	   the	   median	   level,	   whereas	   the	   “Bank”	   subsample	   includes	   banks	   that	  
generate	  less	  non-­‐interest	  income	  than	  the	  median	  level2.	  We	  then	  perform	  two-­‐tailed	  t-­‐
tests	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  are	  no	  differences	  in	  the	  means	  and	  medians	  
between	   market-­‐	   and	   bank-­‐based	   financial	   institutions.	   Table	   4	   shows	   that	   market-­‐
oriented	  banks	  are	  more	  revenue	  diversified	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  balance	  between	  the	  four	  
main	   sources	   of	   income	   (interest,	   commissions	   and	   fees,	   trading,	   and	   other	   operating	  
income)	   as	   proxied	   by	  HHIRD.	   Not	   surprisingly,	  market-­‐based	   banks	   show	   significant	  
positive	  differences	  in	  the	  means	  of	  the	  proportions	  of	  commissions,	  trading,	  and	  other	  
operating	   income	   in	   total	   income	   and	   a	   negative	   difference	   in	   the	   mean	   of	   the	  
proportion	  of	  net	  interest	  income	  in	  total	  operating	  income;	  these	  results	  indicate	  that	  
market-­‐oriented	  banks	  are	  more	  diversified	  than	  bank-­‐oriented	  banks.	  Finally,	  market-­‐
oriented	   institutions	   also	   show	   significant	   positive	   differences	   in	   the	  means	   of	  NPLR,	  
which	  indicates	  that	  market-­‐oriented	  banks	  have	  better	  quality	  assets.	  
                                                
2	  We	  also	  divide	  the	  sample	  into	  tertiles	  and	  compare	  the	  first	  and	  last	  tertiles,	  which	  yields	  similar	  results	  
in	  terms	  of	  both	  signs	  and	  significance.	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Table	  4:	  Univariate	  tests.	  Market	  vs.	  bank	  oriented	  banks	  
	  	   Observations	   Market	   Bank	  	   Dif.	  in	  means	  (market	  -­‐
bank)	  
HHIRD	   13,594	   61.03	   47.03	   13.99***	  
COMR	   20,420	   24.89	   24.89	   0.00***	  
TRADR	   13,621	   1.85	   -­‐0.04	   1.89***	  
OTHR	   20,594	   34.37	   15.05	   19.32***	  
INTR	   20,642	   39.65	   73.04	   -­‐33.39***	  
NPLR	   5,638	   1.41	   1.79	   -­‐0.38***	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   reports	   the	   results	   of	   two-­‐tailed	   t-­‐tests	   under	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   in	   the	  means	   between	  
market	  based	  and	  bank	  based	  financial	  institutions.	  Market	  and	  bank	  subsamples	  consist	  of	  financial	  institutions	  with	  below	  and	  above	  
median	  non-­‐interest	  income	  over	  total	  operating	  income,	  respectively.	  See	  table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  variables.	  ***,	  **,	  and	  *	  denote	  
significance	  at	  the	  0.01,	  0.05,	  and	  0.10	  levels,	  respectively.	  	  
We	   also	   conduct	   univariate	   tests	   to	   examine	   possible	   significant	   differences	  
between	   large	   and	   small	   banks.	   In	   this	   exercise,	   we	   split	   our	   sample	   into	   two	  
subsamples	  based	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  total	  assets;	  the	  “Large”	  subsample	  comprises	  banks	  
with	   total	   assets	   greater	   than	   the	   median,	   whereas	   the	   “Small”	   subsample	   includes	  
banks	  with	  total	  assets	  below	  the	  median.	  We	  again	  perform	  two-­‐tailed	  t-­‐tests	  under	  the	  
null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  are	  no	  differences	   in	  the	  means	  and	  medians	  between	  large	  
and	  small	  banks.	  According	   to	  our	   results,	   large	  banks	  are	  better	  diversified	  and	  have	  
lower	  NPLRs.	  
Table	  5:	  Univariate	  tests.	  Large	  vs.	  small	  banks	  	  
	  	   Observations	   Large	  	   Small	  	   Dif.	  in	  means	  (large-­‐small)	  
HHIRD	   13,594	   55.32	   51.80	   3.52***	  
COMR	   20,420	   19.56	   17.63	   1.92***	  
TRADR	   13,621	   1.04	   0.64	   0.41***	  
OTHR	   20,594	   25.69	   23.77	   1.92***	  
INTR	   20,642	   54.18	   58.51	   -­‐4.33***	  
NPLR	   5,642	   1.38	   1.92	   -­‐0.55***	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  two-­‐tailed	  t-­‐tests	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  means	  between	  the	  
largest	  and	  the	  smallest	  banks.	  Large	  and	  small	  subsamples	  consist	  of	  financial	   institutions	  with	  below	  and	  above	  median	  total	  assets,	  
respectively.	  See	  table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  variables.	  ***,	  **,	  and	  *	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  0.01,	  0.05,	  and	  0.10	  levels,	  respectively.	  	  
Tables	  4	  and	  5	  show	  highly	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  means	  of	  market-­‐	  
and	  bank-­‐oriented	  banks	  and	  between	   the	  means	  of	   large	  and	   small	  banks,	   indicating	  
that	   large	   and	  market-­‐oriented	   banks	   are	   more	   diversified	   and	   have	   a	   better-­‐quality	  
asset	  portfolios.	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4.3. Multivariate	  analysis	  
In	   this	   section,	   we	   conduct	   a	   series	   of	   multivariate	   analyses	   employing	   the	   GMM	  
estimator	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  system	  GMM	  estimator)	  developed	  for	  dynamic	  panel	  
data	  models	   by	   Arellano	   and	   Bover	   (1995)	   and	   Blundell	   and	   Bond	   (1998).	   The	   GMM	  
estimator	  allows	  us	  to	  control	  for	  unobserved	  heterogeneity	  and	  endogeneity	  by	  means	  
of	   suitable	   instruments.	   As	   proposed	   by	  Windmeijer	   (2005),	  we	   employ	   the	   two-­‐step	  
estimation	  procedure	  with	  finite	  sample	  corrected	  standard	  errors,	  which	  produces	  less	  
biased	  coefficient	  estimates	  and	  more	  accurate	  standard	  errors.	  We	  require	  at	  least	  five	  
consecutive	   years	   during	   the	   sample	   period	   for	   each	   analyzed	   variable	   to	   test	   for	   the	  
absence	  of	  second-­‐order	  serial	  correlation.	  	  
Our	  baseline	  equation	  is	  as	  follows:	  
Yitj	  =α=+	  =1	  Yitj-­‐1	  +	  β2(Diversification	  index)j,t+	  β3(Bank-­‐specific	  controls)i,j,t	  +	  β
4(Macroeconomic	  controls)j,t+	  ,5(Regulation	  controls)j,t-­‐1	  +	  εi,j,t	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6 	  
where	  Y	  denotes	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  the	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  (NPLR)	  of	  bank	  i	  in	  
country	   j	   at	   year	   t;	   Yi,j,t-­‐1	  represents	   its	   lagged	   value;	  β1	  measures	   the	   speed	   of	  mean	  
reversion	  (a	  value	  of	  β1	   that	   is	  not	  significantly	  different	   from	  0	   implies	   that	  NPLR	   is	  
characterized	  by	   a	  high	   speed	  of	   adjustment,	  whereas	   a	   value	   that	   is	   not	   significantly	  
different	  from	  1	  means	  that	  adjustment	  is	  very	  slow);	  Diversification	  index	  represents	  5	  
different	   proxies	   of	   diversification;	   Bank-­‐specific	   controls	   denotes	   the	   bank-­‐specific	  
variables	   considered	   in	   our	   study,	   and	  Macroeconomic	   controls	   denotes	   the	   industry-­‐
specific	   and	  macroeconomic	  variables	  used;	  Regulation	  controls	   refers	   to	   several	  bank	  
regulation	   and	   supervision	   control	   variables;	   and	  β	   denotes	   vectors	   of	   coefficient	  
estimates.	   Finally,	  εi,j,t	   is	   the	   disturbance	   term	   that	   contains	   the	   unobserved	   bank-­‐
specific	  effect	  and	  the	  idiosyncratic	  error.	  
Bank-­‐specific	   controls	   and	  diversification	   variables	   are	   considered	   endogenous	  
in	  our	  equation	  specification	  to	  prevent	  possible	  unobserved	  heterogeneity	  and	  reverse	  
causality	   (Demirgüç.-­‐Kunt	   and	   Huizinga,	   2010,	   Baselga-­‐Pascual	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Köhler,	  
2015).	  To	  that	  end,	  we	  employ	  lagged	  first	  differences	  of	  the	  bank-­‐specific	  explanatory	  
variables	   as	   instruments	   for	   the	   equation	   in	   levels	   and	   use	   the	   lagged	   values	   of	   the	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explanatory	   variables	   in	   levels	   as	   instruments	   for	   the	   equation	   in	   differences	   (in	   line	  
with	  Arellano	  and	  Bover,	  1995,	  and	  Blundell	  and	  Bond,	  1998).	  Regulatory	  controls	  are	  
also	  treated	  as	  endogenous	  variables	   in	  our	  regression	  because	  we	  assume	  that	  banks	  
and	   regulators	   choose	   their	   respective	   strategies	   when	   they	   observe	   economic	  
conditions	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  period	  (Delis	  and	  Staikouras,	  2011;	  Baselga-­‐Pascual	  et	  
al.,	  2014).	  Finally,	   industry	  concentration	  and	  macroeconomic	  variables	  are	   treated	  as	  
strictly	   exogenous.	   We	   verify	   that	   the	   instruments	   are	   statistically	   valid	   using	   the	  
Hansen	  J-­‐test	  of	  overidentifying	  restrictions.	  
5.1.4 The	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  NPLR	  in	  Europeans	  banks	  
The	  first	  panel	  (table	  6)	  shows	  the	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  bank	  NPLR	  
after	   controlling	   for	   bank-­‐specific	   characteristics,	   macroeconomic	   conditions	   and	  
regulatory	   restrictions.	   Models	   1	   to	   5	   show	   the	   effects	   of	   alternative	   revenue	  
diversification	   proxies	   and	   of	   bank-­‐specific	   characteristics,	  macroeconomic	   conditions	  
and	   regulatory	   controls	   on	  NPLR	   in	   European	   banks.	   In	  model	   6,	   the	   variable	   Size	   is	  
substituted	  for	  Large,	  which	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  equals	  one	  for	  banks	  in	  the	  first	  
tertile	  of	  total	  assets.	  Model	  7	  includes	  the	  dummy	  variable	  Market,	  which	  equals	  1	  for	  
market-­‐based	   institutions	   (i.e.,	   institutions	   with	   shares	   of	   non-­‐interest	   income	   in	   net	  
income	  that	  are	  above	  the	  median	  level)	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
Table	  6:	  The	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  NPLR	  in	  European	  banks	  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Revenue diversification           
HHIRD -0.00***         
 (0.00)          
COMr   -0.01**       
   (0.00)        
TRADr     -0.00       
     (0.00)      
OTHr       -0.00***   
       (0.00)    
INTr         0.00*** 
         (0.00)  
Control variables           
NPLR_1 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
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 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
loanTA 0.00  *** 0.00  ** 0.00  ** 0.00  ** 0.00  ** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Size -0.01   -0.01   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
Large           
           
GTA -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
EqTA -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.01   
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
ROA -0.12  *** -0.12  *** -0.11  *** -0.12  *** -0.11  *** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
CIR -0.00  ** -0.00   -0.00  ** -0.00  ** -0.00  ** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Listed 0.04   0.05   0.07     0.00   
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  
Actrestind 0.03  *** 0.03  *** 0.04  *** 0.03  *** 0.03  *** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Capregind -0.04  *** -0.03  *** -0.05  *** -0.04  *** -0.03  *** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Suppowind 0.03  *** 0.03  *** 0.04  *** 0.04  *** 0.03  *** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Privmonind -0.00   -0.01   0.04  ** -0.00   -0.01   
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
HHIIC -0.00  *** -0.00  *** -0.00  *** -0.00  ** -0.00   
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
GDPG -0.01  *** -0.01  *** -0.01  *** -0.01  *** -0.01  *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Inflation -0.01   -0.00   -0.00   -0.01   -0.01   
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
UR 0.01  *** 0.01  *** 0.02  *** 0.01  *** 0.01  *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Interest -0.04  *** -0.04  *** -0.05  *** -0.04  *** -0.04  *** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Market           
           
Constant 0.57  * 0.34   -0.15   0.28   0.02   
 (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.33)  
Observations 4,268 4,259 3,854 4,268 4,268 
AR2 -1.80 -1.73 -1.59 -1.72 -1.73 
Hansen  520.16 (461) 525.75 (461)  482.35 (378) 507.43 (461)  509.76 (461) 
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Table	  6:	  (Continued)	  
	   Model	  (6)	   Model	  (7)	  
Revenue	  diversification	   	   	   	   	  
HHIRD	   -­‐0.00	  	   **	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
COMr	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
TRADr	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
OTHr	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
INTr	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Control	  variables	   	   	   	   	  
NPLR_1	   0.78	  	   ***	   0.79	  	   ***	  
	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	  
loanTA	   0.00	  	   ***	   0.00	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Size	   	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	  
	   	   	   (0.01)	   	  
Large	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   	   	  
	   (0.04)	   	   	   	  
GTA	   0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
EqTA	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
ROA	   -­‐0.12	  	   ***	   -­‐0.12	  	   ***	  
CIR	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	  
	   -­‐0.00	  	   **	   -­‐0.00	  	   **	  
Listed	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
	   0.04	  	   	   0.06	  	   	  
Actrestind	   (0.07)	   	   (0.08)	   	  
	   0.03	  	   ***	   0.03	  	   ***	  
Capregind	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	  
Suppowind	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
	   0.03	  	   ***	   0.03	  	   ***	  
Privmonind	   (0.00)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	  
HHIIC	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  
GDPG	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  
Inflation	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
	   -­‐0.01	  	   *	   -­‐0.01	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   Model	  (6)	   Model	  (7)	  
UR	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
	   0.01	  	   ***	   0.01	  	   ***	  
Interest	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
	   -­‐0.05	  	   ***	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	  
Market	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
	   	   	   -­‐0.02	  	   	  
Constant	   	   	   (0.02)	   	  
	   0.37	  	   *	   0.58	  	   *	  
	   (0.21)	   	   (0.33)	   	  
Observations	   4,268	   4,259	  
AR2	   -­‐1.81	   -­‐1.78	  
Hansen	   514.04	  (460)	   526.1	  (496)	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   presents	   the	   effects	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   NPLr	   in	   the	   Eurozone	   during	   the	   period	   1999–2012	   using	   the	  
system-­‐GMM	  estimator	  developed	  by	  Arellano	  and	  Bover	   (1995)	  and	  Blundell	  and	  Bond	  (1998).	  See	  Table	  2	   for	  a	  description	  of	   the	  
independent	  variables.	  NPLR_1	  indicates	  the	  lagged	  period	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Except	  for	  HHIIC,	  GPD,	  Inflation,	  UR	  and	  Interest,	  
all	   variables	   are	   considered	   endogenous	   in	   our	   model.	   We	   report	   heteroskedasticity-­‐consistent	   asymptotic	   standard	   errors	   in	  
parentheses,	  and	  significance	   levels	  are	   indicated	  as	   follows:	  ***=	  significant	  at	   the	  1%	  level;	  **=	  significant	  at	   the	  5%	  level;	  and	  *=	  
significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  AR2	  denotes	  the	  Arellano	  and	  Bond	  test	  for	  the	  second	  order	  autocorrelation	  in	  first	  differences.	  Hansen	  is	  
a	   test	  of	   the	  over-­‐identifying	   restrictions,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  χ2	  under	   the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  correlation	  between	   the	  
instruments	  and	  the	  error	  term,	  with	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  parentheses.	  
The	  panel	  presents	  a	  highly	  statistically	  significant	  negative	  relationship	  between	  
HHIRD	  and	  NPLR.	  It	  also	  shows	  that	  increasing	  the	  shares	  of	  commission	  and	  fee	  income	  
and	  other	  operating	  income	  in	  total	  income	  would	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  assets	  held	  by	  
European	  banks.	  
Regarding	   bank-­‐specific	   controls,	  we	   find	   that	   a	   larger	   share	   of	   loans	   in	   assets	  
significantly	   increases	  NPLR,	  whereas	   greater	   profitability	   significantly	   reduces	  NPLR.	  
Unexpectedly,	  less	  efficient	  banks	  seem	  to	  have	  lower	  NPLRs.	  Regarding	  macroeconomic	  
controls,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   to	   observe	   that	   greater	   sector	   concentration,	   higher	  GDP	  
growth	   and	   higher	   interest	   rates	   significantly	   reduce	   bank	   NPLR,	   whereas	   higher	  
unemployment	   ratios	   significantly	   increase	   bank	   NPLR.	   Interestingly,	   only	   capital	  
stringency	   significantly	  reduces	  bank	  NPLR,	  whereas	  the	  activity	  restriction	  and	  official	  
supervisory	   power	   indices	   show	   a	   significant	   positive	   effect	   in	   most	   models	   and	   the	  
private	   monitoring	   index	   does	   not	   significantly	   affect	   NPLR.	   These	   results	   have	  
important	   implications	   for	   regulators	   and	   policy	   makers	   because	   restrictions	   on	  
banking	   activities	   limit	   the	   diversification	   effect	   on	   non-­‐performing	   loan	   ratios	   of	  
European	  banks	  and	  therefore	  increase	  bank	  risk	  exposure.	  
However,	   although	   our	   univariate	   tests	   show	   significant	   differences	   between	  
large	  and	  small	  banks,	  neither	  the	  Size	  nor	  the	  Large	  variable	  exerts	  statistical	  effects	  on	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NPLR.	  Similarly,	  after	  controlling	  for	  Market	  institutions,	  the	  results	  remain	  unchanged,	  
indicating	  that	  this	  dummy	  variable	  is	  statistically	  insignificant.	  Moreover,	  following	  Lee	  
et	  al.	   (2014),	  we	  classify	  countries	   in	  which	  more	  than	  half	  of	  banks	  are	  market-­‐based	  
institutions	   (Austria,	   Belgium,	   Finland,	   France,	   Luxemburg,	   Netherlands,	   Portugal,	  
Slovenia	   and	  Slovakia)	   as	  Market	  based	  systems;	   the	   effect	  of	   this	   classification	  on	  our	  
model’s	  results	  is	  insignificant3.	  
Finally,	   we	   control	   for	   commercial	   banks	   by	   including	   the	   dummy	   variable	  
Commercial,	  which	  equals	  1	   for	  commercial	  banks	  and	  equals	  0	   for	  savings	  banks	  and	  
credit	   cooperatives,	   to	   test	   whether	   there	   are	   significant	   differences	   in	   the	   effects	   of	  
diversification	  on	  NPLR	   between	  different	  bank	   types.	  We	  consider	   this	   issue	  because	  
savings	  banks	  and	  credit	  cooperatives	  are	  significantly	  different	  than	  commercial	  banks.	  
In	  particular,	  savings	  banks	  and	  credit	  cooperatives	  are	  more	  retail	  oriented	  and	  focus	  
more	   on	   traditional	   banking	   activities	   (Köhler,	   2014,	   2015);	   they	   are	   also	   more	  
geographically	   focused.	   However,	   the	   variable	   Commercial	   becomes	   statistically	  
insignificant	   in	   our	   model,	   whereas	   revenue	   diversification	   maintains	   its	   sign	   and	  
significance.	  Whether	  there	  are	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  between	  bank	  types	  
that	   mediate	   the	   effect	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   NPLR	   must	   be	   studied	   more	  
extensively.	   However,	   the	   (unreported)	   results	   confirm	   thus	   far	   that	   diversification	  
contributes	  to	  reductions	  in	  NPLR	  for	  both	  bank	  types.	  
4.4. Robustness	  tests	  
Table	   7	   shows	   the	   effects	   of	   diversification	   on	   NPLR	   after	   controlling	   for	   the	  
financial	  crisis	  period.	  To	  that	  end,	  we	   include	  a	  dummy	  variable	  (Crisis)	  that	  equals	  1	  
for	  the	  years	  2008-­‐2012.	  Model	  1	  shows	  that	  HHIRD	  keeps	  its	  sign	  and	  significance	  after	  
controlling	  for	  the	  financial	  crisis	  effect.	  Similarly,	  models	  2	  through	  5	  demonstrate	  that	  
COMr	  and	  OTHr	  continue	  to	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  reductions	  in	  NPLR	  whereas	  INTr	  
significantly	   increases	   NPLR.	   These	   results	   indicate	   that	   even	   when	   adverse	  
macroeconomic	   scenarios	   significantly	   affect	  NPLR,	   diversification	   still	   contributes	   to	  
reductions	  in	  NPLR	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  Crisis	  variable.	  We	  introduce	  the	  interaction	  
between	   HHIRD	   and	   Crisis	   (CrisisXrd)	   in	   model	   6.	   As	   expected,	   the	   positive	   and	  
                                                
3	  Results	  are	  available	  upon	  request.	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significant	   sign	   of	   CrisisXrd	   shows	   that	   crisis	   scenarios	   moderate	   the	   relationship	  
between	  HHIRD	  and	  NPLR	  by	  enhancing	  the	  positive	   impact	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  
on	  bank	   risk-­‐taking.	  Therefore,	   after	   this	   first	   robustness	   check,	  we	   can	   conclude	   that	  
revenue	   diversification	   can	   significantly	   reduce	   NPLR,	   especially	   under	   adverse	  
macroeconomic	  conditions,	   such	  as	   the	  conditions	   that	  characterized	   the	   last	   financial	  
crisis.	  
Table	  7:	  The	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  NPLR	  in	  European	  banks	  after	  controlling	  
for	  the	  financial	  crisis	  effect.	  
	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   Model	  5	   Model	  6	  
Revenue	  diversification	  
HHIRD	   -­‐0.00	   ***	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   **	  	  
	   (0.00)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.00)	  
	  COMr	   	   	   -­‐0.01	   **	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  	   	   	   (0.00)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  TRADr	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.00	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.00)	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  OTHr	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.00	   **	   	   	  
	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.00)	   	   	   	  
	   	  INTr	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.00	   ***	  
	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.00)	   	  
	   	  Control	  variables	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
NPLR_1	   0.80	   ***	   0.80	   ***	   0.79	   ***	   0.80	   ***	   0.80	   ***	   0.80	  	   ***	  	  
	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	  	   	  
loanTA	   0.00	   **	   0.00	   **	   0.00	   **	   0.00	   **	   0.00	   **	   0.00	  	   **	  	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Size	   -­‐0.02	   	   -­‐0.02	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.02	  	   	  
	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.02)	  	   	  
GTA	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
EqTA	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
ROA	   -­‐0.12	   ***	   -­‐0.12	   ***	   -­‐0.11	   ***	   -­‐0.11	   ***	   -­‐0.11	   ***	   -­‐0.12	  	   ***	  
	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	  	   	  
CIR	   -­‐0.00	   **	   -­‐0.00	   	   -­‐0.00	   ***	   -­‐0.00	   **	   -­‐0.00	   **	   -­‐0.00	  	   **	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Listed	   0.06	   	   0.09	   	   0.13	   	   0.04	   	   0.03	   	   0.09	  	   	  
	   (0.09)	   	   (0.09)	   	   (0.09)	   	   (0.09)	   	   (0.10)	   	   (0.09)	  	   	  
Actrestind	   0.02	   ***	   0.02	   **	   0.03	   ***	   0.02	   **	   0.02	   **	   0.02	  	   ***	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
Capregind	   -­‐0.04	   ***	   -­‐0.04	   ***	   -­‐0.05	   ***	   -­‐0.04	   ***	   -­‐0.04	   ***	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	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   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   Model	  5	   Model	  6	  
Suppowind	   0.04	   ***	   0.04	   ***	   0.04	   ***	   0.04	   ***	   0.04	   ***	   0.04	  	   ***	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Privmonind	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   0.03	   *	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	  	   	  
HHIIC	   -­‐0.00	   ***	   -­‐0.00	   ***	   -­‐0.00	   ***	   -­‐0.00	   ***	   -­‐0.00	   ***	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
GDPG	   -­‐0.01	   ***	   -­‐0.01	   **	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	   ***	   -­‐0.01	   ***	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	  	   	  
Inflation	   -­‐0.03	   ***	   -­‐0.03	   ***	   -­‐0.04	   ***	   -­‐0.03	   ***	   -­‐0.03	   ***	   -­‐0.03	  	   ***	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	  	   	  
UR	   0.01	   ***	   0.01	   ***	   0.02	   ***	   0.02	   ***	   0.01	   ***	   0.01	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Interest	   0.01	   	   0.02	   	   0.03	   *	   0.02	   	   0.01	   	   0.02	  	   	  
	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	  	   	  
Crisis	   0.18	   ***	   0.21	   ***	   0.26	   ***	   0.18	   ***	   0.18	   ***	   0.02	  	   	  
	   (0.05)	   	   (0.05)	   	   (0.05)	   	   (0.06)	   	   (0.06)	   	   (0.10)	  	   	  
CrisisXrd	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.00	  	   *	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.00)	  	   	  
Constant	   0.56	   	   0.40	   	   -­‐0.19	   	   0.36	   	   0.07	   	   0.64	  	   *	  
	   (0.36)	   	   (0.36)	   	   (0.34)	   	   (0.32)	   	   (0.32)	   	   (0.35)	  	  
	  Observations	   4,268	   4,259	   3,854	   4,268	   4,268	   3,434	  
AR2	   -­‐1.80*	   -­‐1.77*	   -­‐1.54	   -­‐1.76*	   -­‐1.76*	   -­‐1.05	  












Notes:	   This	   table	   presents	   the	   effects	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	   NPLr	   in	   the	   Eurozone	   during	   the	   period	   1999–2012	   using	   the	  
system-­‐GMM	  estimator	  developed	  by	  Arellano	  and	  Bover	   (1995)	  and	  Blundell	  and	  Bond	  (1998).	  See	  Table	  2	   for	  a	  description	  of	   the	  
independent	  variables.	  NPLR_1	  indicates	  the	  lagged	  period	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Except	  for	  HHIIC,	  GPD,	  Inflation,	  UR	  and	  Interest,	  
all	   variables	   are	   considered	   endogenous	   in	   our	   model.	   We	   report	   heteroskedasticity-­‐consistent	   asymptotic	   standard	   errors	   in	  
parentheses,	  and	  significance	   levels	  are	   indicated	  as	   follows:	  ***=	  significant	  at	   the	  1%	  level;	  **=	  significant	  at	   the	  5%	  level;	  and	  *=	  
significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  AR2	  denotes	  the	  Arellano	  and	  Bond	  test	  for	  the	  second	  order	  autocorrelation	  in	  first	  differences.	  Hansen	  is	  
a	   test	  of	   the	  over-­‐identifying	   restrictions,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  χ2	  under	   the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  correlation	  between	   the	  
instruments	  and	  the	  error	  term,	  with	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  parentheses.	  
We	  also	  test	  our	  model	  by	  using	  alternative	  diversification	  proxies.	  In	  most	  cases,	  
the	  alternative	  diversification	  proxies	  produce	  similar	  outcomes;	  hence,	  the	  robustness	  
of	  our	  results	  is	  reinforced.	  HHIREV	  and	  RDLL	  measure	  shifts	  into	  non-­‐interest	  income	  
generating	  activities,	  which	  allows	  the	  breakdown	  of	  net	  operating	  income	  into	  its	  two	  
broad	   components.	   An	   increase	   in	  HHIREV	   signifies	   increased	   revenue	   concentration	  
and	   less	   diversification	   (De	   Jonghe,	   2010;	   Sanya	   and	  Wolfe,	   2010).	  RDLL	   takes	   values	  
from	  0	   to	   1,	  with	   higher	   values	   indicating	   greater	   diversification	   (Laeven	   and	   Levine,	  
2007).	   Both	   proxies	   are	   highly	   statistically	   significant	   in	   our	   model,	   indicating	   that	  
higher	  diversification	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  lower	  NPLR.	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HHINON	   measures	   diversification	   within	   non-­‐interest	   activities,	   with	   higher	  
values	   indicating	   greater	   concentration.	   This	   is	   the	   only	   diversification	   variable	   that	  
yields	   non-­‐statistically	   significant	   results,	   probably	   due	   to	   losses	   in	   banks’	   trading	  
operations	  during	  the	  crisis	  period.	  
Finally	   Diversified	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	   that	   equals	   1	   if	   HHIRD	   is	   above	   the	  
median	   and	   equals	   zero	   otherwise.	   Introduction	   of	   this	   variable	   indicates	   a	   highly	  
statistically	  significant	  negative	  correlation	  between	  revenue	  diversification	  and	  NPLR.	  
Table	   8a:	   The	   effect	   of	   revenue	  diversification	   on	  NPLR	   in	  European	  banks:	  Alternative	  
revenue	  diversification	  proxies	  
	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	  
Revenue	  diversification	  
HHIREV	   0.00	  	   ***	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   (0.00)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
HHINON	   	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   (0.00)	   	   	   	   	   	  
Diversified	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.07	  	   ***	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.02)	   	   	   	  
RDLL	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Control	  variables	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
NPLR_1	   0.78	  	   ***	   0.77	  	   ***	   0.79	  	   ***	   0.79	  	   ***	  
	   (0.02)	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	   	   (0.03)	   	  
loanTA	   0.00	  	   ***	   0.00	  	   ***	   0.00	  	   ***	   0.00	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Size	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	  
	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	  
GTA	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
EqTA	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
ROA	   -­‐0.13	  	   ***	   -­‐0.10	  	   ***	   -­‐0.12	  	   ***	   -­‐0.13	  	   ***	  
	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.02)	   	  
CIR	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	   -­‐0.00	  	   **	   -­‐0.00	  	   *	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Listed	   0.03	  	   	   0.04	  	   	   0.01	  	   	   0.06	  	   	  
	   (0.08)	   	   (0.09)	   	   (0.09)	   	   (0.08)	   	  
Actrestind	   0.03	  	   ***	   0.04	  	   ***	   0.03	  	   ***	   0.03	  	   ***	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
Capregind	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	   -­‐0.05	  	   ***	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	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   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	  
Suppowind	   0.03	  	   ***	   0.03	  	   ***	   0.03	  	   ***	   0.04	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
Privmonind	   0.00	  	   	   0.04	  	   **	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.02)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
HHIIC	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
GDPG	   -­‐0.02	  	   ***	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Inflation	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
UR	   0.01	  	   ***	   0.02	  	   ***	   0.01	  	   ***	   0.01	  	   ***	  
	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	   (0.00)	   	  
Interest	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	   -­‐0.05	  	   ***	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	   -­‐0.04	  	   ***	  
	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	   (0.01)	   	  
Constant	   0.27	  	   	   -­‐0.16	  	   	   0.23	  	   	   0.52	  	   	  
	   (0.33)	   	   (0.38)	   	   (0.35)	   	   (0.35)	   	  
Observations	   4268	   3849	   4268	   4268	  
AR2	   -­‐1.76	  	   -­‐1.55	  	   -­‐1.83	  	   -­‐1.83	  	  
Hansen	   	  513.61	  (461)	   474.20	  (378)	   508.39	  (461)	   527.12	  (461)	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  presents	  the	  effects	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  NPLr	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  during	  the	  period	  1999–2012	  using	  the	  system-­‐
GMM	  estimator	  developed	  by	  Arellano	  and	  Bover	  (1995)	  and	  Blundell	  and	  Bond	  (1998).	  See	  Table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  independent	  
variables.	  NPLR_1	  indicates	  the	  lagged	  period	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Except	  for	  HHIIC,	  GPD,	  Inflation,	  UR	  and	  Interest,	  all	  variables	  
are	   considered	   endogenous	   in	   our	   model.	   We	   report	   heteroskedasticity-­‐consistent	   asymptotic	   standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses,	   and	  
significance	  levels	  are	  indicated	  as	  follows:	  ***=	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level;	  **=	  significant	  at	  the	  5%	  level;	  and	  *=	  significant	  at	  the	  10%	  
level.	   AR2	   denotes	   the	   Arellano	   and	   Bond	   test	   for	   the	   second	   order	   autocorrelation	   in	   first	   differences.	   Hansen	   is	   a	   test	   of	   the	   over-­‐
identifying	  restrictions,	  asymptotically	  distributed	  as	  χ2	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	   instruments	  and	  the	  
error	  term,	  with	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  parentheses.	  
	  
Detailed	  descriptions	  of	  the	  variables	  are	  provided	  in	  Table	  2.	  Table	  8a	  shows	  the	  
effect	   of	   the	   alternative	   diversification	   proxies	   on	   NPLR,	   and	   Table	   8b	   presents	   the	  
correlation	  matrix	  between	  the	  different	  measures	  of	  diversification.	  
Table	  8b:	  Correlation	  matrix	  between	  diversification	  proxies	  
	  
HHIRD	   HHIREV	   RDLL	   HHINON	   COMR	   TRADR	   INTR	   OTHR	   Diversified	  
HHIRD	   1.00	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  HHIREV	   -­‐0.58	   1.00	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  RDLL	   0.65	   -­‐0.94	   1.00	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  HHINON	   -­‐0.14	   0.11	   -­‐0.09	   1.00	  
	   	   	   	   	  COMR	   0.58	   0.02	   0.08	   -­‐0.05	   1.00	  
	   	   	   	  TRADR	   0.27	   0.16	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.04	   -­‐0.12	   1.00	  
	   	   	  INTR	   -­‐0.72	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.04	   0.07	   -­‐0.75	   -­‐0.36	   1.00	  
	   	  OTHR	   0.63	   0.08	   0.05	   -­‐0.06	   0.55	   0.28	   -­‐0.93	   1.00	  
	  Diversified	   0.69	   -­‐0.32	   0.50	   -­‐0.03	   0.48	   0.19	   -­‐0.57	   0.50	   1.00	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Notes:	  This	  table	  presents	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  revenue	  diversification	  variables.	  See	  Table	  2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  variables	  
	  
Table	  9	  presents	  our	  final	  robustness	  checks,	  wherein	  we	  use	  the	  Z-­‐score,	  which	  
is	  defined	  as	  the	  number	  of	  standard	  deviations	  by	  which	  a	  bank’s	  return	  on	  assets	  must	  
fall	  below	  the	  mean	  to	  become	  insolvent,	  as	  an	  alternative	  dependent	  variable	  (models	  1,	  
2	  and	  4).	  We	  expect	  a	  higher	  (lower)	  Z-­‐score	  to	  reflect	  a	  lower	  (higher)	  likelihood	  that	  a	  
bank	  will	  become	  insolvent.	  The	  Z-­‐score	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  
financial	  stability	  and	  of	  risk-­‐adjusted	  performance	  (Laeven	  and	  Levine,	  2010;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  
2014;	  Köhler,	  2015).	  Additionally,	  we	  apply	  alternative	  data	  panel	  methodologies	  (fixed	  
effects	   in	  models	   2	   and	   3	   and	   random	   effects	   in	  models	   4	   and	   5).	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	  
results	   generally	   resemble	   those	   from	   the	   baseline	   model	   and	   show	   similar	  
diversification	   effects	   on	   both	   NPLR	   and	   Z-­‐score.	   Specifically,	   an	   increase	   in	  
diversification	  produces	  higher	  Z-­‐scores	  and	  lower	  NPLRs.	  These	  results	  remain	  highly	  
statistically	   significant	   for	   all	   methodologies	   and	   dependent	   variables	   used,	   with	   the	  
exception	   of	   the	   random	   effects	   methodology	   and	   NPLR	   (model	   5),	   although	   the	  
negative	   coefficient	   is	   maintained	   in	   this	   model.	   In	   conclusion,	   these	   results	   provide	  
robustness	  to	  our	  model	  by	  reinforcing	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  higher	  diversification	  leads	  
to	  lower	  risk-­‐taking	  and	  greater	  financial	  stability	  for	  European	  banks.	  
Table	   9.	   The	   effect	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   on	  NPLR	   and	   Z	   Score	   in	   European	   banks:	  	  
Alternative	  model	  specifications	  and	  dependent	  variable.	  
	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   Model	  5	  
	   (ZSCORE)	   (ZSCORE)	   (NPLR)	   (ZSCORE)	   (NPLR)	  
Revenue	  diversification:	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
HHIRD	   0.00	  	   ***	  	   0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   *	   0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   	  









	  Control	  variables:	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Z	  Score_1	   0.86	  	   ***	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   (0.02)	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
loanTA	   0.00	  	   *	   0.00	  	   *	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	   0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	  









	  Size	   0.02	  	   **	   -­‐0.07	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.17	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.06	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.14	  	   ***	  	  









	  GTA	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	  









	  EqTA	   0.02	  	   ***	  	   0.07	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.01	  	   **	   0.07	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.01	  	   *	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   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   Model	  5	  
	   (ZSCORE)	   (ZSCORE)	   (NPLR)	   (ZSCORE)	   (NPLR)	  
ROA	   0.03	  	   	   0.04	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.13	  	   ***	  	   0.04	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.14	  	   ***	  	  









	  CIR	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	  









	  Listed	   -­‐0.59	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	  









	  Actrestind	   -­‐0.03	  	   ***	  	   0.00	  	   ***	  	   0.00	  	   	   0.00	  	   ***	  	   0.01	  	   **	  









	  Capregind	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   0.01	  	   	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   0.01	  	   *	  









	  Suppowind	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	   0.11	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	   0.10	  	   ***	  	  









	  Privmonind	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.08	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.08	  	   ***	  	  









	  HHIIC	   -­‐0.00	  	   ***	  	   0.02	  	   ***	  	   0.03	  	   ***	  	   0.01	  	   ***	  	   0.06	  	   ***	  	  









	  GDPG	   0.00	  	   ***	  	   0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.02	  	   **	   0.01	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.06	  	   ***	  	  









	  Inflation	   -­‐0.02	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   0.02	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   **	   0.04	  	   ***	  	  









	  UR	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	   0.01	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   0.01	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.02	  	   	  
	   (0.00)	  
	  





	  Interest	   -­‐0.01	  	   ***	  	   -­‐0.00	  	   	   -­‐0.18	  	   	   -­‐0.07	  	   *	   0.03	  	   	  









	  Constant	   0.58	  	   ***	  	   3.63	  	   ***	  	   4.18	  	   ***	  	   3.35	  	   ***	  	   3.13	  	   ***	  	  









	  Methodology	   System-­‐GMM	   Fixed	  
effects	  




Observations	   10,769	   10,809	   5,346	   10,809	   5,346	  
AR2	   0.99	  	   0.63	  	   0.46	  	   0.63	  	   0.45	  	  
Hansen	   	  986.98	  (619)	   	  209.78***	   15.34***	   14,959.66***	   3,347.72***	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  presents	  the	  effects	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  NPLr	  and	  Zscore	  pretax	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  during	  the	  period	  1999–2012	  
using	  alternative	  dependent	  variables	  and/or	  model	  specifications	  for	  our	  baseline	  equations.	  	  In	  Models	  1,	  2	  and	  4	  ZScore	  is	  used	  as	  the	  
dependent	  variable.	   	  Model	  1	  applies	   system-­‐GMM	  estimator	  developed	  by	  Arellano	  and	  Bover	   (1995)	  and	  Blundell	  and	  Bond	   (1998).	  
ZScore_1	  indicates	  the	  lagged	  period	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (ZScore).	  Except	  for	  HHIIC,	  GPD,	  Inflation,	  UR	  and	  Interest,	  all	  variables	  
are	  considered	  endogenous	  in	  this	  model.	  Models	  2	  and	  3	  use	  fixed-­‐effects	  (within)	  regressions,	  while	  Models	  4	  and	  5	  use	  random	  effects.	  
See	   Table	   2	   for	   a	   description	   of	   the	   independent	   variables.	   We	   report	   heteroskedasticity-­‐consistent	   asymptotic	   standard	   errors	   in	  
parentheses,	   and	   significance	   levels	   are	   indicated	   as	   follows:	   ***=	   significant	   at	   the	   1%	   level;	   **=	   significant	   at	   the	   5%	   level;	   and	   *=	  
significant	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  AR2	  denotes	  the	  Arellano	  and	  Bond	  test	  for	  the	  second	  order	  autocorrelation	  in	  first	  differences.	  Hansen	  is	  a	  
test	   of	   the	   over-­‐identifying	   restrictions,	   asymptotically	   distributed	   as	  χ2	   under	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   no	   correlation	   between	   the	  
instruments	  and	   the	   error	   term,	  with	  degrees	   of	   freedom	   in	  parentheses.	  R2	   is	   the	  proportion	  of	   variation	   in	   the	  dependent	   variable	  
explained	  by	  the	  model.	  
	  




This	  essay	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  NPLR	  using	  a	  sample	  
of	  more	   than	  2,000	  Eurozone	  banks.	  We	  apply	   the	  system-­‐GMM	  estimator,	  which	  was	  
developed	   for	  dynamic	  panel	  data	  models	  by	  Arellano	  and	  Bover	   (1995)	  and	  Blundell	  
and	  Bond	   (1998).	  We	   control	   for	   bank-­‐specific	   characteristics	   as	  well	   as	   for	   variables	  
related	  to	  macroeconomic	  conditions	  and	  bank	  regulations.	  	  
Our	  results	  show	  that	  revenue	  diversification	  reduces	  NPLR.	  Moreover,	  a	  closer	  
look	  at	  the	  different	  types	  of	  income	  shows	  that	  higher	  percentages	  of	  commission	  and	  
fee	  income	  and	  other	  operating	  income	  in	  total	  operating	  revenue	  increase	  asset	  quality,	  
whereas	   the	   proportion	   of	   trading	   revenues	   in	   a	   bank’s	   total	   income	   does	   not	  
significantly	  affect	  NPLR.	  	  
We	   further	   provide	   robustness	   to	   our	   results	   by	   using	   alternative	   revenue	  
diversification	  variables,	  alternative	  risk	  proxies	  and	  alternative	  methodologies.	  In	  most	  
cases,	  the	  use	  of	  these	  alternatives	  produces	  similar	  results.	  
This	  study	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  regulators	  and	  policy	  makers	  because	  
regulatory	  controls	  that	  restrict	  banking	  activities	  limit	  the	  diversification	  effect	  on	  non-­‐
performing	   loan	   ratios	   and	   on	   the	   Z-­‐scores	   of	   European	   banks	   and	   therefore	   such	  
regulations	  increase	  bank	  risk	  exposure.	  Furthermore,	  we	  show	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
increases	  the	  effect	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  NPLR,	  implying	  that	  diversified	  banks	  
are	  better	  prepared	  than	  their	  non-­‐diversified	  counterparts	  and	  that	  the	  crisis	  has	  less	  
impact	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  diversified	  banks’	  loan	  portfolios.	  
6. Limitations	  and	  further	  research	  
We	  acknowledge	  several	   limitations	  of	  our	  study.	  First,	  we	   focus	  on	  accounting	  
measures	  of	  bank	  risk,	  which	  are	  susceptible	  to	  managerial	  manipulation	  and	  backward	  
looking	   (Altunbas	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   We	   could	   therefore	   extend	   our	   analysis	   by	   using	  
alternative	  market	  risk	  measures,	  such	  as	  systematic	  and	  idiosyncratic	  risk	  (Baele	  et	  al.,	  
2007;	  Sawada,	  2013)	  or	  standard	  deviations	  of	   returns	   (Lepetit,	  2008),	  among	  others.	  
However,	  because	  only	  5%	  of	   the	  banks	   in	  our	   study	  are	  publically	   traded,	   the	  use	  of	  
market	   measures	   would	   not	   be	   representative	   of	   the	   full	   sample.	   Second,	   the	   use	   of	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NPLR	   as	   the	   main	   dependent	   variable	   drastically	   reduces	   the	   number	   of	   available	  
observations.	  We	  try	  to	  overcome	  this	  limitation	  by	  using	  the	  Z-­‐score	  as	  an	  alternative	  
proxy	   for	   bank	   risk-­‐taking,	   and	   similar	   results	   are	   obtained.	   Finally,	   whether	   large	  
and/or	  market-­‐oriented	  banks	  or	  different	  types	  of	  banks	  have	  a	  moderating	  effect	  on	  
the	   relationship	  between	  revenue	  diversification	  and	  NPLR	   is	   a	  question	   that	  must	  be	  
studied	  more	  carefully.	  Interaction	  between	  these	  variables	  and	  revenue	  diversification	  
could	  provide	  a	  deeper	  analysis	  and	  more	  accurate	  results.	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Appendix	  1:	  Summary	  of	   the	   findings	  on	  the	   impact	  of	  revenue	  diversification	  on	  banks’	  
risk	  and	  return	  
	  





US	  	   1989	  -­‐2001	   Well-­‐managed	   banks	   expand	   more	   slowly	   into	   noninterest	   activities,	   and	  
marginal	   increases	   in	  noninterest	   income	  are	  associated	  with	  poorer	  risk-­‐return	  




US	   1997	  -­‐	  2002	   Diversification	   benefits	   exist	   between	   Financial	   Holding	   Companies	   (FHCs),	   but	  
these	  gains	  are	  offset	  by	  the	  increased	  exposure	  to	  non-­‐interest	  activities,	  which	  
are	   much	   more	   volatile	   but	   not	   necessarily	   more	   profitable	   than	   interest-­‐
generating	  activities.	  
	  





1989–2004	   A	   higher	   share	   of	   non-­‐interest	   income	   in	   total	   income	   affects	   banks’	   franchise	  
values	   positively.	   Diversification	   of	   revenue	   streams	   from	   distinct	   financial	  
activities	   increases	   the	   systematic	   risk	   of	   banks	   while	   the	   effect	   on	   the	  







1998–2002	   The	  market	   values	   of	   financial	   conglomerates	   that	   engage	   in	  multiple	   activities,	  
e.g.,	   lending	  and	  non-­‐lending	   financial	   services,	   are	   lower	   than	   if	   those	   financial	  
conglomerates	   were	   broken	   into	   financial	   intermediaries	   that	   specialize	   in	   the	  
individual	  activities.	  
	  





1997-­‐2003	   A	  shift	   from	  interest	   income	  activities	   into	  non-­‐interest	   income	  activities	  results	  
in	  lower	  average	  profitability.	  This	  implies	  that	  small	  banks	  in	  Europe	  do	  not	  gain	  
by	  diversifying	  outside	   their	   traditional	   lines	  of	  business,	   suggesting	   that	   it	  may	  





Italy	   1993-­‐2003	   Income	  diversification	  increases	  risk-­‐adjusted	  returns	  being	  this	  relation	  stronger	  
at	  larger	  banks.	  	  Small	  banks	  can	  make	  gains	  from	  increasing	  non-­‐interest	  income,	  
but	  only	  when	  they	  have	  very	  little	  non-­‐interest	  income	  share	  to	  start	  with.	  
	  





1996-­‐2002	   Banks	   expanding	   into	   non-­‐interest	   income	   activities	   present	   higher	   risk	   and	  
higher	   insolvency	   risk	   than	   banks,	   which	   mainly	   supply	   loans.	   However,	   the	  
positive	  link	  with	  risk	  is	  mostly	  accurate	  for	  small	  banks	  and	  essentially	  driven	  by	  











101	  countries.	  	   1995-­‐2007	   Expansion	   into	   non-­‐interest	   income-­‐generating	   activities	   such	   as	   trading	  
increases	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  assets,	  and	  it	  could	  offer	  some	  risk	  diversification	  
benefits	  at	  very	  low	  levels.	  
Overall,	   banking	   strategies	   that	   rely	   prominently	   on	   generating	   non-­‐interest	  
income	   or	   attracting	   non-­‐deposit	   funding	   are	   very	   risky,	   consistent	   with	   the	  
demise	  of	  the	  US	  investment	  banking	  sector.	  
	  




Australia,	  Europe,	  	  
1996-­‐2008	   Diversification	   increases	   bank	   profitability	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence	   also	   market	  
valuations.	   	   This	   evidence	   against	   a	   conglomerate	   discount	   in	   banking	   remains	  








	   Diversification	   across	   and	   within	   both	   interest	   and	   non-­‐interest	   income	  




Japan,	  1999-­‐2011	   	   Revenue	   diversification	   positively	   affects	   bank	   market	   value	   but	   there	   is	   no	  
evidence	   that	   it	   reduce	   bank	   risks.	   By	   contrast,	   when	   non-­‐interest	   income	   is	  
divided	   into	   its	   constituent	   parts—	   fee	   income,	   trading	   income,	   and	   other	   non-­‐
interest	   income—	   a	   shift	   towards	   fee	   income-­‐generating	   business	   decreases	   all	  
types	   of	   risks	   (systematic	   risk,	   idiosyncratic	   risk,	   and	   total	   risk).	   Furthermore,	  
revenue	   diversification	   affects	   bank	   value	   and	   risk	   differently	   depending	   on	  
particular	   bank	   characteristics,	   such	   as	   organizational	   form	   and	   traditional	  
banking	  business	  performance.	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Author	  (s)	   Country	   Period	   Empirical	  findings	  
Köhler	  (2015)	   15	  EU	  countries	   2002	  -­‐	  2011	   Banks	  will	  be	  significantly	  more	  stable	  and	  profitable	  if	  they	  increase	  their	  share	  
of	   non-­‐interest	   income.	   Such	   benefits	   are	   particularly	   large	   for	   savings	   and	  
cooperative	   banks.	   Investment	   banks,	   in	   contrast,	   become	   significantly	   more	  
risky.	  	  
	  
Köhler	  (2014)	  	   Germany	  	   2002	  -­‐	  2012	   The	   impact	   of	   non-­‐interest	   income	   on	   bank	   risk	   differs	   between	   retail	   and	  
investment-­‐oriented	   banks:	   while	   retail-­‐oriented	   banks	   such	   as	   savings,	  
cooperative	   and	   other	   banks	   that	   focus	   on	   lending	   and	   deposit-­‐taking	   services	  
become	  significantly	  more	  stable	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  a	  higher	  Z-­‐score)	  if	  they	  
increase	   their	   share	   of	   non-­‐interest	   income;	   investment-­‐oriented	   banks	   become	  
significantly	  more	  risky.	  
	  




1995-­‐2009	   For	   bank-­‐based	   groups,	   bank	   performance	   can	   be	   improved	   through	  
diversification,	   supporting	   the	   ‘‘bank-­‐based	   view’’	   hypothesis.	   Under	   different	  
financial	   systems,	   the	   relationships	   among	   revenue	   diversity,	   financial	   reforms,	  
and	  bank	  performances	  are	  multidimensional.	  
Meslier	  et	  al.	  
(2014)	  
Philippines	  	   1999	  -­‐	  2005	   A	   shift	   toward	   non-­‐interest	   activities	   increases	   bank	   profits	   and	   risk-­‐adjusted	  
profits	   particularly	   when	   banks	   are	   more	   involved	   in	   trading	   in	   government	  
securities.	  
	   	  











This	   essay	   examines	   the	   association	  between	  board	   characteristics	   and	   the	   ethical	  
reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   Given	   the	   pivotal	   governance	   role	   of	   the	   board	   of	  
directors	  and	  the	  value-­‐relevance	  of	  ethical	  corporate	  behavior,	  we	  postulate	  a	  positive	  
relationship	   between	   ethical	   reputation	   and	   board	   features	   that	   foster	  more	   effective	  
monitoring	   and	   oversight.	   Using	   a	   sample	   of	   large	   financial	   institutions	   from	   13	  
different	  countries,	  we	  run	  several	  alternative	  panel	  regressions	  of	  ethical	  reputation	  on	  
board	  characteristics	  and	  firm-­‐specific	  controls.	  Our	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  ethical	  
reputation	  of	   financial	   institutions	   is	  positively	  associated	  with	  board	  size,	  experience,	  
gender	  diversity,	  and	  CEO	  duality,	  while	  being	  negatively	  related	  to	  the	  busyness	  of	  the	  
board	   members	   and	   a	   composite	   index	   reflecting	   poor	   monitoring.	   Nevertheless,	  
inconsistent	  with	  our	  hypothesis,	  we	  also	  document	  that	  financial	  institutions	  with	  less	  
frequent	  board	  meetings	  have	  better	  ethical	  reputation.	  Overall,	  our	  empirical	  findings	  




This	   essay	   focuses	   on	   the	   association	   between	   board	   characteristics	   and	   the	  
ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  
politicians,	   banking	   supervisors,	   and	   central	   bankers	   have	   alleged	   and	   acknowledged	  
that	   flaws	   in	   the	   corporate	   governance	   mechanisms	   and	   ethical	   culture	   of	   financial	  
institutions	   had	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   crisis	   (see	   e.g.,	   Basel	  
Committee	  on	  Banking	   Supervision,	   2010;	  Board	  of	  Governors	   of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  
System,	  2009,	  2010;	  Haldane,	  2012).	  More	  generally,	   the	   financial	  crisis	  demonstrated	  
that	   poor	   governance	   structures	   and	   absence	   of	   ethics	   in	   the	   financial	   industry	   may	  
have	  severe	  adverse	  consequences	  on	  global	   financial	  stability	  and	  societal	  well-­‐being.	  	  
The	   significant	   impact	   that	   major	   financial	   institutions	   can	   have	   not	   only	   on	   global	  
economic	   conditions	   but	   on	   the	   overall	   health	   and	   functioning	   of	   the	   society	   has	  
                                                
¶	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  essay	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  written	  while	  L.	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  University	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amplified	  expectations	   towards	  stronger	  governance	  and	  more	  ethical	  behavior	   in	   the	  
financial	   industry.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   of	   general	   interest	   to	   empirically	   examine	  whether	  
and	   how	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions	   is	   affected	   by	   the	   board	   of	  
directors.	   If	   ethical	   reputation	   is	   a	   value-­‐relevant	   intangible	   asset	   for	   financial	  
institutions,	  we	  should	  observe	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  ethical	   reputation	  and	  
board	  attributes	  that	  reflect	  more	  stringent	  monitoring	  and	  oversight.	  	  
The	   board	   of	   directors	   is	   the	   most	   important	   internal	   governance	   mechanism	  
within	   a	   firm.	   The	   board	   is	   responsible,	   among	   other	   things,	   for	   monitoring	   and	  
controlling	   the	  major	   long-­‐term	   strategic	   decisions	   of	   the	   firm	   and	   ensuring	   that	   the	  
firm	  acts	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  its	  shareholders	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  e.g.	  Fields	  and	  Keys,	  
2003).	  Board	  members	  also	  have	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  towards	  shareholders	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
stakeholders	  to	  monitor	  that	  the	  firm	  is	  following	  the	  basic	  ethical	  customs	  and	  rules	  of	  
society.	  Hence,	   it	   can	  be	   argued	   that	   the	  board	  of	   directors	   is	   directly	   responsible	   for	  
monitoring	  the	  ethical	  culture	  within	  the	  firm.	  	  	  
Previously,	   a	   vast	   body	   of	   literature	   has	   examined	   how	   observable	   board	  
characteristics	   such	   as	   size,	   independence,	   experience,	   and	   gender	   diversity	   affect	  
corporate	  decisions	  and	  outcomes	  (see	  Hermalin	  and	  Weisbach,	  2003	  and	  Adams	  et	  al.,	  
2010	   for	   comprehensive	   literature	   reviews).	   The	   role	   of	   the	   board	   of	   directors	   in	  
financial	   institutions	   has	   been	   examined,	   for	   instance,	   by	  Mishra	   and	   Nielsen	   (2000),	  
Macey	  and	  O’Hara	  (2003),	  Sierra	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  de	  Andrés	  and	  Vallelado	  (2008),	  Jiraporn	  
and	  Chintrakarn	  (2009),	  Laeven	  and	  Levine	  (2009),	  Pathan	  (2009),	  Fortin	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  
Aebi	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  Adams	  and	  Mehran	  (2012),	  Beltratti	  and	  Stulz	  (2012),	  and	  Erkens	  et	  
al.	  (2012).	  In	  brief,	  these	  studies	  demonstrate	  that	  boards	  have	  a	  pivotal	  monitoring	  role	  
in	   financial	   institutions,	   and	   moreover,	   that	   structural	   differences	   across	   boards	   are	  
reflected	  in	  the	  financial	  performance,	  market	  valuation,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  risk-­‐taking	  of	  
financial	   institutions.	   Our	   essay	   builds	   upon	   the	   prior	   literature	   by	   addressing	   the	  
relationship	   between	   board	   characteristics	   and	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	  
institutions	  around	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  essay	  is	  
the	  first	  attempt	  to	  examine	  the	  association	  between	  ethical	  reputation	  and	  the	  board	  of	  
directors	  in	  the	  financial	  industry.	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The	   empirical	   findings	   reported	   in	   this	   essay	   demonstrate	   that	   board	  
characteristics	   may	   matter	   for	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   Our	  
analysis	  is	  based	  on	  a	  sample	  of	  43	  large	  publicly	  traded	  financial	   institutions	  from	  13	  
different	   countries,	   and	   we	   utilize	   the	   Covalence	   EthicalQuote	   index	   to	   measure	   the	  
ethical	   reputation	   of	   these	   institutions.	   Consistent	   with	   our	   research	   hypothesis,	   the	  
results	  indicate	  that	  more	  effective	  monitoring	  and	  oversight	  by	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  
may	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  ethical	  reputation	  in	  the	  financial	  industry.	  	  
The	   remainder	   of	   this	   essay	   proceeds	   in	   the	   following	   manner.	   The	   second	  
section	   reviews	   the	   related	   literature	   on	   ethical	   behaviour,	   social	   responsibility,	   and	  
factors	  that	  influence	  the	  responsibility	  and	  reputation	  of	  non-­‐financial	  firms.	  The	  third	  
section	  describes	  the	  data	  and	  introduces	  the	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  analysis.	  The	  fourth	  
section	   presents	   the	   methods	   and	   reports	   the	   empirical	   findings	   on	   the	   association	  
between	  board	  characteristics	  and	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  Finally,	  
the	  fifth	  section	  summarizes	  the	  results	  and	  provides	  concluding	  remarks.	  
2.	  Related	  literature	  
Although	  the	  association	  between	  board	  characteristics	  and	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  
financial	   institutions	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  examined	  in	  the	  literature,	  our	  empirical	  
analysis	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   at	   least	   three	   strands	   of	   literature.	   First,	   studies	   by	  
Gunthorpe	  (1997),	  Fischer	  and	  Khoury	  (2007),	  Choi	  and	  Jung	  (2008)	  and	  Blazovich	  and	  
Smith	  (2011)	  examine	  the	  association	  between	  ethical	  behavior	  and	  firm	  performance.	  
In	  brief,	   these	   studies	   show	   that	  ethical	   conduct	  benefits	   the	   firm	  and	  may	  matter	   for	  
shareholder	   value.	   Gunthorpe	   (1997)	   conducts	   an	   event	   study	   on	   the	   impact	   of	  
unethical	  corporate	  behavior	  on	  stock	  prices,	  and	  documents	  a	  strong	  negative	  market	  
reaction	  to	  public	  disclosures	  of	  unethical	  behavior.	  The	  results	  of	  Fischer	  and	  Khoury	  
(2007),	   Choi	   and	   Jung	   (2008)	   and	   Blazovich	   and	   Smith	   (2011)	   provide	   evidence	   to	  
suggest	   that	   ethical	   business	   practices	  may	   have	   positive	   effects	   on	   firm	   profitability	  
and	   market	   valuation.	   Given	   these	   findings,	   Blazovich	   and	   Smith	   (2011)	   argue	   that	  
ethical	  corporate	  behavior	  creates	  an	  intangible	  asset,	  which	  may	  enhance	  firm	  value	  by	  
reducing	  conflicts	  and	  strengthening	  trust	  between	  the	  core	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  firm.	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Our	  study	  also	  complements	  a	  small	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  social	  responsibility	  in	  
the	  financial	  industry.	  	  Simpson	  and	  Kohers	  (2002),	  Chih	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  and	  Wu	  and	  Shen	  
(2013)	  investigate	  the	  association	  between	  social	  responsibility	  and	  bank	  performance.	  
While	   Simpson	   and	   Kohers	   (2002)	   and	  Wu	   and	   Shen	   (2013)	   document	   that	   socially	  
responsible	   behavior	   is	   positively	   related	   to	   profitability	   of	   financial	   institutions,	   the	  
results	   of	   Chih	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   suggest	   that	   the	   link	   between	   social	   responsibility	   and	  
financial	  performance	  is	  weak	  and	  insignificant.	  Scholtens	  (2009)	  develops	  a	  framework	  
for	  assessing	  social	  responsibility	  in	  the	  banking	  industry,	  and	  documents	  the	  extent	  of	  
social	  responsibility	  activities	  to	  vary	  considerably	  across	  individual	  banks.	  His	  findings	  
also	   indicate	   that	   larger	   banks	   with	   higher	   capital	   ratios	   have	   higher	   social	  
responsibility	  scores.	  Closely	  related	  to	  the	  current	  study,	  Jizi	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  examine	  the	  
association	  between	  board	   characteristics	   and	   social	   responsibility	  disclosure	  of	   large	  
U.S.	   commercial	   banks.	   They	   find	   that	   board	   size	   and	   independence	   are	   positively	  
related	  to	  the	  level	  of	  social	  responsibility	  disclosure	  in	  banks’	  annual	  reports.	  	  
Finally,	   our	   essay	   is	   related	   to	   the	   management	   literature	   about	   factors	   that	  
influence	   firm	  reputation.	   In	   their	   seminal	   study,	  Fombrun	  and	  Shanley	   (1990)	   report	  
that	   firm	   reputation	   is	   positively	   associated	  with	   profitability,	   market	   valuation,	   firm	  
size,	   and	   advertising	   intensity,	   while	   being	   negatively	   affected	   by	   the	   variability	   of	  
profits.	  Most	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  current	  study,	  Musteen	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  and	  Brammer	  et	  
al.	  (2009)	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  board	  characteristics	  on	  firm	  reputation.	  Musteen	  et	  al.	  
(2010)	   document	   that	   board	   size,	   independence,	   experience,	   and	   CEO	   duality	   are	  
positively	   related	   to	   firm	   reputation.	  Moreover,	   they	   find	   that	   reputation	   is	   positively	  
influenced	   by	   profitability,	   growth	   and	   firm	   size.	   Brammer	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   use	   a	  
reputational	  score	  based	  on	  the	   ‘Britain’s	  most	  admired	  companies’	  survey	  to	  examine	  
how	   board	   gender	   diversity	   affects	   firm	   reputation.	   Their	   findings	   indicate	   that	   the	  
effect	   of	   board	   gender	   diversity	   on	   reputational	   assessments	   varies	   across	   industries;	  
female	   board	   representation	   is	   positively	   associated	  with	   reputation	   in	   the	   consumer	  
services	   and	   consumer	   manufacturing	   industries,	   while	   being	   negatively	   related	   to	  
reputation	   in	   the	  producer	   services	   sector.	   Consistent	  with	  Musteen	   et	  al.	   (2010),	   the	  
findings	  of	  Brammer	  et	  al.	   (2009)	  suggest	  that	   firms	  with	   larger	  boards	  are	  associated	  
with	  better	  reputational	  assessments.	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In	   this	  essay,	  we	  aim	  to	  extend	  the	  existing	   literature	  by	  empirically	  examining	  
whether	   board	   characteristics	   affect	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions.	  
Assuming	   that	   ethical	   reputation	   is	   a	   value-­‐relevant	   intangible	   asset	   for	   financial	  
institutions,	   we	   expect	   to	   find	   a	   positive	   relationship	   between	   ethical	   reputation	   and	  
board	  characteristics	  that	  reflect	  more	  stringent	  monitoring	  and	  oversight.	  To	  the	  best	  
of	   our	   knowledge,	   the	   current	   study	   is	   the	   first	   attempt	   to	   address	   the	   relationship	  
between	  board	  characteristics	  and	  ethical	  reputation	  in	  the	  financial	  industry.	  
3.	  Data	  and	  variables	  
The	  empirical	  analysis	  presented	  in	  this	  essay	  is	  based	  on	  a	  sample	  of	  43	  large,	  
publicly	   traded	   financial	   institutions	   from	   13	   different	   countries	   (Australia,	   Bermuda,	  
Brazil,	   Canada,	   Germany,	   France,	   Italy,	   Japan,	   Spain,	   Switzerland,	   Taiwan,	   the	   United	  
Kingdom,	  and	  the	  United	  States).	  The	  sample	  firms	  are	  listed	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  We	  limit	  our	  
sample	  to	  financial	  institutions	  for	  which	  the	  Covalence	  EthicalQuote	  reputation	  index	  is	  
available.	   The	   sample	   comprises	   commercial	   banks,	   investment	   banks,	   diversified	  
financial	  services	  firms,	  and	  other	  lending	  institutions.	  The	  firms	  included	  in	  our	  sample	  
are	   among	   the	   largest	   financial	   institutions	   in	   the	  world	   and	   about	   60	   percent	   of	   the	  
sample	  firms	  are	  classified	  as	  globally	  systematically	  important	  financial	  institutions	  (g-­‐
SIFIs)	   by	   the	   Financial	   Stability	   Board.	   Hence,	   despite	   the	   very	   small	   number	   of	  
individual	  financial	  institutions,	  our	  sample	  covers	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  
amount	  of	  banking	  assets	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  sample	  period	  spans	  from	  2005	  to	  2010,	  and	  
thereby	  covers	  the	  fiscal	  years	  surrounding	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  
3.1.	  Ethical	  reputation	  
The	   dependent	   variable	   in	   our	   analysis	   is	   ethical	   reputation.	   Following	   e.g.	  
Amazeen	   (2011),	   Erwing	   (2011),	   and	   Maon	   et	   al.	   (2009),	   we	   use	   the	   EthicalQuote	  
reputation	  index	  developed	  by	  Covalence	  to	  measure	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  
institutions.	   In	   brief,	   this	   index	   tracks	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   large,	   international	  
companies	   based	   on	   news,	   reporting	   and	   stakeholders’	   claims	   related	   to	   ethical	   and	  
responsible	  conduct.	  The	  data	  on	  the	  EthicalQuote	   index	  are	  obtained	  from	  Covalence.	  
The	  EthicalQuote	  reputation	  index	  integrates	  information	  about	  various	  ethical	  criteria	  
related	   to	   environmental,	   social	   and	   governance	   aspects	   that	   are	   divided	   to	   the	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following	   seven	   groups:	   (i)	   governance,	   commitments	   and	   engagement,	   (ii)	   economic	  
performance,	   (iii)	   environmental	   performance,	   (iv)	   labor	   practices	   and	   decent	   work	  
conditions,	  (v)	  human	  rights,	  (vi)	  societal	  responsibility,	  and	  (vii)	  product	  responsibility.	  
The	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   firms	   is	   assessed	   by	   analyzing	   ethical	   behaviors	  
materialized	   in	   the	   quantities	   of	   positive	   and	   negative	   news.	   Covalence	   considers	  
positive	  news	  as	  ethical	  offers	  which	  express	   “information	  on	  what	   the	  company	  does	  
for	   society”,	   while	   unethical	   conducts	   reported	   in	   negative	   news	   represent	   ethical	  
demands,	  meaning	  “information	  on	  what	  the	  company	  should	  do	  for	  society”.	  Therefore,	  
the	   ethical	   reputation	   index	   constructed	   by	   Covalence	   reflects	   the	   actual,	   observed	  
ethical	   behavior	   of	   the	   firm.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   ethical	  
behavior	  is	  a	  human	  concern	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify.	  
The	  subjectivity	  and	  credibility	  problems	  are	  addressed	  by	   integrating	  multiple	  
opinion	  and	  information	  sources	  like	  search	  engines,	  individual	  websites,	  and	  different	  
correspondents.	  Each	  news	  item	  is	  assessed	  and	  graded	  from	  the	  cumulative	  addition	  of	  
positive	  and	  negative	  points	  produced	  by	  ethical	  offers	   and	  demands.	  A	   specific	  news	  
item	  can	  receive	  as	  many	  points	  as	   there	  are	  criteria	   involved	  (i.e.	   a	  news	   item	  coded	  
with	  two	  ethical	  offers	  related	  to	  governance	  and	  economic	  performance	  and	  one	  ethical	  
demand	  concerning	  customer	  privacy	  would	  be	  graded	  as	  2	  –	  1	  =	  +1	  point).	  	  
An	  absolute	  ethical	  score	  (S)	  is	  calculated	  for	  each	  company	  by	  subtracting	  items	  
that	  received	  negative	  scores	  (B)	  from	  positive	  scored	  items	  (A),	  i.e.	  S	  =	  A	  –	  B.	  To	  control	  
for	   the	   potential	   size	   and	  media	   exposure	   biases	   related	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   larger	   firms	  
typically	   obtain	  much	  more	  media	   attention	   than	   smaller	   firms,	   a	   rate-­‐adjusted	   score	  
(Ras)	  is	  created	  as	  Ras	  =	  S	  ×	  |R|.	  The	  absolute	  ethical	  score	  (S)	  is	  changed	  to	  a	  relative	  
measure	  (R)	  by	  dividing	  each	  score	  by	  the	  overall	  volume	  of	  news	  affecting	  the	  company.	  
This	   rate-­‐adjusted	   score	   enables	   comparisons	   between	   companies	  with	   different	   size.	  
With	  respect	   to	  our	  empirical	  analysis,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   the	  size	  and	  media	  
exposure	   biases	   should	   be	   mitigated	   by	   our	   sample	   which	   consists	   of	   a	   relatively	  
homogeneous	  set	  of	  very	  large	  financial	  institutions.	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  Finally,	  to	  control	  for	  potential	  time	  effects,	  a	  two	  percent	  erosion	  factor	  (E)	  per	  
month	   is	  applied	   in	  order	   to	  reduce	   the	  relevance	  of	   the	  older	  news	   items.	  Hence,	   the	  
ethical	  reputation	  score	  ERS	  of	  firm	  j	  at	  time	  t	  is	  measured	  as	  follows:	  
	  
( )EERSRSERS tjtj −×+×= − 11,, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  
	  
In	  our	  empirical	  analysis,	  we	  use	  two	  alternative	  measures	  of	  ethical	  reputation:	  
(i)	   Ethical	   scorej,t	   and	   (ii)	   Ethical	   rankj,t.	   Ethical	   score	   is	   the	   Covalence	   EthicalQuote	  
index	  given	  by	  Equation	  (1),	  while	  Ethical	  rank	  is	  the	  EthicalQuote	  index	  rank	  order	  of	  
the	  financial	  institutions	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  Specifically,	  Ethical	  rank	  is	  constructed	  
by	  assigning	  the	  financial	  institution	  with	  the	  best	  ethical	  reputation	  at	  time	  t	  to	  value	  1	  
and	  the	  institution	  with	  the	  worst	  ethical	  reputation	  to	  value	  43.	  
3.2.	  Board	  characteristics	  
The	   test	   variables	   of	   interest	   in	   our	   empirical	   analysis	   are	   the	   following	   board	  
characteristics:	   	   (i)	   Board	   size,	   (ii)	   Small	   board,	   (iii)	   Board	   independence,	   (iv)	   Board	  
meetings,	  (v)	  Board	  experience,	  (vi)	  Board	  gender	  diversity,	  (vii)	  Two	  or	  more	  females,	  
(viii)	  Board	  affiliations,	  (ix)	  Busy	  board,	  and	  (x)	  CEO	  duality.	  These	  variables	  have	  been	  
extensively	   used	   in	   the	   prior	   literature	   to	   measure	   the	   functioning	   and	   monitoring	  
effectiveness	  of	   the	  board	  of	  directors.	  The	  data	  on	  board	  characteristics	  are	  obtained	  
from	  Thomson	  Reuters	  Worldscope.	  	  
We	  use	  two	  alternative	  proxies	  for	  board	  size;	  Board	  size	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  
number	  of	  board	  members	  and	  Small	  board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  
firms	  with	   below	  median	   board	   size.	   These	   two	   variables	   are	   used	   as	   substitutes	   for	  
each	  other	  and	  are	  not	  used	  in	  the	  regressions	  simultaneously.	  Previous	  studies	  indicate	  
that	   larger	   boards	  may	   be	  more	   effective	  monitors	   of	   financial	   institutions	   and	   other	  
complex	   firms	  (see	  e.g.	  Boone	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Coles	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  de	  Andrés	  and	  Vallelado,	  
2008;	  Linck	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Pathan,	  2009;	  Adams	  and	  Mehran,	  2012).	  Hence,	  we	  predict	  a	  
positive	   (negative)	   relationship	   between	   Board	   size	   (Small	   board)	   and	   ethical	  
reputation.	   Board	   independence	   is	  measured	   as	   the	   percentage	   of	   independent	   board	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members.	   A	   large	   body	   of	   literature	   indicates	   that	   independent	   directors	   are	   more	  
effective	  monitors	  of	  the	  firm	  (see	  e.g.,	  Brickley	  et	  al.	  1994;	  Mehran,	  1995;	  Harvey	  and	  
Shrieves,	   2001;	   Webb,	   2004;	   Yeh	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   and	   therefore,	   we	   expect	   a	   positive	  
relation	   between	   Board	   independence	   and	   ethical	   reputation.	   Board	   meetings	   is	  
measured	   as	   the	   logarithm	   of	   the	   number	   of	   board	   meetings	   during	   a	   fiscal	   year.	   A	  
larger	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  are	  assumed	  to	  reflect	  more	  stringent	  monitoring	  by	  
the	   board	   (e.g.,	   Brick	   and	   Chidambaran,	   2010).	   Thus,	   a	   positive	   relationship	   between	  
Board	  meetings	  and	  ethical	  reputation	  is	  predicted.	  	  
We	   measure	   Board	   experience	   as	   the	   average	   number	   of	   years	   each	   board	  
member	  has	  been	  on	  the	  board	  (i.e.,	  membership	  tenure).	  Given	  that	  more	  experienced	  
boards	  may	  have	  better	  firm-­‐specific	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  (e.g.,	  Bacon	  et	  al.,	  1997),	  
and	  moreover,	  may	   exert	  more	   stringent	  monitoring	   (e.g.,	   Kosnik,	   1990;	  Mallette	   and	  
Fowler,	  1992),	  we	  expect	   to	   find	  a	  positive	  association	  between	  Board	  experience	  and	  
ethical	   reputation.	   Board	   affiliations	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   average	   number	   of	   other	   board	  
memberships	  of	  the	  board	  members	  and	  Busy	  board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  
one	   for	   firms	   in	   which	   board	   members	   on	   average	   have	   at	   least	   three	   other	   board	  
memberships.	   These	   two	   board	   busyness	   measures	   are	   used	   as	   alternatives	   to	   each	  
other	   in	   the	   regressions.	   Busy	  directors	  may	  not	   devote	   sufficient	   effort	   to	   effectively	  
monitor	   the	   firm	   (e.g.,	   Fich	   and	   Shivdasani,	   2006;	   Adams	   and	   Ferreira,	   2008).	  
Furthermore,	   the	   findings	   of	   Beasley	   (1996)	   and	   Crutchley	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   suggest	   that	  
board	  busyness	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  accounting	  fraud.	  Therefore,	  we	  expect	  that	  
Board	  affiliations	  and	  Busy	  board	  are	  negatively	  related	  to	  ethical	  reputation.	  
We	  use	  two	  alternative	  proxies	  to	  measure	  gender	  diversity	  of	  the	  boards.	  Board	  
gender	   diversity	   is	   the	   percentage	   of	   female	   board	   members,	   while	   Two	   or	   more	  
females	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  with	  at	  least	  two	  female	  board	  
members.	   Recent	   studies	   have	   argued	   that	   one	  woman	  on	   the	   board	   is	   a	   “token”	   and	  
more	  women	  are	  needed	  to	  achieve	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  diversity	  (e.g.	  Torchia	  et	  al.,	  
2011;	   Joecks	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Similarly	   to	   the	   two	  board	  size	  and	  busyness	  measures,	   the	  
two	  gender	  diversity	  variables	  are	  used	  as	  substitutes	  for	  each	  other	  in	  the	  regressions.	  
Previous	  studies	  suggest	  that	  female	  representation	  on	  the	  boards	  of	  directors	  may	  have	  
positive	  effects	  on	  board	  effectiveness	  and	  oversight	  (see	  e.g,	  Almazan	  and	  Suarez,	  2003;	  
Adams	   and	   Ferreira,	   2009;	   Srinidhi	   et	  al.,	   2011).	  Moreover,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   in	   the	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prior	   literature	   that	  women	   have	   higher	   ethical	   and	  moral	   standards	   (e.g.,	   Betz	   et	  al.	  
1989;	  Albaum	  and	  Peterson,	   2006;	   Lund,	   2008).	  Hence,	  we	  predict	   that	   female	   board	  
representation	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  ethical	  reputation.	  	  
Finally,	  CEO	  duality	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  in	  which	  the	  
CEO	   is	   the	   board	   chair	   or	   a	   member	   of	   the	   board.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   other	   board	  
characteristics,	  the	  relationship	  between	  CEO	  duality	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  boards	  
is	   more	   ambiguous	   in	   nature.	   Hermalin	   and	   Weisbach	   (2003)	   argue	   that	   the	  
independence	  of	  the	  board	  from	  the	  firm’s	  CEO	  is	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  determining	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  board.	  Moreover,	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  CEO	  duality	  
increases	   the	   CEO’s	   influence	   in	   decision	   making	   and	   may	   hinder	   the	   monitoring	  
function	  of	   the	  board	  (see	  e.g.,	  Adams	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Goyal	  and	  Park,	  2002).	  However,	   it	  
has	  also	  been	  argued	   in	  the	   literature	  that	  CEO	  duality	  may	  have	  positive	   implications	  
for	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   firm	   (e.g.,	   Finkelstein	   and	  D’Aveni,	   1994;	   Boyd,	   1995).	   	   In	   a	  
recent	  study,	  Yang	  and	  Zhao	  (2014)	  document	  that	  CEO	  duality	  provides	  value-­‐relevant	  
benefits	   for	   the	   firm	   by	   improving	   information	   acquisition	   and	   transmission	   and	   by	  
facilitating	  faster	  decision	  making.	  Furthermore,	  the	  prior	  studies	  about	  the	  reputation	  
of	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  have	  documented	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  CEO	  duality	  and	  
firm	   reputation	   (Bear	   et	  al.,	   2010;	  Musteen	   et	  al.,	   2010).	   Thus,	   despite	   the	   somewhat	  
ambiguous	   theoretical	   relationship,	   we	   are	   inclined	   to	   predict	   a	   positive	   association	  
between	  CEO	  duality	  and	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   individual	   board	   characteristics,	   we	   also	   build	   a	   composite	  
index	   variable	   to	   reflect	   poor	   monitoring	   by	   the	   board	   of	   directors.	   Specifically,	   we	  
define	   Poor	   monitoring	   as	   a	   	   (0,5)	   index	   measure	   constructed	   as	   the	   sum	   of	   the	  
following	   five	   binary	   criteria:	   (i)	   the	   number	   of	   board	  members	   is	   below	   the	   sample	  
median	  (0,1),	   (ii)	   the	  percentage	  of	   independent	  board	  members	   less	  than	  50	  %	  (0,1),	  
(iii)	  the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  is	  below	  the	  sample	  median	  (0,1),	  (iv)	  there	  are	  no	  
female	  board	  members	  (0,1),	  and	  (v)	  the	  average	  number	  of	  other	  board	  affiliations	  of	  
the	   board	   members	   is	   at	   least	   three	   (0,1).	   Naturally,	   we	   hypothesize	   a	   negative	  
association	  between	  ethical	  reputation	  and	  the	  poor	  monitoring	  index.	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3.3.	  Control	  variables	  
We	   include	   several	   firm-­‐specific	   control	   variables	   in	   our	  multivariate	   analysis.	  
Previous	  studies	  have	  documented	   that	   firm	  size,	  profitability,	  and	  risk	  characteristics	  
may	  affect	  firm	  reputation	  (Fombrun	  and	  Shanley,	  1990;	  Bear	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Musteen	  et	  al.,	  
2010,	  Brammer	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Following	  the	  prior	  firm	  reputation	  literature	  and	  the	  bank	  
corporate	   governance	   literature,	   we	   control	   for	   firm	   size,	   capital	   structure,	   financial	  
performance,	  growth,	  riskiness,	  and	  asset	  structure	  in	  our	  analysis.	  Given	  that	  firm	  size	  
is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  media	  exposure	  of	  companies,	  the	  largest	  companies	  could	  be	  over	  
or	  under	  scored	  by	  the	  EthicalQuote	  reputation	  index.	  Although	  the	  EthicalQuote	  index	  
is	  adjusted	  for	  firm	  size,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  control	  for	  size	  effects	  because	  different-­‐sized	  
financial	  institutions	  may	  have	  very	  different	  business	  strategies,	  product	  compositions,	  
and	  governance	  structures.	  Previous	  studies	  have	  documented,	  for	  instance,	  that	  larger	  
financial	   institutions	  hold	   lower	   levels	  of	  equity	  capital	  and	  are	  engaged	  in	  more	  risky	  
operations.	  Moreover,	   size	  may	   also	   surrogate	   for	   numerous	   omitted	   variables	   in	   the	  
empirical	   analysis.	   Following	   the	   prior	   banking	   literature	   (see	   e.g.,	   de	   Andrés	   and	  
Vallelado,	   2008;	   Pathan,	   2009;	   Aebi	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   we	   measure	   Size	   by	   the	   natural	  
logarithm	  of	  the	  total	  assets.	  	  
The	  second	   important	  variable	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  controlled	   for	  when	  comparing	  
financial	   institutions	   is	   the	   amount	   of	   equity	   capital.	  We	  measure	  Capital	   ratio	   as	   the	  
ratio	   of	   equity	   capital	   to	   total	   assets.	   Furthermore,	   we	   control	   for	   the	   financial	  
performance	   and	   growth	   of	   the	   financial	   institutions.	   Profitability	   and	   growth	   can	   be	  
seen	  as	  signals	  of	  management	  quality	  and	  both	  measures	  have	  been	   linked	  with	   firm	  
reputation	  (Bear	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Musteen	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  We	  measure	  financial	  performance	  
with	  Return	  on	  equity,	  which	   is	   calculated	  as	   the	   ratio	  of	  net	   income	   to	   equity	   capital,	  
while	  Growth	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  percentage	  change	  in	  total	  assets	  from	  year	  t–1	  to	  year	  
t.	   Because	   the	   level	   of	   risk-­‐taking	  may	   affect	   firm	   reputation	   (Fombrun	   and	   Shanley,	  
1990;	  Brammer	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Musteen	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  especially	  amidst	  periods	  of	  financial	  
turmoil,	  we	  control	  for	  the	  volatility	  of	  stock	  returns.	  Following	  Pathan	  (2009),	  Volatility	  
is	  measured	  by	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  annualized	  standard	  deviation	  of	  daily	  stock	  returns	  
during	   the	   fiscal	   year.	   Similar	   to	   Beltratti	   and	   Stulz	   (2012),	   we	   control	   for	   the	   asset	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structure	  of	   financial	   institutions	  with	  Loans	  to	  assets,	  which	   is	  defined	  as	   the	   ratio	  of	  
net	  loans	  to	  total	  assets.	  	  
Finally,	   given	   that	   our	   sample	   comprises	   of	   commercial	   banks	   as	  well	   as	   other	  
types	   of	   financial	   services	   institutions	   and	   includes	   institutions	   from	   13	   different	  
countries,	  we	   include	  the	  dummy	  variables	  Financial	  services	  and	  Non-­‐US	  institution	   in	  
our	  analysis.	  Financial	  services	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  binary	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  other	  
types	  of	  financial	  institutions	  than	  commercial	  banks	  and	  Non-­‐US	  institution	  is	  assigned	  
to	   one	   for	   institutions	   that	   are	   not	   headquartered	   in	   the	   U.S.	   The	   balance	   sheet	   and	  
income	  statement	  data	  for	  the	  control	  variables	  are	  collected	  from	  Bankscope,	  while	  the	  
stock	   price	   data	   for	   calculating	   volatility	   are	   obtained	   from	   Thomson	   Reuters	  
Datastream.	  
4.	  Empirical	  analysis	  
4.1.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  	  
Table	  1	  reports	   the	  descriptive	  statistics	   for	   the	  variables	  used	   in	   the	  empirical	  
analysis.	   In	   general,	   it	   can	   be	   noted	   from	   Table	   1	   that	   our	   sample	   is	   relatively	  
heterogeneous	  in	  terms	  of	  board	  characteristics	  and	  firm-­‐specific	  control	  variables	  with	  
the	   variables	   exhibiting	   considerable	   variation	   from	   minimum	   to	   maximum	   values.	  
However,	   given	   that	   the	   standard	   deviations	   are	   relatively	   low,	   the	   mean	   and	   the	  
median	   values	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   representative	   of	   a	   typical	   institution	   in	   our	  
sample.	  	  
Table	  1	  shows	  that	  the	  boards	  of	  financial	  institutions,	  on	  average,	  are	  relatively	  
large	  and	  typically	  consist	  of	  14	  directors.	  Furthermore,	  it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  boards	  
consist	   mostly	   of	   independent	   directors	   and	   hold,	   on	   average,	   11.85	   board	   meetings	  
during	   a	   year.	   Interestingly,	   there	   is	   considerable	   variation	   in	   the	   number	   of	   board	  
meetings	  from	  the	  minimum	  of	  four	  to	  the	  maximum	  of	  47	  meetings.	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  our	  
data	   indicates	   that	   for	   some	   institutions	   the	   number	   of	   board	   meetings	   increased	  
considerably	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  For	  instance,	  the	  maximum	  of	  47	  meetings	  were	  
held	  by	  the	  board	  of	  UBS	  in	  2008,	  which	  met	  only	  seven	  times	  annually	  during	  the	  pre-­‐
crisis	  years	  2005-­‐2007.	  The	  average	   tenure	  of	  board	  members	   in	  our	  sample	   is	  about	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seven	   years	   and,	   on	   average,	   the	   directors	   are	   simultaneously	   holding	   less	   than	   two	  
other	  board	  seats.	  In	  most	  of	  the	  sample	  institutions,	  the	  CEO	  is	  also	  the	  board	  chair	  or	  a	  
member	   of	   the	   board.	   The	   descriptive	   statistics	   also	   demonstrate	   that	   females	   are	  
severely	  underrepresented	  in	  the	  boards	  of	  large	  financial	  institutions,	  as	  only	  about	  13	  
percent	   of	   board	   seats	   are	   held	   by	  women.	  Nevertheless,	   in	   almost	   60	  percent	   of	   our	  
sample	  firms	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  female	  directors	  on	  the	  board.	  	  
Table	  1.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. dev. No. of obs. 
Ethical reputation:             
Ethical score 31.95 12.45 -157.74 362.31 58.15 220 
Ethical rank 20.47 20.00 1.00 43.00 12.20 220 
              
Board characteristics:             
Board size 13.89 14.00 6.00 22.00 3.25 220 
Small board 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 220 
Board independence 69.96 77.53 0.00 100.00 23.44 200 
Board meetings 11.85 10.50 4.00 47.00 5.59 208 
Board experience 7.10 6.67 0.48 16.08 3.13 211 
Board gender diversity 13.54 14.29 0.00 40.00 8.51 220 
Two or more females 0.59 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 220 
Board affiliations 1.91 1.75 0.05 8.27 1.01 202 
Busy board 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 220 
CEO duality 0.87 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 220 
Poor monitoring 1.34 1.00 0.00 5.00 1.03 205 
              
Control variables:             
Size 20.04 20.41 14.65 22.06 1.47 220 
SIFI 0.57 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 220 
Capital ratio 9.62 5.76 0.38 90.51 15.51 220 
Return on equity 10.37 11.87 -106.94 55.08 14.14 220 
Loans to assets 39.44 41.74 0.00 89.77 23.72 220 
Growth 11.36 8.39 -36.98 135.59 22.73 220 
Volatility 45.13 35.33 9.01 151.83 30.36 220 
Financial services 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 220 
Non-US institution 0.53 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 220 
The	  table	  reports	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  the	  sample.	  Ethical	  reputation	  is	  measured	  with	  the	  following	  two	  variables:	  (i)	  Ethical	  
score	   is	   the	   EthicalQuote	   Index	   issued	   by	   Covalence	   and	   (ii)	   Ethical	   rank	   is	   the	   Ethical	   Quote	   Index	   rank	   order	   of	   the	   financial	  
institutions	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  The	  board	  characteristics	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  Board	  size	  is	  the	  number	  of	  board	  members,	  Small	  
board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  with	  below	  median	  board	  size,	  Board	  independence	  is	  percentage	  of	  independent	  
board	  members,	  Board	  meetings	  is	  the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  during	  a	  fiscal	  year,	  Board	  experience	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  years	  
each	  board	  member	  has	  been	  on	  the	  board,	  Board	  gender	  diversity	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  female	  board	  members,	  Two	  or	  more	  females	  is	  
a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	   for	   firms	  with	  at	   least	   two	   female	  board	  members,	  Board	  affiliations	   is	   the	  average	  number	  of	  
other	  board	  memberships	  of	  the	  board	  members,	  Busy	  board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  in	  which	  board	  members	  
on	  average	  have	  at	  least	  three	  other	  board	  memberships,	  CEO	  duality	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  in	  which	  the	  CEO	  
is	  the	  board	  chair	  or	  a	  member	  of	  the	  board,	  and	  Poor	  monitoring	  is	  a	  (0,5)	  composite	  measure	  for	  poor	  monitoring	  by	  the	  board	  of	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directors.	  The	  control	  variables	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  Size	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  logarithm	  of	  total	  assets,	  SIFI	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  
systematically	  important	  financial	  institutions	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Board,	  Capital	  ratio	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  equity	  to	  total	  
assets,	  Return	  on	   equity	   is	   the	   ratio	  of	  net	   income	   to	   equity,	   Loans	   to	  assets	   is	   the	   ratio	  of	  net	   loans	   to	   totals	  assets,	  Growth	   is	   the	  
percentage	  change	  in	  total	  assets	  from	  year	  t–1	  to	  year	  t,	  Volatility	  is	  the	  annualized	  standard	  deviation	  of	  daily	  stock	  returns	  during	  
the	   fiscal	  year,	  Financial	  services	   is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	   for	  other	   financial	   institutions	  than	  commercial	  banks,	  and	  
Non-­‐US	  institution	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  non-­‐US	  financial	  institutions.	  The	  43	  financial	  institutions	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  are	  listed	  
in	  Appendix	  1.	  
Regarding	  the	  control	  variables,	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  in	  Table	  1	  indicate	  that	  
financial	   institutions	   included	   in	   our	   sample	   are	   very	   heterogeneous	   in	   terms	   of	   size,	  
capital	  ratios,	  profitability,	  growth,	  and	  asset	  structure.	  The	  sample	  institutions	  are	  very	  
large	   in	  terms	  of	   total	  assets	  and	  approximately	  60	  percent	  of	   them	  are	  classified	  as	  a	  
globally	   systematically	   important	   financial	   institution	   (SIFI)	   by	   the	   Financial	   Stability	  
Board.	   The	   considerable	   variations	   in	   Capital	   ratio	   and	   Loans	   to	   assets	   reflect	   the	  
inclusion	   of	   commercial	   banks	   as	   well	   as	   other	   types	   of	   financial	   institutions	   in	   the	  
sample,	  while	  the	  negative	  minimum	  values	  for	  Return	  on	  equity	  and	  Growth	  are	  largely	  
driven	   by	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   Finally,	   it	   can	   be	   noted	   from	   Table	   1	   that	   a	   vast	  
majority	  of	   the	  sample	   firms	  are	  commercial	  banks	  and	  that	  U.S.	   institutions	  comprise	  
almost	  50	  percent	  of	  our	  sample.	  	  
4.2.	  Correlations	  
Pairwise	   correlations	   (not	   tabulated)	   indicate	   that	   our	   dependent	   variables	  
Ethical	   score	   and	  Ethical	   rank	   are	   statistically	   significantly	   correlated	  with	  Board	  size,	  
Small	  board,	  Gender	  diversity	  and	  Two	  or	  more	   females.4	  In	   particular,	  we	   find	  positive	  
correlation	   coefficients	   between	   the	   ethics	   measures	   and	   Board	   Size	   and	   Gender	  
diversity,	   indicating	   that	   financial	   institutions	   with	   larger	   and	   more	   gender	   diverse	  
boards	  may	  have	  better	  ethical	   reputation.	  Furthermore,	  ethical	   reputation	   is	  strongly	  
positively	  correlated	  with	  Size	  and	  SIFI,	  and	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  Financial	  services.	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  our	  two	  ethical	  reputation	  measures	  are	  strongly	  negatively	  correlated	  
with	  each	  other	  (-­‐0.71).	  	  
Regarding	  the	  board	  characteristics,	  it	  is	  observed	  that	  Board	  size	  is	  significantly	  
negatively	   correlated	   with	   Small	   board,	   Board	   independence,	   and	   CEO	   duality	   and	  
                                                
4	  We	  do	  not	  tabulate	  the	  correlation	  coefficients	  for	  brevity.	  The	  correlation	  matrix	  is	  available	  from	  the	  
authors	  upon	  request.	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negatively	  correlated	  with	  Busy	  board.	  The	  two	  gender	  diversity	  variables	  are	  positively	  
correlated	   with	   Board	   size,	   Board	   independence	   and	   Board	   affiliations,	   and	   thereby	  
indicate	  that	  female	  directors	  are	  more	  common	  in	  larger,	  more	  independent	  and	  more	  
busy	  boards.	  Finally,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  several	  of	  our	  control	  variables	  are	  strongly	  
correlated	  with	  each	  other.	  Most	  notably,	  Size	  is	  strongly	  positively	  correlated	  with	  SIFI,	  
Capital	  ratio,	  Financial	  services	  and	  Non-­‐US	  institution.	  Given	   these	  strong	  correlations,	  
we	   perform	   several	   robustness	   checks	   to	   ensure	   that	   our	   empirical	   findings	   are	   not	  
affected	  by	  multicollinearity.	  
4.3.	  Univariate	  analysis	  
We	   first	   conduct	   univariate	   tests	   to	   examine	   the	   relationship	   between	   board	  
characteristics	   and	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   For	   this	   purpose,	   we	  
divide	   our	   sample	   into	   two	   subsamples	   based	   on	   the	   level	   of	   ethical	   reputation;	   the	  
“stronger	   ethical	   reputation”	   subsample	   consists	   of	   financial	   institutions	   with	   above	  
median	   Ethical	   rank,	   while	   the	   “weaker	   ethical	   reputation”	   subsample	   consists	   of	  
institutions	  with	   below	  median	  Ethical	   rank.5	  We	   then	   perform	   two-­‐tailed	   t-­‐tests	   and	  
Wilcoxon	  rank-­‐sum	  tests	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  are	  no	  differences	  in	  the	  
means	  and	  medians	  between	  the	  most	  and	  the	  least	  ethical	  financial	  institutions.	  
	   	  
                                                
5	  We	  conduct	  the	  univariate	  tests	  also	  by	  comparing	  differences	  between	  the	  first	  and	  last	  quartiles	  and	  
tertiles.	  The	  results	  of	  these	  additional	  tests	  are	  similar	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  signs	  and	  statistical	  significance.	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Table	  2.	  Univariate	  tests	  
            Most ethical           Least ethical Diff. in  
means 
Diff. in  
medians   Mean Median Mean Median 
Board size 2.684  2.708  2.514  2.485  0.170  *** 0.223  *** 
Small board 0.035  0.000  0.248  0.000  -0.213  *** 0.000  *** 
Board independence 68.868  80.000  70.917  76.920  -2.049    3.080    
Board meetings 2.347  2.303  2.434  2.398  -0.087    -0.095  * 
Board experience 7.286  6.715  6.885  6.630  0.401    0.085    
Board gender diversity 15.312  15.380  11.598  11.110  3.714  *** 4.270  *** 
Two or more females 0.704  1.000  0.467  0.000  0.238  *** 1.000  *** 
Board affiliations 1.973  1.865  1.835  1.650  0.138    0.215  * 
Busy board 0.104  0.000  0.086  0.000  0.019    0.000    
CEO duality 0.870  1.000  0.867  1.000  0.003    0.000    
Poor monitoring 1.145  1.000  1.568  1.000  -0.423  *** 0.000  ***  
The	  table	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  two-­‐tailed	  t-­‐tests	  and	  Wilcoxon	  rank-­‐sum	  tests	  for	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  
means	  and	  medians	  between	  the	  most	  and	   the	   least	  ethical	   financial	   institutions.	  The	  most	  ethical	  and	   the	   least	  ethical	   subsamples	  
consist	   of	   financial	   institutions	   with	   below	   and	   above	   median	   Ethical	   rank,	   respectively.	   The	   board	   characteristics	   are	   defined	   as	  
follows:	  Board	  size	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  number	  of	  board	  members,	  Small	  board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  with	  
below	  median	  board	  size,	  Board	  independence	  is	  percentage	  of	   independent	  board	  members,	  Board	  meetings	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  
the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  during	  a	  fiscal	  year,	  Board	  experience	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  years	  each	  board	  member	  has	  been	  on	  
the	  board,	  Board	  gender	  diversity	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  female	  board	  members,	  Two	  or	  more	  females	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  
one	   for	   firms	  with	  at	   least	   two	   female	  board	  members,	  Board	  affiliations	   is	   the	  average	  number	  of	  other	  board	  memberships	  of	   the	  
board	  members,	  Busy	  board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  in	  which	  board	  members	  on	  average	  have	  at	  least	  three	  
other	   board	  memberships,	   CEO	   duality	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	   which	   equals	   one	   for	   firms	   in	   which	   the	   CEO	   is	   the	   board	   chair	   or	   a	  
member	  of	  the	  board,	  and	  and	  Poor	  monitoring	  is	  a	  (0,5)	  composite	  measure	  for	  poor	  monitoring	  by	  the	  board	  of	  directors.	  ***,	  **,	  and	  
*	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  0.01,	  0.05,	  and	  0.10	  levels,	  respectively.	  	  
Table	  2	  reports	  the	  mean	  and	  median	  values	  for	  the	  board	  characteristic	  of	  both	  
subsamples	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  univariate	  tests.	  As	  can	  be	  noted	  from	  the	  table,	  there	  
are	  statistically	  highly	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  means	  and	  medians	  between	  the	  two	  
subsamples	   in	   terms	   of	   Board	   size,	   Small	   board,	   Gender	   diversity	   and	   Two	   or	   more	  
females.	   Specifically,	   the	   univariate	   tests	   indicate	   that	   financial	   institutions	   with	  
stronger	   ethical	   reputation	   have	   larger	   and	   more	   gender	   diverse	   boards.	   This	  
observation	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	  pairwise	   correlations	  discussed	  above,	   and	   thereby	  
provides	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   board	   size	   and	   gender	   diversity	   are	   strongly	  
associated	   with	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
univariate	   tests	   for	   differences	   in	   Poor	   monitoring	   indicate	   that	   institutions	   with	  
stronger	  ethical	   reputation	  are	  statistically	  significantly	   less	   likely	   to	  have	  boards	   that	  
fulfill	   the	   characteristics	   for	   poor	   monitoring.	   In	   contrast	   to	   our	   expectations,	   the	  
difference	   in	   the	   median	   number	   of	   board	   meetings	   between	   the	   two	   subgroups	   is	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negative	   and	   significant	   at	   the	   10	   percent	   level,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   institutions	   with	  
weaker	  ethical	  reputation	  are	  associated	  with	  more	  frequent	  board	  meetings.6	  	  
4.4.	  Regression	  results	  
We	  continue	  our	  empirical	  analysis	  by	  examining	  the	  association	  between	  board	  
characteristics	   and	   ethical	   reputation	   in	   a	   multivariate	   setting.	   For	   this	   purpose,	   we	  
estimate	  several	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  following	  panel	  regression	  specification:	  
tjtj
tjtjtj











−− 	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  
where	   the	   dependent	   variable	   is	   one	   of	   the	   two	   alternative	   ethical	   reputation	  
measures	  for	  bank	  j	  at	  time	  t,	  i.e.	  Ethical	  score	  or	  Ethical	  rank.	  In	  each	  of	  the	  alternative	  
regressions,	  we	  include	  seven	  different	  board	  characteristics.	  The	  board	  characteristics	  
included	   in	   the	   baseline	   specification	   are	   Board	   size,	   Board	   independence,	   Board	  
Meetings,	  Board	  experience,	  Board	  gender	  diversity,	  Board	  affiliations,	   and	  CEO	  duality.	  
We	   also	   estimate	   models	   in	   which	   the	   continuous	   measures	   of	   board	   size,	   gender	  
diversity,	   and	  busyness	  are	   replaced	  with	  Small	  board,	  Two	  or	  more	  females,	   and	  Busy	  
board	   dummy	   variables.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   the	   set	   of	   firm-­‐specific	   control	   variables	  
includes	  proxies	  for	  firm	  size,	  capital	  structure,	  financial	  performance,	  growth,	  riskiness,	  
and	   asset	   structure.	   The	   regressions	   also	   include	   dummy	   variables	   to	   control	   for	  
differences	  between	  commercial	  banks	  and	  other	  types	  of	  financial	   institutions	  as	  well	  
as	   between	   U.S.	   and	   non-­‐U.S.	   institutions.	   Finally,	   we	   control	   for	   potential	   time	   fixed	  
effects	   with	   fiscal	   year	   dummy	   variables	   and	   we	   also	   estimate	   two-­‐way	   fixed	   effects	  
regressions	  that	  allow	  for	  a	  firm-­‐specific	  constant.	  Throughout	  the	  regressions,	  we	  use	  
robust	   standard	   errors	   which	   are	   adjusted	   for	   heteroskedasticity	   and	   within-­‐firm	  
clustering.	  
Table	  3	  reports	   the	  estimates	  of	   the	  panel	  regressions	  with	  Ethical	  score	   as	   the	  
dependent	  variable.	  Models	  1	  and	  2	  are	  parsimonious	  models,	  which	   include	  Size	   and	  
                                                
6	  In	   further	   analysis,	   we	   observe	   that	   financial	   institutions	   which	   were	   experiencing	   severe	   problems	  
during	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  increased	  the	  frequency	  of	  board	  meetings	  in	  2008	  and	  2009.	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Capital	  ratio	  as	   the	  only	  control	  variables,	  while	  Models	  3	  and	  4	   include	  the	   full	  set	  of	  
control	  variables.	  Finally,	  Model	  5	  includes	  both	  year	  fixed	  effects	  as	  well	  as	  firm	  fixed	  
effects.	   As	   can	   be	   noted	   from	   Table	   3,	   the	   adjusted	  R2s	   of	  Models	   1-­‐4	   are	   around	   40	  
percent,	  whereas	  the	  inclusion	  of	  firm	  fixed	  effects	  in	  Model	  5	  increases	  the	  adjusted	  R2	  
to	  almost	  80	  percent.	  The	  F-­‐statistics	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level	   for	  all	  
five	  regression	  specifications.	  
Table	  3.	  Board	  characteristics	  and	  ethical	  score	  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Constant -667.325 *** -539.485 *** -739.304 *** -581.865 *** -1370.101 *** 
  (-10.251)   (-11.241)   (-8.08)   (-7.49)   (-6.194)   
Board characteristics:                     
Board size 82.089 ***     85.798 ***     49.082 *** 
  (3.47)       (3.41)       (2.97)   
Small board     -2.056       -4.985       
      (-0.28)       (-0.88)       
Board independence -0.042   -0.321 ** 0.135   -0.169 * -0.212   
  (-0.23)   (-2.24)   (0.81)   (-1.72)   (-0.64)   
Board meetings -58.144 *** -60.618 *** -58.189 *** -60.543 *** -26.641 ** 
  (-8.93)   (-8.91)   (-7.66)   (-7.98)   (-2.04)   
Board experience -0.669   0.773   0.580   1.512 * 4.091   
  (-0.84)   (1.59)   (0.65)   (1.83)   (1.48)   
Board gender diversity 1.040 ***     1.279 ***     -0.215   
  (3.37)       (3.41)       (-0.26)   
Two or more females     26.193 ***     28.689 ***     
      (5.10)       (4.22)       
Board affiliations -4.846 ***     -7.435 ***     -7.936 *** 
  (-2.62)       (-5.96)       (-4.21)   
Busy board     -18.263       -22.708       
      (-1.18)       (-1.53)       
CEO duality 53.966 *** 41.325 *** 59.571 *** 45.738 *** 29.165 * 
  (3.21)   (4.17)   (3.77)   (5.41)   (1.96)   
Control variables:                     
Size 28.370 *** 33.523 *** 29.603 *** 33.913 *** 63.017 *** 
  (14.97)   (15.93)   (9.67)   (8.99)   (5.38)   
Capital ratio 1.473 *** 1.569 *** 1.524 *** 1.683 *** 1.550   
  (12.19)   (16.75)   (7.83)   (8.16)   (1.41)   
Return on equity         -0.163   -0.147 ** -0.135   
          (-1.32)   (-2.57)   (-0.73)   
Loans to assets         -0.127   -0.021   -0.304   
          (-0.81)   (-0.15)   (-0.45)   
Growth         -0.029   -0.004   -0.173   




Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
          (-0.21)   (-0.04)   (-1.57)   
Volatility         0.083   0.066   15.763 *** 
          (0.91)   (0.88)   (2.82)   
Financial services         8.349   4.149       
          (0.68)   (0.33)       
Non-US institution         22.077 ** 18.172 **     
          (2.52)   (2.28)       
                      
Firm fixed effects No   No   No   No   Yes   
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
                      
Adjusted R2 41.44%   37.29%   40.83%   36.15%   79.63%   
F-stat.  10.30 *** 9.07 *** 7.35 *** 6.38 *** 13.40 *** 
The	  table	  reports	  the	  estimates	  of	  five	  alternative	  versions	  of	  Equation	  (2).	  The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  regressions	  is	  Ethical	  score	  which	  is	  
the	  EthicalQuote	  Index	   issued	  by	  Covalence.	  The	  board	  characteristics	  are	  defined	  as	   follows:	  Board	  size	   is	  the	   logarithm	  of	  the	  number	  of	  
board	   members,	   Small	   board	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	   which	   equals	   one	   for	   firms	   with	   below	   median	   board	   size,	   Board	   independence	   is	  
percentage	  of	   independent	  board	  members,	  Board	  meetings	   is	   the	   logarithm	  of	   the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  during	  a	   fiscal	  year,	  Board	  
experience	   is	   the	  average	  number	  of	  years	  each	  board	  member	  has	  been	  on	  the	  board,	  Board	  gender	  diversity	   is	   the	  percentage	  of	   female	  
board	  members,	   Two	   or	  more	   females	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	  which	   equals	   one	   for	   firms	  with	   at	   least	   two	   female	   board	  members,	   Board	  
affiliations	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  other	  board	  memberships	  of	  the	  board	  members,	  Busy	  board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  
firms	  in	  which	  board	  members	  on	  average	  have	  at	  least	  three	  other	  board	  memberships,	  and	  CEO	  duality	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  
one	   for	   firms	   in	  which	   the	  CEO	   is	   the	  board	  chair	  or	  a	  member	  of	   the	  board.	  The	  control	   variables	  used	   in	   the	   regressions	  are	  defined	  as	  
follows:	  Size	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  logarithm	  of	  total	  assets,	  Capital	  ratio	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  equity	  to	  total	  assets,	  Return	  on	  equity	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  net	  
income	  to	  equity,	  Loans	  to	  assets	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  net	  loans	  to	  totals	  assets,	  Growth	  is	  the	  percentage	  change	  in	  total	  assets	  from	  year	  t–1	  to	  year	  
t,	  Volatility	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  annualized	  standard	  deviation	  of	  daily	  stock	  returns	  during	  the	  fiscal	  year,	  Financial	  services	  is	  a	  dummy	  
variable	  which	  equals	  one	   for	  other	   financial	   institutions	   than	  commercial	  banks,	  and	  Non-­‐US	   institution	   is	  a	  dummy	  variable	   for	  non-­‐US	  
financial	   institutions.	   The	   t-­‐statistics	   (in	   parentheses)	   are	   based	   on	   robust	   standard	   errors	  which	   are	   adjusted	   for	   heteroskedasticity	   and	  
within-­‐firm	  clustering.	  ***,	  **,	  and	  *	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  0.01,	  0.05,	  and	  0.10	  levels,	  respectively.	  	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  Table	  3,	  the	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  Board	  size	  are	  positive	  
and	   statistically	   highly	   significant	   in	   all	   three	  models,	  while	   the	   coefficients	   for	  Board	  
gender	   diversity	   and	   Two	   or	   more	   females	   are	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	  
throughout	   Models	   1-­‐4.	   Hence,	   consistent	   with	   our	   research	   hypothesis	   and	   the	  
univariate	  tests	  reported	   in	  Table	  2,	   the	  regressions	   indicate	  that	   financial	   institutions	  
with	   larger	   and	   more	   gender	   diverse	   boards	   are	   associated	   with	   better	   ethical	  
reputation.	  However,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  noted	  from	  Table	  3	  that	  the	  coefficient	  estimate	  for	  
Board	   gender	   diversity	   becomes	   insignificant	   after	   firm	   fixed	   effects	   are	   included	   in	  
Model	  5.	  This	   suggests	   that	   there	   are	  omitted	   (or	  unobserved)	   variables	   that	  mediate	  
the	   relationship	   between	   gender	   diversity	   and	   ethical	   reputation.	   The	   documented	  
positive	   effects	   of	   board	   size	   and	   gender	   diversity	   on	   ethical	   reputation	   are	   broadly	  
consistent	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  Brammer	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  Musteen	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  and	  Bear	  et	  
al.	  (2010),	  who	  report	  that	  board	  size	  and	  gender	  diversity	  are	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  
reputation	  of	  non-­‐financial	  firms.	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Table	   3	   further	   shows	   that	   ethical	   reputation	   is	   significantly	   negatively	  
associated	  with	  Board	  affiliations	  and	  positively	  associated	  with	  CEO	  duality	  throughout	  
the	  alternative	  model	  specifications.	  With	  respect	   to	   the	  CEOs’	  presence	  on	   the	  board,	  
our	   results	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	   findings	   of	   Bear	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   and	   Musteen	   et	   al.	  
(2010)	   regarding	   the	   reputation	   of	   non-­‐financial	   firms,	   and	   hence,	   provide	   further	  
evidence	  that	  CEO	  duality	  may	  be	  beneficial	  for	  firm	  reputation.	  Overall,	  the	  regression	  
estimates	   in	   Table	   3	   suggest	   that	   board	   characteristics	   that	   reflect	   stronger	   board	  
monitoring	  and	  oversight	  may	  have	  positive	  effects	  of	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  
institutions.	  	  
However,	   inconsistent	  with	   our	   hypothesis,	   the	   coefficient	   estimates	   for	  Board	  
meetings	   are	   negative	   and	   statistically	   highly	   significant	   throughout	   the	   alternative	  
regression	  specifications.	  This	  provides	  strong	  evidence	  that	  financial	   institutions	  with	  
less	   frequent	  board	  meetings	  have	  better	   ethical	   reputation.	  The	  unexpected	  negative	  
relation	  between	  ethical	  reputation	  and	  the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  may	  be	  at	  least	  
partially	   related	   to	   the	   drastic	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   board	  meetings	   during	   the	  
global	  financial	  crisis,	  especially	  in	  troubled	  institutions.	  Regarding	  the	  control	  variables,	  
the	  estimates	  in	  Table	  3	  indicate	  that	  ethical	  reputation	  is	  strongly	  positively	  associated	  
with	  Size	  and	  Capital	  ratio,	  suggesting	  that	  larger	  financial	  institutions	  with	  higher	  levels	  
of	  equity	  capital	  have	  better	  ethical	  reputation.	  The	  estimates	  also	  indicate	  that	  non-­‐US	  
financial	  institutions	  are	  associated	  with	  better	  reputation.	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Table	  4.	  Board	  characteristics	  and	  ethical	  rank	  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Constant 208.158 *** 182.526 *** 162.491 *** 137.003 *** 399.183 *** 
  (12.373)   (10.303)   (9.44)   (14.49)   (4.999)   
Board characteristics:                     
Board size -13.749 ***     -11.838 ***     -13.749 *** 
  (-5.02)       (-2.91)       (-3.08)   
Small board     2.986       2.317       
      (1.45)       (1.17)       
Board independence -0.032   0.002   -0.025   0.015   -0.038   
  (-1.08)   (0.07)   (-1.30)   (0.59)   (-0.60)   
Board meetings 8.246 *** 9.472 *** 7.287 *** 8.013 *** 4.342 * 
  (3.01)   (3.78)   (2.98)   (3.79)   (1.89)   
Board experience -0.473 *** -0.667 *** -0.262 * -0.356 * -1.520 *** 
  (-3.05)   (-4.29)   (-1.82)   (-1.85)   (-5.88)   
Board gender diversity -0.238 **     -0.239 *     -0.169   
  (-2.41)       (-1.96)       (-0.79)   
Two or more females     -4.225 **     -3.990 *     
      (-2.33)       (-1.92)       
Board affiliations 1.291 ***     1.898 ***     2.286 *** 
  (4.21)       (6.64)       (3.93)   
Busy board     3.189 *     4.101 **     
      (1.81)       (2.55)       
CEO duality -5.201 ** -3.698 *** -8.130 *** -6.437 *** -1.272   
  (-2.48)   (-4.68)   (-5.49)   (-5.30)   (-0.19)   
Control variables:                     
Size -7.833 *** -8.541 *** -5.583 *** -6.053 *** -16.525 *** 
  (-8.08)   (-11.77)   (-14.01)   (-19.98)   (-4.31)   
Capital ratio -0.414 *** -0.441 *** -0.306 *** -0.338 *** -0.434   
  (-9.79)   (-12.75)   (-9.38)   (-14.29)   (-1.53)   
Return on equity         0.007   -0.002   0.004   
          (0.26)   (-0.09)   (0.24)   
Loans to assets         0.064 * 0.041   -0.108   
          (1.75)   (1.19)   (-1.25)   
Growth         -0.008   -0.014   0.047   
          (-0.32)   (-0.68)   (1.60)   
Volatility         -2.458 *** -2.078 *** -0.538   
          (-3.34)   (-4.58)   (-0.55)   
Financial services         8.739 *** 9.218 ***     
          (2.82)   (3.14)       
Non-US institution         -0.229   0.682       
          (-0.11)   (0.44)       
                      
Firm fixed effects No   No   No   No   Yes   




Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
                      
Adjusted R2 50.33%   47.21%   52.36%   49.72%   77.27%   
F-stat.  14.32 *** 13.14 *** 11.11 *** 10.40 *** 11.78 *** 
The	  table	  reports	  the	  estimates	  of	  five	  alternative	  versions	  of	  Equation	  (2).	  The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  regressions	  is	  Ethical	  rank	  
which	   is	   the	   EthicalQuote	   Index	   rank	   order	   of	   the	   financial	   institutions	   included	   in	   the	   sample.	  Ethical	   rank	   is	   constructed	   by	  
assigning	  the	  financial	  institution	  with	  the	  best	  ethical	  reputation	  to	  value	  1	  and	  the	  institution	  with	  the	  worst	  ethical	  reputation	  to	  
value	  43.	  The	  board	   characteristics	   are	  defined	  as	   follows:	  Board	   size	   is	   the	   logarithm	  of	   the	  number	  of	   board	  members,	  Small	  
board	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	   which	   equals	   one	   for	   firms	   with	   below	   median	   board	   size,	   Board	   independence	   is	   percentage	   of	  
independent	   board	   members,	   Board	   meetings	   is	   the	   logarithm	   of	   the	   number	   of	   board	   meetings	   during	   a	   fiscal	   year,	   Board	  
experience	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  years	  each	  board	  member	  has	  been	  on	  the	  board,	  Board	  gender	  diversity	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  
female	   board	  members,	  Two	   or	  more	   females	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	  which	   equals	   one	   for	   firms	  with	   at	   least	   two	   female	   board	  
members,	  Board	   affiliations	   is	   the	  average	  number	  of	  other	  board	  memberships	  of	   the	  board	  members,	  Busy	   board	   is	  a	  dummy	  
variable	  which	  equals	  one	   for	   firms	   in	  which	  board	  members	  on	  average	  have	  at	   least	  three	  other	  board	  memberships,	  and	  CEO	  
duality	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  in	  which	  the	  CEO	  is	  the	  board	  chair	  or	  a	  member	  of	  the	  board.	  The	  control	  
variables	  used	  in	  the	  regressions	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  Size	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  logarithm	  of	  total	  assets,	  Capital	  ratio	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  
equity	  to	  total	  assets,	  Return	  on	  equity	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  net	  income	  to	  equity,	  Loans	  to	  assets	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  net	  loans	  to	  totals	  assets,	  
Growth	   is	   the	   percentage	   change	   in	   total	   assets	   from	   year	   t–1	   to	   year	   t,	  Volatility	   is	   the	   logarithm	  of	   the	   annualized	   standard	  
deviation	  of	  daily	  stock	  returns	  during	  the	  fiscal	  year,	  Financial	  services	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  other	  financial	  
institutions	  than	  commercial	  banks,	  and	  Non-­‐US	   institution	   is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  non-­‐US	  financial	  institutions.	  The	  t-­‐statistics	  
(in	  parentheses)	  are	  based	  on	  robust	  standard	  errors	  which	  are	  adjusted	  for	  heteroskedasticity	  and	  within-­‐firm	  clustering.	  ***,	  **,	  
and	  *	  denote	  significance	  at	  the	  0.01,	  0.05,	  and	  0.10	  levels,	  respectively.	  	  
The	  regression	  results	  with	  Ethical	  rank	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  are	  reported	  
in	  Table	  4.	  Overall,	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  regressions	  with	  Ethical	  rank	  as	  the	  dependent	  
variable	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  Table	  3.	  Specifically,	  the	  estimated	  
coefficients	   for	   Board	   size,	   Board	   gender	   diversity,	   Two	   or	   more	   females,	   and	   Board	  
affiliations	  suggest	  that	  financial	  institutions	  with	  larger,	  more	  gender	  diverse,	  and	  less	  
busy	   boards	   are	   associated	   with	   better	   ethical	   reputation.	   Moreover,	   consistent	   with	  
Table	  3,	  the	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  Board	  meetings	  and	  CEO	  duality	  suggest	  that	  ethical	  
reputation	  is	  negatively	  related	  to	  the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  and	  positively	  related	  
to	  CEO’s	  board	  membership.	  	  
The	  main	  difference	  between	  Tables	  3	  and	  4	  is	  the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  the	  
coefficient	  estimates	  of	  Board	  experience.	  The	  negative	  coefficient	  estimates	  suggest	  that	  
institutions	  with	  more	  experienced	  boards	  are	  associated	  with	  better	  ethical	  reputation.	  
Analogously	  to	  Table	  3,	  the	  negative	  coefficients	  for	  Size	  and	  Capital	  ratio	   indicate	  that	  
larger	   financial	   institutions	   with	   higher	   levels	   of	   equity	   capital	   have	   better	   ethical	  
reputation.	   In	  general,	   the	  regressions	  with	  Ethical	  rank	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  are	  
very	  similar	  to	  the	  estimates	  reported	  in	  Table	  3,	  and	  thereby	  provide	  further	  evidence	  
to	   suggest	   that	   board	   characteristics	   that	   are	   considered	   to	   reflect	   stronger	   board	  
monitoring	  and	  oversight	  may	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  
institutions.	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As	   the	   next	   step	   of	   the	   analysis,	   we	   utilize	   the	   composite	   index	  measure	  Poor	  
monitoring	   to	   further	   examine	   the	   association	   between	   board	  monitoring	   and	   ethical	  
reputation.	   Specifically,	   we	   estimate	   alternative	   versions	   of	   Equation	   (2)	   with	   Poor	  
monitoring	   as	   the	  only	   test	   variable	  of	   interest.	  The	  estimates	  of	   the	  alternative	  panel	  
regressions	   are	   presented	   in	   Table	   5.	   In	   Models	   1-­‐3,	   we	   use	   Ethical	   score	   as	   the	  
dependent	   variable,	   whereas	   in	   Models	   4-­‐6	   the	   dependent	   variable	   is	   Ethical	   rank.	  
Models	  1	  and	  4	  include	  only	  two	  control	  variables,	  while	  Models	  2	  and	  5	  include	  the	  full	  
set	  of	  firm-­‐specific	  controls.	  Finally,	  Models	  3	  and	  6	  include	  year	  fixed	  effects	  as	  well	  as	  
firm	   fixed	   effects.	   The	   adjusted	   R2s	   for	   the	   models	   with	   Poor	  monitoring	   as	   the	   only	  
board	  related	  variable	  are	  considerably	  lower	  than	  the	  R2s	  reported	  in	  Tables	  3	  and	  4.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   adjusted	   R2s	   indicate	   relatively	   good	   fit	   and	   the	   F-­‐statistics	   are	   all	  
statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  1	  percent	  level.	  
Table	  5.	  Poor	  monitoring	  and	  ethical	  reputation	  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 Ethical score Ethical score Ethical score Ethical rank Ethical rank Ethical rank 
Constant -509.941 *** -423.155 *** -1400.648 *** 143.354 *** 100.927 *** 341.126 *** 
  (-17.226)   (-7.803)   (-5.50)   (8.80)   (7.615)   (4.883)   
Board variable:                         
Poor monitoring -9.891 *** -7.844 *** 2.356   2.936 *** 1.738 ** -0.264   
  (-7.29)   (-5.75)   (0.96)   (4.48)   (2.38)   (-0.54)   
Control variables:                         
Size 27.181 *** 26.096 *** 70.445 *** -6.190 *** -4.272 *** -16.031 *** 
  (18.09)   (13.11)   (6.27)   (-7.81)   (-5.45)   (-5.27)   
Capital ratio 1.523 *** 1.483 *** 0.529   -0.333 *** -0.252 *** -0.117   
  (23.53)   (15.46)   (0.83)   (-11.08)   (-10.40)   (-0.61)   
Return on equity     0.303 ** -0.060       -0.071 ** -0.039   
      (2.03)   (-0.29)       (-2.06)   (-0.73)   
Loans to assets     0.021   0.531 ***     0.024   -0.140   
      (0.15)   (3.46)       (0.61)   (-1.60)   
Growth     0.194 * -0.193 **     -0.053 ** 0.021   
      (1.97)   (-2.10)       (-2.09)   (0.77)   
Volatility     -18.675 ** -0.869       0.005   2.064   
      (-2.15)   (-0.08)       (0.00)   (0.66)   
Financial services     -7.436 *         10.109 ***     
      (-1.78)           (6.97)       
Non-US institution     -1.018           2.769 **     
      (-0.17)           (1.98)       
                          
Firm fixed effects No   No   Yes   No   No   Yes   
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
                          




Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 Ethical score Ethical score Ethical score Ethical rank Ethical rank Ethical rank 
Adjusted R2 18.04%   17.57%   79.86%   33.15%   40.16%   70.97%   
F-stat.  6.09 *** 3.66 *** 13.60 *** 12.48 *** 9.36 *** 8.76 *** 
The	  table	  reports	  the	  estimates	  of	  six	  alternative	  versions	  of	  Equation	  (2).	  In	  Models	  1-­‐3,	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  regressions	  
is	  Ethical	   score	  which	   is	   the	  EthicalQuote	   Index	   issued	  by	  Covalence.	   In	  Models	  4-­‐6,	   the	  dependent	  variable	   in	   the	   regressions	   is	  
Ethical	   rank	  which	   is	   the	  EthicalQuote	   Index	  rank	  order	  of	   the	   financial	   institutions	   included	   in	   the	   sample.	  The	   test	  variable	  of	  
interest	  is	  Poor	  monitoring	  which	  is	  a	  (0,5)	  measure	  constructed	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  following	  five	  binary	  criteria:	  (i)	  the	  number	  of	  
board	  members	  is	  below	  the	  sample	  median,	  (ii)	  the	  percentage	  of	  independent	  board	  members	  less	  than	  50	  %,	  (iii)	  the	  number	  of	  
board	  meetings	  is	  below	  the	  sample	  median,	  (iv)	  there	  are	  no	  female	  board	  members,	  and	  (v)	  the	  average	  number	  of	  other	  board	  
affiliations	   of	   the	   board	  members	   is	   at	   least	   three.	   The	   control	   variables	   used	   in	   the	   regressions	   are	   defined	   as	   follows:	   Size	   is	  
measured	  as	  the	   logarithm	  of	   total	  assets,	  Capital	   ratio	   is	   the	  ratio	  of	  equity	  to	  total	  assets,	  Return	  on	   equity	   is	   the	  ratio	  of	  net	  
income	  to	  equity,	  Loans	  to	  assets	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  net	  loans	  to	  totals	  assets,	  Growth	  is	  the	  percentage	  change	  in	  total	  assets	  from	  year	  
t–1	  to	  year	  t,	  Volatility	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  annualized	  standard	  deviation	  of	  daily	  stock	  returns	  during	  the	  fiscal	  year,	  Financial	  
services	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  other	  financial	  institutions	  than	  commercial	  banks,	  and	  Non-­‐US	  institution	  is	  a	  
dummy	  variable	  for	  non-­‐US	  financial	  institutions.	  The	  t-­‐statistics	  (in	  parentheses)	  are	  based	  on	  robust	  standard	  errors	  which	  are	  
adjusted	   for	   heteroskedasticity	   and	   within-­‐firm	   clustering.	   ***,	   **,	   and	   *	   denote	   significance	   at	   the	   0.01,	   0.05,	   and	   0.10	   levels,	  
respectively.	  	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  noted	   from	  Table	  5,	   the	  coefficient	  estimates	   for	  Poor	  monitoring	  are	  
negative	  and	  statistically	  highly	  significant	   in	  Models	  1	  and	  2	  with	  Ethical	  score	  as	   the	  
dependent	  variable	  and	  positive	  and	  significant	  in	  Models	  4	  and	  5	  with	  Ethical	  rank	  as	  
the	  dependent	  variable.	  Hence,	  consistent	  with	  our	  research	  hypothesis,	  the	  regressions	  
suggest	   that	  poor	  monitoring	  by	   the	  board	  of	  directors	  may	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  
ethical	   reputation.	   However,	   after	   firm	   fixed	   effects	   are	   included	   in	   the	   regressions	  
(Models	  3	  and	  6),	   the	  coefficients	  for	  Poor	  monitoring	  appear	  statistically	   insignificant,	  
suggesting	   that	   omitted	   or	   unobserved	   firm	   characteristics	  may	  mediate	   the	   negative	  
relationship	   between	   ethical	   reputation	   and	   poor	   monitoring.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	  
control	   variables,	   it	   can	   be	   again	   noted	   from	   Table	   5	   that	   Size	   and	   Capital	   ratio	   are	  
strongly	  positively	  associated	  with	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  	  
4.5.	  Endogeneity	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   our	   empirical	   analysis	   may	   suffer	   from	  
endogeneity	   and	   reverse	   causality.	   Unfortunately,	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   use	   the	   standard	  
econometric	   tools	   for	   alleviating	   endogeneity	   problems.	   We	   cannot	   use	   instrumental	  
variable	   regressions	   because	   we	   have	   seven	   potentially	   endogenous	   board	  
characteristics	   in	   each	   regression	   and	   this	   would	   require	   seven	   valid	   instruments.	  
Moreover,	   given	   the	   small	   sample	   limited	   to	   financial	   institutions	   for	   which	   the	  
Covalence	   EthicalQuote	   is	   available,	  we	   are	   unable	   to	   use	   propensity	   score	  matching.	  
Finally,	   we	   cannot	   perform	   difference-­‐in-­‐difference	   tests	   because	   most	   board	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characteristics	   change	   very	   slowly	   over	   time	   and	   do	   not	   display	   much	   within-­‐firm	  
variation	   during	   the	   sample	   period.	   In	   order	   to	   alleviate	   endogeneity	   concerns,	   we	  
exploit	  the	  financial	  crisis	  as	  an	  “exogenous”	  shock	  to	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  
institutions.	   Specifically,	   we	   estimate	   cross-­‐sectional	   regressions	   with	   the	   changes	   in	  
Ethical	  score	  and	  Ethical	  rank	  amidst	  the	  financial	  crisis	  from	  year	  2008	  to	  year	  2009	  as	  
the	  dependent	  variables	  and	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  board	  characteristics	  and	  institution-­‐specific	  
controls	  as	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  
Table	   6	   reports	   the	   estimates	   of	   six	   alternative	   regressions	  with	   the	   change	   in	  
ethical	   reputation	  as	   the	  dependent	  variable.	   In	  Models	  1-­‐3,	   the	  dependent	  variable	   is	  
the	  change	  in	  Ethical	  score	  from	  2008	  to	  2009,	  while	  in	  Models	  4-­‐6	  we	  use	  the	  change	  in	  
Ethical	   rank	   as	   the	   dependent	   variable.	   Hence,	   the	   coefficients	   of	   these	   regressions	  
indicate	  how	  board	  characteristics	  are	  related	  to	  the	  direction	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  
change	   in	   ethical	   reputation	   amidst	   the	   financial	   crisis.	   Interestingly,	   the	   regressions	  
indicate	  that	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  ethical	  reputation	  during	  the	  financial	  
crisis	   can	   be	   explained	   with	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   board	   characteristics.	   Consistent	   with	   our	  
main	  analysis	  in	  Tables	  3	  and	  4,	  the	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  Board	  size,	  Board	  meetings,	  
and	  CEO	  duality	   are	   statistically	  highly	   significant,	   and	   indicate	   that	   the	   change	   in	   the	  
ethical	  reputation	  of	  financial	  institutions	  during	  the	  crisis	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  board	  
size	   and	   the	  CEO’s	   board	  membership	   and	  negatively	   related	   to	   the	   number	   of	   board	  
meetings.	   Furthermore,	   the	   coefficient	   for	  Poor	  monitoring	   is	   positive	   and	   statistically	  
significant	   in	  Model	   6,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   adverse	   influence	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   on	  
ethical	  reputation	  may	  have	  been	  moderated	  by	  boards	  that	  exert	  stronger	  monitoring.	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Table	   6.	  Board	  characteristics	  and	  changes	   in	  ethical	   reputation	  during	   the	   financial	  
crisis	  	  
 














                        
Board size 58.099 ***         -15.886 **         
  (3.03)           (-2.38)           
Small board     -4.406           0.289       
      (-0.49)           (0.08)       
Board independence 0.232   -0.093       -0.044   0.013       
  (0.95)   (-0.33)       (-0.78)   (0.19)       
Board meetings -36.661 ** -45.072 ***     4.659   7.285 **     
  (-2.49)   (2.87)       (1.38)   (2.22)       
Board experience -1.317   -0.041       0.228   0.038       
  (-1.17)   (-0.03)       (0.69)   (0.08)       
Board gender 
diversity 
-0.844           0.111           
  (-1.10)           (0.70)           
Two or more females     -8.148           0.565       
      (-0.81)           (0.21)       
Board affiliations 8.216 *         -1.433           
  (1.73)           (-1.37)           
Busy board     13.409           -2.182       
      (1.52)           (-1.22)       
CEO duality 51.552 *** 51.110 **     -12.117 *** -9.588 *     
  (3.13)   (2.44)       (-3.00)   (-1.90)       
Poor monitoring         -3.746           1.940 * 
          (-0.94)           (2.01)   
                          
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
                          
Adjusted R2 55.46%   49.31%   2.33%   47.29%   47.29%   17.99%   
F-stat.  5.70 *** 4.57 *** 1.28   4.39 *** 4.39 *** 3.56 ** 
The	   table	   reports	   the	  estimates	  of	   six	  alternative	   cross-­‐sectional	   regressions.	  The	  dependent	   variable	   is	   the	   change	   in	  Ethical	   score	  
from	  year	  2008	   to	  year	  2009	   in	  Models	  1-­‐3	  and	   the	  change	   in	  Ethical	   rank	   from	  year	  2008	   to	  year	  2009	   in	  Models	  4-­‐6.	  The	  board	  
characteristics	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  Board	  size	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  number	  of	  board	  members,	  Small	  board	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  
which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  with	  below	  median	  board	  size,	  Board	   independence	   is	  percentage	  of	  independent	  board	  members,	  Board	  
meetings	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  during	  a	  fiscal	  year,	  Board	  experience	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  years	  each	  
board	  member	  has	  been	  on	  the	  board,	  Board	  gender	  diversity	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  female	  board	  members,	  Two	  or	  more	  females	  is	  a	  
dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  with	  at	  least	  two	  female	  board	  members,	  Board	  affiliations	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  other	  
board	  memberships	  of	  the	  board	  members,	  Busy	  board	   is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  in	  which	  board	  members	  on	  
average	  have	  at	  least	  three	  other	  board	  memberships,	  CEO	  duality	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  equals	  one	  for	  firms	  in	  which	  the	  CEO	  is	  
the	   board	   chair	   or	   a	  member	   of	   the	   board,	   and	  Poor	   monitoring	   is	   an	   index	   for	   poor	  monitoring	   by	   the	   board	   of	   directors.	  Poor	  
monitoring	  is	  an	  (0,5)	  measure	  constructed	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  following	  five	  binary	  criteria:	  (i)	  the	  number	  of	  board	  members	  is	  below	  
the	  sample	  median,	  (ii)	  the	  percentage	  of	  independent	  board	  members	  less	  than	  50	  %,	  (iii)	  the	  number	  of	  board	  meetings	  is	  below	  the	  
sample	  median,	  (iv)	  there	  are	  no	  female	  board	  members,	  and	  (v)	  the	  average	  number	  of	  other	  board	  affiliations	  of	  the	  board	  members	  
is	   at	   least	   three.	   The	   t-­‐statistics	   (in	   parentheses)	   are	   based	   on	  White’s	   heteroskedasticity	   consistent	   standard	   errors.	   ***,	   **,	   and	   *	  
denote	  significance	  at	  the	  0.01,	  0.05,	  and	  0.10	  levels,	  respectively.	  	  
	  
Essays	  on	  Bank	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  Diversification,	  and	  Ethics	  during	  the	  Financial	  Crisis	  
 
150	  
Nevertheless,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   from	  Table	   6	   that	   the	   change	   regressions	   are	  
somewhat	   inconsistent	   with	   our	   main	   analysis	   with	   respect	   to	   board	   busyness	   and	  
gender	  diversity.	  While	  the	  panel	  regressions	  in	  Tables	  3	  and	  4	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  
that	  Board	  affiliations	  and	  Busy	  board	  are	  negatively	  associated	  with	  ethical	  reputation,	  
the	   coefficient	   estimates	   for	   both	   variables	   now	   appear	   insignificant	   in	  most	  models,	  
indicating	  that	  the	  change	  in	  ethical	  reputation	  amidst	  the	  crisis	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  board	  
busyness.	  Furthermore,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  6,	  the	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  Board	  gender	  
diversity	   and	   Two	   or	   more	   females	   are	   statistically	   insignificant	   throughout	   the	  
alternative	   regression	   specifications,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   change	   in	   ethical	   reputation	  
during	   the	   financial	   crisis	   is	   unaffected	   by	   board	   gender	   diversity.	   Given	   the	  
insignificance	   of	   Board	   gender	   diversity	   in	   the	   two-­‐way	   fixed	   effects	   regressions	   in	  
Tables	   3	   and	   4	   and	   also	   in	   the	   change	   regressions	   in	   Table	   6,	   we	   conclude	   that	   the	  
strong	   positive	   association	   between	   ethical	   reputation	   and	   board	   gender	   diversity	  
documented	   in	   the	   univariate	   tests	   and	   in	   the	   one-­‐way	   fixed	   effects	   regression	  
specifications	  is	  not	  a	  robust	  result	  and	  may	  be	  largely	  driven	  by	  endogeneity.	  
In	   our	   main	   analysis,	   we	   use	   contemporaneous	   data	   on	   the	   dependent	   and	  
independent	  variables.	  To	  further	  address	  concerns	  related	  to	  endogeneity	  and	  reverse	  
causality,	  we	  re-­‐estimate	  the	  regressions	  by	  using	  one-­‐year	  lagged	  board	  characteristics	  
and	  firm-­‐specific	  control	  variables	  as	  the	  independent	  variables.7	  The	  estimation	  results	  
of	  the	  regressions	  with	  lagged	  independent	  variables	  (not	  tabulated)	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  
the	   results	   reported	   in	  Tables	  3	  and	  4.	  Most	   importantly,	   the	   coefficient	   estimates	   for	  
Board	   size,	   Board	   meetings,	   and	   CEO	   duality	   are	   statistically	   highly	   significant	   in	   the	  
regressions	   with	   the	   lagged	   independent	   variables,	   and	   consistent	   with	   our	   main	  
analysis	  indicate	  that	  ethical	  reputation	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  board	  size	  and	  CEO	  
duality	   and	   negatively	   associated	   with	   the	   number	   of	   board	   meetings.	   Furthermore,	  
when	   Ethical	   score	   is	   used	   as	   the	   dependent	   variable,	   the	   estimated	   coefficients	   for	  
                                                
7	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  board	  characteristics	  change	  slowly	  over	  time,	  and	  therefore,	  the	  one-­‐year	  lagged	  
values	   of	   the	   board	   characteristics	   are	   highly	   correlated	   with	   the	   contemporaneous	   values.	   The	   only	  
board	   characteristic	   that	   displays	   significant	   within-­‐firm	   variation	   during	   our	   sample	   period	   is	   Board	  
meetings;	   troubled	   financial	   institutions	   increased	   the	   frequency	  of	  board	  meetings	  amidst	   the	   financial	  
crisis.	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Board	   gender	   diversity,	   Two	   or	   more	   females,	   Board	   affiliations,	   and	   Busy	   board	   are	  
consistent	   with	   the	   estimates	   reported	   in	   Table	   3.	   However,	   in	   the	   regressions	   with	  
Ethical	   rank	   as	   the	   dependent	   variable,	   the	   coefficients	   for	   our	   two	   female	   board	  
representation	  variables	  as	  well	  as	  the	  two	  board	  busyness	  variables	  appear	  statistically	  
insignificant.	  	  
4.6.	  Additional	  tests	  	  
We	  conduct	  several	  additional	  tests	  to	  ascertain	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  empirical	  
findings.8	  First,	  we	  re-­‐estimate	  the	  alternative	  versions	  of	  Equation	  (2)	  by	  replacing	  Size	  
and	   also	   by	   replacing	   both	   Size	   and	   Capital	   ratio	   with	   a	   dummy	   variable	   for	  
systematically	   important	   financial	   institutions	  (SIFI).	  The	  estimates	  of	   these	  additional	  
regressions	   are	   consistent	   with	   our	   main	   analysis.	   Interestingly,	   the	   coefficient	  
estimates	   for	   SIFI	   are	   positive	   (negative)	   and	   highly	   significant	   in	   the	   Ethical	   score	  
(Ethical	   rank)	   regressions,	   suggesting	   that	   systemically	   important	   institutions	   are	  
associated	  with	  better	  ethical	  reputation.	  
Furthermore,	  to	  ensure	  that	  our	  findings	  are	  not	  affected	  by	  size	  effects,	  we	  re-­‐
estimate	  the	  regressions	  in	  two	  subsamples	  from	  which	  the	  largest	  20	  percent	  and	  the	  
smallest	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  institutions	  are	  excluded.	  The	  results	  of	  these	  regressions	  are	  
qualitatively	   similar	   to	   the	   results	   reported	   in	   Tables	   3-­‐5,	   and	   hence,	   provide	   further	  
evidence	  that	   the	  ethical	  reputation	  of	   financial	   institutions	   is	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  
board	  characteristics	  that	  reflect	  more	  effective	  monitoring.	  
We	  also	  conduct	  additional	   tests	   to	  examine	  the	  potential	  effect	  of	   the	   financial	  
crisis	  on	  our	  results.	  Specifically,	  we	   first	  re-­‐estimate	   the	  regression	  using	  data	  on	   the	  
pre-­‐crisis	  years	  2005-­‐2007.	  The	  estimates	  of	  the	  regressions	  in	  this	  subsample	  are	  very	  
similar	  to	  our	  main	  findings.	  We	  also	  re-­‐estimate	  the	  regressions	  using	  data	  on	  the	  crisis	  
and	   the	  post-­‐crisis	  years	  2008-­‐2010.	  Once	  again,	   the	   regression	   results	  are	   consistent	  
with	  the	  results	  reported	  in	  Tables	  3-­‐5,	  and	  thereby	  suggest	  that	  our	  empirical	  findings	  
                                                
8	  For	  brevity,	  we	  do	  not	  tabulate	  our	  robustness	  checks.	  The	  results	  of	  these	  additional	  tests	  are	  naturally	  
available	  from	  the	  authors	  upon	  request.	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are	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  sample	  period.	  Finally,	  we	  define	  “troubled”	  institutions	  based	  on	  
high	  stock	  return	  volatility	  and	  negative	  return	  on	  equity	  and	  exclude	  these	  institutions	  
from	   the	   sample.	   The	   estimates	   based	   on	   the	   restricted	   sample	   without	   “troubled”	  
institutions	   are	   consistent	   with	   our	   main	   findings.	   Hence,	   we	   conclude	   that	   our	  
empirical	   findings	   are	   not	   affected	   by	   the	   financial	   crisis	   and	   are	   not	   particularly	  
sensitive	  to	  different	  samples	  and	  different	  sample	  periods.	  	  	  
4.7.	  Limitations	  
We	   acknowledge	   that	   there	   are	   several	   limitations	   that	   should	   be	   considered	  
when	   interpreting	   our	   empirical	   findings.	   First,	   the	   sample	   used	   in	   the	   analysis	   is	  
extremely	   small	   and	   limited	   to	   only	   43	   large	   financial	   institutions	   for	   which	   the	  
Covalence	   EthicalQuote	   index	   is	   available.	   The	   small	   number	   of	   financial	   institutions	  
obviously	  limits	  the	  statistical	  power	  of	  our	  tests	  and	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  results.	  
Second,	  our	  sample	  period	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  fiscal	  years	  surrounding	  the	  global	  financial	  
crisis.	  Given	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  had	  a	  strong	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	  performance	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   relation	  
between	  board	  characteristics	  and	  ethical	  reputation	  would	  be	  different	  in	  more	  normal	  
business	  conditions.	  	  
Furthermore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  our	  empirical	  analysis	  relies	  on	  the	  
assumption	  that	  the	  Covalence	  EthicalQuote	  index	  is	  an	  effective	  measure	  of	  the	  ethical	  
reputation	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  Given	  the	  obvious	  difficulty	  with	  quantifying	  ethical	  
conduct	  and	  ethical	  reputation,	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  Covalence	  EthicalQuote	  index	  is	  
a	   very	   imperfect	   proxy	   for	   ethical	   reputation.	   More	   generally,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  
remember	  that	  ethics	  is	  a	  human	  concern	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  numbers.	  Unethical	  
behavior	   is	   often	   observed	   only	   in	   hindsight	   and	   cases	   like	   Enron	   demonstrate	   that	  
external	  assessment	  of	  ethical	  conduct	  can	  be	  difficult.	  
Finally,	   as	   most	   empirical	   research	   on	   corporate	   boards	   and	   corporate	  
governance,	   our	   analysis	   is	   subject	   to	   endogeneity	   concerns.	   We	   are	   unfortunately	  
unable	  to	  use	  the	  standard	  econometric	  tools	  for	  alleviating	  endogeneity	  problems,	  and	  
consequently,	   any	  causal	   interpretations	  of	  our	   findings	  should	  be	  made	  with	  caution.	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Given	  these	  severe	  limitations,	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  presented	  in	  this	  essay	  should	  be	  
viewed	  as	  exploratory	  in	  nature.	  	  
5.	  Conclusions	  
In	  this	  essay,	  we	  examine	  the	  association	  between	  board	  characteristics	  and	  the	  
ethical	  reputation	  of	   financial	   institutions.	  The	  motivation	  for	  this	  analysis	  stems	  from	  
the	  public	  outcry	  and	  policy	  debate	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	   financial	   industry’s	  unethical	  
business	   practices	   and	   flawed	   governance	   mechanism	   for	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   global	  
financial	   crisis.	  Given	   the	  amplified	  expectations	   towards	  more	  ethical	  behavior	   in	   the	  
financial	  industry,	  it	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  empirically	  examine	  whether	  the	  ethical	  reputation	  
of	  financial	  institutions	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  board	  of	  directors.	  The	  board	  of	  directors	  is	  the	  
most	  important	  internal	  governance	  mechanism	  within	  a	  firm	  and	  is	  responsible,	  among	  
other	   things,	   for	   establishing	   and	  monitoring	   the	   ethical	   culture	   of	   the	   firm.	   If	   ethical	  
reputation	   is	   a	   value-­‐relevant	   intangible	   asset	   for	   financial	   institutions,	   we	   should	  
observe	   a	   positive	   relationship	   between	   ethical	   reputation	   and	   board	   attributes	   that	  
reflect	  more	  stringent	  board	  monitoring	  and	  oversight.	  
The	   empirical	   analysis	   presented	   in	   this	   essay	   is	   based	   on	   a	   sample	   of	   large	  
publicly	   traded	   financial	   institutions	   from	   13	   different	   countries.	   We	   measure	   the	  
ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions	  with	   the	   Covalence	   EthicalQuote	   index	   and	  
our	   sample	  period	   covers	   the	   years	   surrounding	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   Consistent	  
with	   our	   research	   hypothesis,	   the	   results	   demonstrate	   that	   financial	   institutions	  with	  
board	   characteristics	   that	   reflect	  more	   effective	  monitoring	   and	  oversight	  have	  better	  
ethical	   reputation.	   Specifically,	   we	   document	   that	   ethical	   reputation	   is	   positively	  
associated	  with	  board	  size,	   experience,	   gender	  diversity,	   and	  CEO	  duality,	  while	  being	  
negatively	  related	  to	  board	  busyness	  and	  a	  composite	  index	  reflecting	  poor	  monitoring	  
by	  the	  board	  of	  directors.	  Nevertheless,	   inconsistent	  with	  our	  hypothesis,	  we	  also	   find	  
that	  financial	  institutions	  with	  less	  frequent	  board	  meetings	  are	  associated	  with	  better	  
ethical	  reputation.	  We	  conduct	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  tests	  to	  ensure	  the	  robustness	  of	  
our	   findings.	  These	  tests	   indicate,	   for	   instance,	   that	  the	  adverse	   influence	  of	   the	  global	  
financial	   crisis	   on	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions	  was	   less	   pronounced	   for	  
institutions	  with	   larger	  boards,	   less	   frequent	  board	  meetings,	  CEO	  duality,	  and	  boards	  
that	  exert	  stronger	  monitoring.	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Overall,	   the	   empirical	   findings	   reported	   in	   this	   essay	   provide	   considerable	  
evidence	   that	  more	   stringent	  monitoring	  and	  oversight	  by	   the	  board	  of	  directors	  may	  
improve	   the	   ethical	   reputation	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   Assuming	   that	   the	   perceived	  
ethical	   reputation	   reflects	   actual	   ethical	   behavior,	   our	   results	   indicate	   that	   structural	  
factors	  such	  as	  board	  size	  and	  CEO	  duality	  as	  well	  as	  certain	  observable	  characteristics	  
of	   individual	   directors	   such	   as	   busyness,	   experience,	   and	   gender	   may	   be	   important	  
factors	   associated	   with	   firm-­‐level	   ethical	   conduct.	   While	   recent	   regulatory	   initiatives	  
and	  policy	  reforms	  have	  emphasized	  board	  independence	  and	  discouraged	  CEO	  duality	  
as	  means	  to	  improve	  the	  functioning	  of	  boards,	  our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  inside	  directors	  
may	  actually	  have	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  establishing	  and	  advocating	  an	  ethical	  corporate	  
culture.	   Given	   the	   alleged	   role	   of	   governance	   failures	   and	   negligent	   ethical	   culture	   of	  
financial	   institutions	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis,	  we	   believe	   that	  
our	   results	   may	   have	   important	   implications	   for	   bank	   supervisors,	   regulators,	  
depositors,	   and	   other	   stakeholders	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   Most	   importantly,	   our	  
results	  highlight	  the	  benefits	  of	  effective	  board	  monitoring	  and	  oversight	  in	  advocating	  
and	  sustaining	  ethical	  business	  practices	  in	  the	  financial	  industry.	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Appendix	  1.	  List	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  
1. Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  Banking	  Group	  
2. Banco	  Bilbao	  Vizcaya	  
Argentaria	  	  
3. Banco	  Santander	  	  
4. Bank	  of	  America	  
5. Bank	  of	  New	  York	  Mellon	  
6. Bank	  of	  Nova	  Scotia	  	  
7. Barclays	  Bank	  	  
8. BNP	  Paribas	  
9. Capital	  One	  Financial	  
Corporation	  
10. Charles	  Schwab	  	  
11. Citigroup	  	  
12. Commonwealth	  Bank	  of	  
Australia	  
13. Credit	  Agricole	  	  
14. Credit	  Suisse	  	  
15. Daiwa	  Securities	  Group	  
16. Deutsche	  Bank	  	  
17. Fannie	  Mae	  
18. Fifth	  Third	  Bancorp	  
19. Freddie	  Mac	  
20. Fubon	  Financial	  Holding	  	  
21. Goldman	  Sachs	  	  
22. HSBC	  	  
23. Intesa	  Sanpaolo	  
24. Invesco	  	  
25. Itausa-­‐	  Investimentos	  Itau	  	  
26. JPMorgan	  Chase	  	  
27. Lloyds	  Banking	  Group	  	  
28. Macquarie	  Group	  	  
29. Mitsubishi	  UFJ	  Financial	  
Group	  	  
30. Morgan	  Stanley	  
31. National	  Australia	  Bank	  
Limited	  
32. Orix	  Corporation	  
33. Royal	  Bank	  of	  Canada	  
34. Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  
35. Sallie	  Mae	  
36. Société	  Générale	  
37. State	  Street	  Corporation	  
38. Sumitomo	  Mitsui	  
Financial	  Group	  
39. T.	  Rowe	  Price	  	  
40. Toronto	  Dominion	  Bank	  
41. UBS	  
42. US	  Bancorp	  
43. Wells	  Fargo	  and	  Company	  
	   	  




The	  overall	  conclusion	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  that	  bank-­‐specific	  variables	  that	  are	  closely	  
related	   to	   skilled	   and	   qualified	  management	   significantly	   contribute	   to	   reductions	   in	  
bank	   risk-­‐taking.	   In	   addition,	   effective	   information	   systems	   such	   as	   well-­‐monitored	  
boards	   of	   directors,	   lead	   to	   better	   ethical	   reputations	   for	   financial	   institutions.	  
Moreover,	  these	  indicators	  exert	  a	  similar	  or	  greater	  effect	  under	  crisis	  macroeconomic	  
conditions.	  
Other,	  more	  specific	   findings	  of	   these	   three	  essays	  are	   the	   following:	   i)	  an	   increase	   in	  
bank-­‐specific	   factors,	   such	   as	   capitalization,	   profitability,	   efficiency	   and	   liquidity,	   can	  
significantly	  contribute	  to	  reductions	  in	  bank	  risk,	  whereas	  wholesale	  funding	  by	  banks	  
increases	   their	   risk;	   ii)	   different	   sources	   of	   revenue	   diversification	   significantly	  
contribute	  to	  reductions	  in	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  of	  commercial	  banks	  in	  the	  euro	  area;	  
iii)	  bank	  risk	  is	  significantly	  affected	  by	  external	  factors	  that	  do	  not	  directly	  depend	  on	  
bankers’	   managerial	   quality	   and	   skills,	   such	   as	   concentrated	   markets,	   lower	   interest	  
rates,	  higher	   inflation	  rates	  and	  economic	  crises	  (with	  e.g.,	   falling	  GDP),	  each	  of	  which	  
increases	  bank	  risk;	  and	  iv)	  financial	  institutions	  with	  board	  characteristics	  that	  reflect	  
more	  effective	  monitoring	  and	  oversight	  have	  better	  ethical	  reputations.	  	  
	  
